Cramer is a loose cannon, but here he's largely on the mark and says some stuff that's usually considered far too rude (because it's far too true) to discuss.
It's kind of interesting that Cramer has no compunction speaking about things he doesn't understand. The AAA rating on most SF bonds is not achieved via wrap but via credit enhancement.
I mean most of the wrapped stuff by monolines is not MTM and is all the way at the top of the capital structure. The idea that what was done at Enron was more honest than what the monolines is insulting and uninformed.
RowdyRoddyPiper, IMO comparing to Enron was inappropriate. But saying some of the monolines might go away - that their AAA rating is "fiction" is probably true.
"But saying some of the monolines might go away - that their AAA rating is "fiction" is probably true."
Agreed, but it's not particularly interesting or informative, I mean the agencies have been putting these guys on notice for ummm the past 2 months.
As someone who has actually negotiated a half dozen wraps as an issuer I can tell you that the monolines took an exceedingly aggressive stance in preserving their rights with respect to the issues they've wrapped. They also were actually quite good in picking their spots wrt the deals they'd cover.
In addition to the ability to accelerate and liquidate deals, they typically have the right to delay payment of principal on the wrapped piece until at least the stated and in many cases the final maturity of the deal which can be 10-30 years from now. Like all insurance companies they have ways of delaying or not paying claims at all.
I'm not going to be shocked if some ratings get cut, but I don't think that they were fraudulant to begin with. Reasonable people are of course free to disagree with this, but where was the level of outrage when the market was good?
crammer rant was planned and set-up, maybe to give the broadcast folks some cover for all the recent and past happy talk. Crammer can take a bow while the financial media in general looks worse and worse. Also a good tip off to what's coming regarding the AAA loss.
All bond issuers that paid MBI or ABK to borrow their AAA rating did not pay the same amount.
Some paid a premium of X.
Others paid 2X or 3X.
The difference is this. Those that paid X will get nicked when the AAA goes away.
Those that paid 2X will get nailed.
And those that paid 3X will get murdered, because their bonds are crap without insurance and refunding. At the same time that insurance goes away, the bond refunding market is drying up. There will be another round of writedowns in the billions on 3X bonds. Some muni bond dealers may have to write down big inventories.
I think it'll get really fun when the banks that Cramer touts as "honest number" banks (Goldman, JP Morgan, USB, Wells, etc.) turn out to have numbers almost as funny as the rest. And from state of Tier 3 assets at some of those places, I think that day is coming sooner rather than later...
OT but I think I will throw it out for discussion and see if I get any bites. Has anyone noticed the shape of the yield curve lately, it is a wierd U shape, it was inverted about a year ago, which is never a good sign, but then righted itself, but over the last month it has started to look goofy. I know how to interprut an inverted yield curve, it means that the economy is going to slow sharply about a year out, and a steep positive curve, better growth and more inflationary pressure, but what does a U say?
Though I wouldn't call it outrage, this site has been critical of some aspects of monolines for some time now - certainly at times when the market was said to be 'good'.
WaMu (NYSE: WM) today announced a fourth quarter 2007 net loss of $1.87 billion, or $2.19 per diluted share. The company attributed the loss to the $1.6 billion after-tax charge to writedown Home Loans goodwill and the higher level of provisioning stemming from the housing market weakness. Due to fourth quarter results, the company recorded a net loss of $67 million, or $0.12 per diluted share, for all of 2007.
The starter rates on these loans were often higher than the rates on subprime fixed rate loans.
WRONG. I think she meant prime fixed loans. The reason borrowers opted for 2/28's in the first place is because they wanted the 'cheapest' payment, despite it being only marginally lower than the fixed rate option, and despite its risk of reset hikes in the future.
its amazing how straight down the major indices have fallen since 12/27 dumbfounding the techicians who've been calling for the bounce that never comes. we are due.
I agree with ya idoc- bought 40 dawas for an average of 52 cents today- they should blow up to about 2.75 tomorrow just to begin to cover the incredible damage the option sellers have had on the put side. They gotta move up to at least 125/6 on the dow to get even.
A news driven bounce could even take it to 12800 on the dow tomorrow before settling in for total damage later in the month.
But first the folks who provide options liquidity have to get back to at least even.
Gonna be sick with the losses for quite a while will any big long hedgies.
buddy of mine used to work for fitch. tells me models are 15 years old, undocumented and largely misunderstood due to quant job turnstile. sure makes me feel good.
EEV has done well this week. I can already see a new mantra from Wall Street that "the U.S. market is crap but emerging markets are still okay and that's where investors should go." I can even see hedge funds buying this mantra.
The next month could we rough for EEV (double short emerging markets) due to all the rate cut, stimulus, BRIC crap. But if you have patience, you will make at least 50% in EEV over the next year from here.
Emerging markets earned by an ARR of 38% per year over the last five years through 12/31/07. A big part of that gain will be given back in 08.
We've had a lot of big 200-300 selloffs in recent months but the always reliable Leverage-O-Meter seems to be indicating something more serious is going on this time.
On those lower-rated bonds backed by Ambac and MBIA (the ones that paid the highest premiums), there is ZERO investor demand for some of those bonds. They might trade once per week, if that. So, the dealers and big investors who hold those bonds will be in the same boat as those who held CDOs. No bid, no way to value, no transparency into what they are worth. There is no thinner investment market than crap little munis.
The shape of the yield curve is important because it has an implicit forecast of future interest rates. If i have an obligation I have to meet in 2 years I have a choice, I can buy a 2 year note, or I could buy a 1 year note and then roll it over at the end of the year (insert as many itterations as you want for different maturities). Normally, since a 2 year note has a greater duration it is higher risk, and should carry a some what higher yield that the 1 + 1 option, but they should be close. If the 2 year is lower than the 1 year it implies that the market expects the rate on a one year note, one year from now to be lower than it is today. I just dont know how to make sense of the U shape. One hypothosis is that the market expects lower rates in teh near future, due to a soft economy, but for inflation to pick up later on. I'm just trying to think this through, my gut says there is some significance to this. MP could you get conjure to weigh in on this, seems like the sort of conundrum he gets to the heart of pretty quick.
"certainly at times when the market was said to be 'good'."
See but on this site I don't expect outrage anywhoo, I generally expect good analysis and a healthy bit of snark. Cramer, I expect outrage from, of course I expect it much to late for me to make money off of so that's why I don't watch him.
Ackman has been hammering the Monolines for years. He seriously would come in and do a little presentation about it for anyone that would listen. I know he is a true believer that they are crap, but like many true believers he operates on faith alone. I'm going to assume he made up all the theta he pissed down the drain shorting them for so long. You may want to check up on his misadventures with Gotham Partners before assuming he has an honest agenda however.
I'm not going to say things are hunky dory at MBIA or AMBAC but they certainly not as glum as recent stock price would indicate. In fact I probably shouldn't be using the two in the same sentence as they are in different positions with respect to their exposures (MBIA has about 2/3rds the structured finance CDO exposure of AMBAC). The only thing keeping me from going long at this point is an unwillingness to invest in a company that's business plan is predicated on thoughtful analysis from a rating agency.
What does the chart in Leverage-O-Meter portend? Are we heading for a crash?
Oh, I just made that up.
Since it's an index of stocks of materials comapnies, I figured it was a good combined measure of equities and commodities.
I figure if just one asset class is going down, it could be a movement out of, say, stocks into commodities. But if everything is falling in price, to me that suggests a broad-based unwinding of leverage.
That has the potential to turn into a self-reinforcing rout of margin calls and more selling.
But I think the Fed might step in to keep it from getting out of control like they did in August.
Basically the Leverage-O-Meter predicts that the sun will rise tomorrow.
i'm not so sure i agree with u on that. my sense, from my chair here on the W.Coast, is that it seems to be generally accepted that there will be no decoupling. yesterdays and todays resilience in EEV reflects that. ur right in the sense that there's going to be a crapload of stimulus coming. i'm actually waiting for SRS to lift off again as there is an increasing realization about problems with CMBS, as seen at Markit, and in the MSM.
I'll take a shot. The U-shaped curve implies to me that the market is predicting that the next 3 years are going to be extremely interesting (read: rough). Credit will be tight in the near term before the before the buy short/lend long bank credit game works again. In my opinion therefore, the market is pricing in a 3-year slowdown...
Sounds like the deflation/inflation thesis - short term cash is king due to big leverage unwind, then we get lots of inflation due to policy response - just my guess...
I was short MBI and ABK on and off and Ackman may have some holes in his thesis, but I believe the basic idea that regulators and capital providers will sacrifice the holding company in favor of the insurance sub. Also, I don't think CDOs are the only problem. I genuinely believe in municipal debt problems, even though they may be minimal. Whatever the issue, a stock that goes down 20-30-40-50% two days in a row is probably doing so for good reason.
I agree with energyecon. This shape is consistent with Ka-Poom Theory.
Except... The "U" shape should be more pronounced, especially at the longer durations. If the Fed really is planning to dump gasoline on this fire, why are long-term yields and the TIPS spread so low? (Or in Fedspeak, why do inflation expectations remain well-anchored?)
Ackman did not so anything too crazy at Gotham. He lost a lot of his partners' money and he spiraled into an desperate unfortunate way of dealing with the situation. He could have done it differently, more gracefully. But overall this was very far from being one of those "fraud hedge fund cases" and certainly the SEC found nothing wrong. Furthermore, Ackman has already been proven right with respect to many of his MBIA predictions, and also I would point out that when somebody's short a stock for 6 years, he only questions himself more and more. So he should be more confident, not less, and the proof is he keeps pouring money into it.
Oh and one last thing, the proeeds of his MBIA short are for charity.
Stocks do funny things all the time. Again I think a lot of the drop has to do with the spectre of a ratings cut, which effectively shutters their business or forces them to retool dramatically.
I have a hard time believe that a short term efficient market exists for a company with a decent portion of revenues tied to insuring bonds that no one claims they can understand or properly value. May just be me though.
Took the biggest loss of my life... I have no problem admitting defeat. Congrats to the shorts. I don't think the game is over but you guys likely will cruise to a win... I still think the bond insurance industry is viable but none of that matters for the time being...
Not that I spit in the face of anyone donating their own scratch, but this news came out after MBIA had traded off. Additionally it's his personal share, not his funds share. Admirable all the same but it's not as though he hasn't had an agenda for nearly 6 years.
If you think he didn't do shady shit at Gotham, that's your business. Shareholders in FUREE and Hallwood would beg to differ.
I have a hard time believe that a short term efficient market exists for a company with...
I know, I agree on a general level... but we're talking about huge declines here. I mean with respect to RDN, MTG, you might be right, but the actual 2 stocks that are directly affected? hmm... there has to be some efficiency in there.
But as you say, this is also an earnings power issue, not just a book value thing. Anyway, if Buffett does his thing right, there should be enough winds to knock out the two. As you said, if your business model is to insure something based on the opinion of a quasi-actuary who works at Moody's, AND the future behavior of this actuary...well...good luck
Ok i just did a search for Hallwood and Gotham. I concede - you are right that this he is fishy. Up until today I was only aware of the demise of the hedge fund, which if I recall correctly involved an illiquid golf course investment and a parking lot operation...anyway...
I just wish O-Joe had a blog, with his recommendations.
Thanks, SV for sharing yours with us. Not everyone has the cojones to do that, especially after biting the dirt.
my condolences to you as well. my earlier remarks were not meant as any disrespect for u. its sometimes tough to tell who's sincere here on the blog vs. a hedge fund person talking his book.
Amazing. Jim channels that mix of Dos Passos and Big Bill Haywood while taking calls from an apparent Marxist on the floor of the CME. Meanwhile everyone else at the table looks at each other like its business as usual, and asks the same inane questions.
I think Cramer has to be taken at his word on this one, if only because he's been driven 'round the bend by the limp dishrags he has to sit with.
The U means the market expects interest rates to drop for the next 2-3 years, and then rise but remain low. The low long yields show no significant inflation is expected. This is basically a prediction of Japan in the 90's.
REBear - It means: "oh shit!" This stuff is priced through the roof. It means they GOT TO get the deal done right away.
Was this really part of the original package - or was it / is it a desperate move to shore up the books. Worse, it means they are shy of cash (now).
The premium is out of this world.
NEW YORK, Jan 17 (Reuters) - Citigroup (C.N: Quote, Profile, Research) is expected to sell $2 billion of convertible preferred stock Thursday evening, with a dividend between 6.5 percent and 6.75 percent, according to two sources that had seen the deal.
The securities are expected to be convertible into Citigroup shares at a 24 percent premium, the sources said, speaking on the condition of anonymity.
A Citi spokesperson was not immediately available for comment.
Citi announced plans to sell the convertible stock on Tuesday, as part of an effort to raise at least $14.5 billion of capital. (Reporting by Dan Wilchins; Editing by Brian Moss
Maybe this has already been posted; if not here it is. Better Ambac throw in the towel than try to save itself. Know when to commit suicide, as it were.
Well, there's monoline, and then there's monoline.
A story's just come across Dow Jones on the failure of one of MBIA's reinsurers, ChannelRe.
The failure shouldn't come as a surprise, since according to the report the reinsurer "was set up in 2004 to exclusively reinsure some of MBIA's risks. At the end of September, it reinsured $8.4 billion of exposures for the bond insurer."
"MBIA owns 17.4% of the Bermuda firm, while RenaissanceRe owns 32.7%. PartnerRe and Koch Financial are the other investors."
So they set up a "reinsurer" whose sole purpose was to reinsure their risk (thus reducing capital requirements), then took a substantial equity interest in the reinsurer.
Guess that's what's meant by "spreading of risk."
Nothing new under the sun, I suppose, but it's still nauseating.
RowdyRoddyPiper
My evaluation of MBI (I've never owned or shorted it) and probably many other investors was hugely impacted by the Channel re-insurance news. This deal guarantees I would never buy the stock without new management.
My numbers indicated they are not AAA but would probably survive.(Before losses on any "funny" accounting? hidden liabilities? or reinsurance related liabilities)
"And those that paid 3X will get murdered, because their bonds are crap without insurance and refunding. At the same time that insurance goes away, the bond refunding market is drying up. There will be another round of writedowns in the billions on 3X bonds. Some muni bond dealers may have to write down big inventories."
I'm curious who you think is going to get hurt by this. I don't think the bond dealers will be surprised. 60% of munis are held by individuals and the rest by insurance companies and banks. They don't need to be marked to market if they are intended to be held to maturity, as far as I can see.
The default rate on them has been low and mbi has/had reasonably strict underwriting policy regarding munis.
When mbi's monoline subs lose their AAA as long as they remain investment grade, so will the bonds.
One of Ackman's arguments is that you don't "need" insurance if you have a diversified portfolio. The economic justification for bond insurance is that it is cheaper then the frictional costs of active management of a portfolio.
As far as new bonds are concerned, if it is needed, Buffett will insure it for an appropriate price (from his perspective).
I am just wondering if I am missing something, since to me, the issues are in structured finance and I don't see it having a big impact on munis.
In addition, to the extent that interest rates fall, and people anticipate higher tax rates post election, the value of munis, excluding credit risk will increase.
I agree that you can lose money without fraud and malice. I have worded for companies that have lost billions. It is just part of capitalism.
Also, Ackman's comments about running out of cash at the sub level strikes me as implausable. Cash flows in insurance are the opposite of most businesses and they collect cash first and pay it out over time. An insurer can be insolvent for years without running out of cash.
ZIGGURAT: "The default rate on them has been low and mbi has/had reasonably strict underwriting policy regarding munis...When mbi's monoline subs lose their AAA as long as they remain investment grade, so will the bonds. "
Yes, you are right. The way I see it, the only ones impacted by the municipal bond downgrades would be banks that have to mark-to-market, and mutual/hedge funds whose rules call for them to only hold AAA-rated bonds. Since almost any insured bond likely had a sub-AAA rating originally (otherwise what's the point of insurance or credit enhancement), many bonds will likely fall back to their underlying rating (likely AA or A).
So most of this only impacts people who can't hold AA and hence will be forced to sell the AAA-insured bond which drops to AA. This will still cause a mass sell-off in the bonds that were downgraded to their underlying rating.
As for Ackman... well... I think he will be proven wrong in the long run. I have no credibility given my bad decision but I still believe that the bond insurance business is viable. I really don't think you are going to end up with a Berkshire monopoly.
Even the structured side, which is where the problems are, will likely exist in the future. Death of CDOs have been greatly exaggerated IMO.
It's just that the insurers didn't price things properly. What happened with the monolines is no different than how many of the smaller reinsurers went bankrupt after Katrina. This didn't mean that mega-catastrophic insurance isn't a viable business; all it meant was that the pricing by some of these companies was incorrect.
SV, "all it meant was that the pricing by some of these companies was incorrect"
That may be true. But that's what made the model work, the pricing. If the insurance pricing reflects actual risk then any company with assets will get priced out by those without assets since they can sell the AAA rating cheap, like ACA, with little consequences, thus forcing every other insurer in a race to the bottom.
I think structured credit is dead for the foreseeable future.
It's just that the insurers didn't price things properly.
Maybe the model is worable (which is why Buffett got in) and maybe something significant is even workable at a AA rating, but I don't see how you equate that with a belief that the holding company's common stock won't go to zero.
Someone needs to say something about this! http://www.fakepaycheckstubs.com IS THIS LEGAL? No wonder why we have the subprime mess we have when lenders USE FAKE DOCUMENTATION to help PUSH the loan through Quickly SO THAT EVERYONE DOWN THE FOOD CHAIN (from loan processor to the loan officer to the actual lender) can make the commissions they "WERE" making during the booming 90's!!! Now we are BAILING OUT THESE CROOKS....SOUNDS LIKE the good ol' 1980's Savings and Loan BAILOUT DAYS to me! http://www.fakepaycheckstubs.com see it with YOUR OWN EYES!
PROBERT: "...but I don't see how you equate that with a belief that the holding company's common stock won't go to zero."
The holding companies CAN go to zero. However it is uncertain at this point. I might be biased since I'm a shareholder but it comes down to a couple of points that Martin Whitman made in his commentary:
(i) actual losses
(ii) recoveries
Even with the huge mark-to-market loss that Ambac took, the book value is around $20 and the adjusted book value is around $50 (or somewhere around that).
Ambac can stop writing business today and just wait to see if the mark-to-market losses become real. The shorts, such as yourself, obviously believe that the mark-to-market will be the real losses. But I am hopeful that is not the case. I would imagine that the insurers have some expertise in picking some good deals over the bad ones. Furthermore, when an investment bank or a hedge fund writes off a loss on a tranche in a CDO, they are nowhere near the super-senior tranche that monolines generally insure. The markit ABX index, as well as losses incurred by investment banks, do not have the protections that monolines generally have (eg. super-senior tranche with acceleration rights).
The fact that monolines don't have to pay losses right away also means that they can buy time by waiting if they can generate revenue from new business (say from their muni bond business). Of course, if they lose their AAA rating, then the muni bond market is almost completely gone (although there will still be some A and BBB muni bonds that mononlines can enhance).
The only thing that can real blow up for monolines is CDO-squared (since the underlying collateral is generally mezzanine CDO, and I have no hope for anything mezzanine). Monolines also don't seem to have much control over the CDO-squareds.
So, yeah, the monolines can go bankrupt but it's not clear...
BARLEY: "If the insurance pricing reflects actual risk then any company with assets will get priced out by those without assets since they can sell the AAA rating cheap, like ACA, with little consequences, thus forcing every other insurer in a race to the bottom. "
I have a somewhat radical view that is different from all of you...
In theory, I would imagine that investors will not invest in a company that takes imprudent risks. In your scenario, who will finance ACA? Such companies will not survive. The reason cmopanies like ACA (or even Ambac and MBIA) exist right now is because no one thought they were taking imprudent risks (we were wrong obviously in hindsight).
Furthermore, if things are really out of whack, then the monolines won't write new business or look elsewhere. Consider catastrophe insurance. There are many cases where insurers simply won't write insurance. In some areas they will never write flood insurance for your home. In other areas, they won't write anything if hte price is too low. I'll admit that this takes discipline and is hard to do but that's why Berkshire Hathaway is the best.
"I think structured credit is dead for the foreseeable future."
It's going to decline but I'm not sure if it will die off. There are other non-mortgage related areas (eg. credit card debt, auto loans, commerical loans, student loans, etc) so it will depend on how those areas shake out.
Although this isn't a fashionable view riht now, but I think it makes sense to package risk and offload onto investors. This is just my guess but watch the US economy not do as poorly because the risk is spread out. If all the risk was held by Americans and American corporations, I think the current housing meltdown will definitely result in a depression. However, that's not the case. Banks in Germany are absorbing some losses; Chinese funds are taking some losses; investors in the Middle East are taking losses (haven't heard of any yet but I'm sure they have som exposure); investors in Canada are taking some losses (me ).
Spreading risk seems to be a good thing and, as a free market guy, I think it is a natural advancement of capital markets. Where I think they went wrong is when it was taken to the nth degree. Things like CDO-squareds are crazy (small movement in price wipes out the whole thing).
I also think that what made the whole thing a disaster is not the structured product itself but the DECLINE IN THE COST OF CAPITAL! Basically there was too much money sloshing around, depressing returns everywhere. Needless to say, investors invested in assets with low yields and high risks. If they had been investing in high yields and high risk, it wouldn't be so bad. The risk premium on all these risky assets was too low. Sadly for me, the monolines wrote insurance without charging enough (as Buffett remarked). This likely happened because the market itself was accepting these assets with a lower yield.
The revised assumptions announced by the RMBS surveillance group reflect the growing economic consensus that U.S. home price declines will be larger than previously forecasted and that the U.S. housing market slump may last far longer than previously expected.
Previously forecasted by whom? Previously expected by whom?
By those who had a vested interested in keeping the party going, that's who.
Man did Cramer finally find jesus? I have had zero respect for that guy....but that was classic. It makes you wonder what he has really been thinking all along. I remember a few months ago him calling for the Fed to cut faster because all his poor cronies on Wall Street were going to lose their cushy jobs. But this is something entirely different. It's amost if he said F*** it...I am telling it like it is. It's almost like he is daring them to fire him. Remember...GE pays his salary....
"So most of this only impacts people who can't hold AA and hence will be forced to sell the AAA-insured bond which drops to AA. This will still cause a mass sell-off in the bonds that were downgraded to their underlying rating."
Who are these people? There may be some, but how many? Furthermore, since everyone has had time to anticipate this, the people that absolutely have to have AAA credits have had time to actively manage their portfolio.
A few weeks back, when Buffet made his announcement that he was getting into the credit insurance business, I posted on PBear that he he just signed the death sentence for the impaired monolines.
Better yet, he could have set in motion cascading failures (countery party risk) in the credit markets that prove his own views about derivative balances being powder kegs waiting to explode. Instruments of mass financial desctruction I think he has called them. We guess what...he himself lit one of the matches.
Things get really interesting when the monolines lose their AAAs. There are only a few choices that I see:
Systemic chaos as chartered entities (like pension funds) are forced to sell asset that lose their AAA ratings as a result of a monoline downgrade. There are not enough buyers for those assets, resulting in huge paper losses, etc etc. In other words, Muni bonds start behaving like subprime CDOs simly due to liquidy reasons....not that they are in fact junk.
Scramble to change thousands of charters to let pension funds, etc hold lower grade assets. This will have to be done on a case by case basis.
Don't downgrade any monolines. See no evil, hear no evil. They will stay AAA in name until they go belly up and shut their doors. When the first one goes down, then their will be complete panic.
They are pension funds, and other similar entities....like say CALPERS...and they are the BIGGEST players in the debt markets! They are THE BOND GODs.
BrantW | 01.18.08 - 12:51 am | #
Calpers can buy common stocks and, in fact, just decided to include a larger dose of hedge funds in its investment portfolio. It is also a government entity, making it unlikely to buy tax free bonds, e.g. munis. Obviously common stocks are riskier then any investment grade bond.
In memory of Billy "first" Blanks
As expected.
Our leaders are idiots.
my poor savings account ain't doing too bad so far for '08 comparatively
.
Cramer is a loose cannon, but here he's largely on the mark and says some stuff that's usually considered far too rude (because it's far too true) to discuss.
AAA still. Surely. Because, any other possible rating is still unthinkable.
Does anyone else think we're going to get a "well anchored" distrust of wall street.
Putting aside the early adopters on this and other blogs, I sense mainstreet is getting fed (pun intended) up of being fleeced.
I cannot wait until that downgrade of MBIA/Ambac next week.
It's kind of interesting that Cramer has no compunction speaking about things he doesn't understand. The AAA rating on most SF bonds is not achieved via wrap but via credit enhancement.
I mean most of the wrapped stuff by monolines is not MTM and is all the way at the top of the capital structure. The idea that what was done at Enron was more honest than what the monolines is insulting and uninformed.
Yeesh.
Cramer is screwing the small investor again.
cramer talks of $32 charge vor ambac, but what about that huge charge over at GM?
RowdyRoddyPiper, IMO comparing to Enron was inappropriate. But saying some of the monolines might go away - that their AAA rating is "fiction" is probably true.
Best to all.
Nice. Cramer wants to keep the career going, so he's switching from stock pumping permabull to the Lou Dobbs of Wall Street injustice.
Maybe he'll talk about how the global rise of short sellers is going to destroy the US economy.
agree ac - he seems to be searching for his next crowd of sheeple!
MER got spanked today...dwn >10%
WM is on deck - lets see if they keep this thing going...
"But saying some of the monolines might go away - that their AAA rating is "fiction" is probably true."
Agreed, but it's not particularly interesting or informative, I mean the agencies have been putting these guys on notice for ummm the past 2 months.
As someone who has actually negotiated a half dozen wraps as an issuer I can tell you that the monolines took an exceedingly aggressive stance in preserving their rights with respect to the issues they've wrapped. They also were actually quite good in picking their spots wrt the deals they'd cover.
In addition to the ability to accelerate and liquidate deals, they typically have the right to delay payment of principal on the wrapped piece until at least the stated and in many cases the final maturity of the deal which can be 10-30 years from now. Like all insurance companies they have ways of delaying or not paying claims at all.
I'm not going to be shocked if some ratings get cut, but I don't think that they were fraudulant to begin with. Reasonable people are of course free to disagree with this, but where was the level of outrage when the market was good?
pretty amazing day for us short sellers.
WM plunging AH
maybe not
idoc,
lol now don't talk your book - too much!
crammer rant was planned and set-up, maybe to give the broadcast folks some cover for all the recent and past happy talk. Crammer can take a bow while the financial media in general looks worse and worse. Also a good tip off to what's coming regarding the AAA loss.
Remarks by FDIC Chair Bair at the Bear Stearns Mortgage and Structured Product Conference; NY, NY 1.17.2008
FDIC: Error 404 - Page Not Found
energy
well at least i've been consistent for this past year!!!
Here's an important thing to realize.
All bond issuers that paid MBI or ABK to borrow their AAA rating did not pay the same amount.
Some paid a premium of X.
Others paid 2X or 3X.
The difference is this. Those that paid X will get nicked when the AAA goes away.
Those that paid 2X will get nailed.
And those that paid 3X will get murdered, because their bonds are crap without insurance and refunding. At the same time that insurance goes away, the bond refunding market is drying up. There will be another round of writedowns in the billions on 3X bonds. Some muni bond dealers may have to write down big inventories.
I tried to listen to the Cramer clip but his grunts and squeals reminded me of when I used to have to castrate young pigs. Not a pleasant memory.
rich
i took your advice and picked up some EEV. great call so far.
Bill Ackman of Pershing Square Capital had this
to say about the monoline insurers on Jan 10th.
Also, you can count on the monolines' hedges (via reinsurers) being really crappy.
I think it'll get really fun when the banks that Cramer touts as "honest number" banks (Goldman, JP Morgan, USB, Wells, etc.) turn out to have numbers almost as funny as the rest. And from state of Tier 3 assets at some of those places, I think that day is coming sooner rather than later...
OT but I think I will throw it out for discussion and see if I get any bites. Has anyone noticed the shape of the yield curve lately, it is a wierd U shape, it was inverted about a year ago, which is never a good sign, but then righted itself, but over the last month it has started to look goofy. I know how to interprut an inverted yield curve, it means that the economy is going to slow sharply about a year out, and a steep positive curve, better growth and more inflationary pressure, but what does a U say?
Now month ago
3m 2.93 2.93
6m 2.87 3.23
3yr 2.31 3.13
5yr 2.86 3.51
10yr 3.61 4.12
30yr 4.24 4.53
Cramer says "I never felt there was a level of fiction to the financials honest ... honestly"
more cock and bull stories for suckers who watch his show
Yes, Salomon . . . what happens when the counterparties to the "winning bets" can't pay?
RowdyRoddyPiper,
Appreciate your information.
Though I wouldn't call it outrage, this site has been critical of some aspects of monolines for some time now - certainly at times when the market was said to be 'good'.
idoc,
yes but when you name your boat then you just made the market go up
It says that people are buying into the middle of yield curve!
WaMu (NYSE: WM) today announced a fourth quarter 2007 net loss of $1.87 billion, or $2.19 per diluted share. The company attributed the loss to the $1.6 billion after-tax charge to writedown Home Loans goodwill and the higher level of provisioning stemming from the housing market weakness. Due to fourth quarter results, the company recorded a net loss of $67 million, or $0.12 per diluted share, for all of 2007.
Thanks, FFDIC. From your bosslady's statement:
The starter rates on these loans were often higher than the rates on subprime fixed rate loans.
WRONG. I think she meant prime fixed loans. The reason borrowers opted for 2/28's in the first place is because they wanted the 'cheapest' payment, despite it being only marginally lower than the fixed rate option, and despite its risk of reset hikes in the future.
ABX looks like 9 new lows, CMBX looks like 13 new highs, LCDX widens though looks to be shy the late November spread...
WaMu's RATIOs!! EGads
Wamu should have listened to those stodgy old bankers!
its amazing how straight down the major indices have fallen since 12/27 dumbfounding the techicians who've been calling for the bounce that never comes. we are due.
I agree with ya idoc- bought 40 dawas for an average of 52 cents today- they should blow up to about 2.75 tomorrow just to begin to cover the incredible damage the option sellers have had on the put side. They gotta move up to at least 125/6 on the dow to get even.
A news driven bounce could even take it to 12800 on the dow tomorrow before settling in for total damage later in the month.
But first the folks who provide options liquidity have to get back to at least even.
Gonna be sick with the losses for quite a while will any big long hedgies.
1000 points in three weeks of trading.
Gulp.
Someday this war's gonna end...
Ambac investor tells insurer to halt capital raising plan
Ambac investor tells insurer to halt capital raising plan - MarketWatch
What does monoline mean?
And why are people buying into the middle of the yield curve when they could get higher interest at 30yr?
If lending your money out for ten years at 3.64% turns out to be a good investment, we are all in more trouble than I thought.
MBIA's surplus notes plunge to 80 cents on dollar
| Reuters
How low will it go...
MBIA's surplus notes plunge to 80 cents on dollar
What does monoline mean?
A insurer whose business is limited to just one specific type of insurance.
buddy of mine used to work for fitch. tells me models are 15 years old, undocumented and largely misunderstood due to quant job turnstile. sure makes me feel good.
tedzbear,
Monoline insurance - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
If I owned that much Ambac stock, I sure as hell wouldn't put out a press release. I'd try to hide.
remember that guy SV who this past weekend told us he put his life savings into ABK? geez, i hope he's ok :0
i went to SV's website just to look at what crazy things he had to say. every recommendation was something i was on the other side of.
idoc,
EEV has done well this week. I can already see a new mantra from Wall Street that "the U.S. market is crap but emerging markets are still okay and that's where investors should go." I can even see hedge funds buying this mantra.
The next month could we rough for EEV (double short emerging markets) due to all the rate cut, stimulus, BRIC crap. But if you have patience, you will make at least 50% in EEV over the next year from here.
Emerging markets earned by an ARR of 38% per year over the last five years through 12/31/07. A big part of that gain will be given back in 08.
We've had a lot of big 200-300 selloffs in recent months but the always reliable Leverage-O-Meter seems to be indicating something more serious is going on this time.
On those lower-rated bonds backed by Ambac and MBIA (the ones that paid the highest premiums), there is ZERO investor demand for some of those bonds. They might trade once per week, if that. So, the dealers and big investors who hold those bonds will be in the same boat as those who held CDOs. No bid, no way to value, no transparency into what they are worth. There is no thinner investment market than crap little munis.
ac,
What does the chart in Leverage-O-Meter portend? Are we heading for a crash?
The shape of the yield curve is important because it has an implicit forecast of future interest rates. If i have an obligation I have to meet in 2 years I have a choice, I can buy a 2 year note, or I could buy a 1 year note and then roll it over at the end of the year (insert as many itterations as you want for different maturities). Normally, since a 2 year note has a greater duration it is higher risk, and should carry a some what higher yield that the 1 + 1 option, but they should be close. If the 2 year is lower than the 1 year it implies that the market expects the rate on a one year note, one year from now to be lower than it is today. I just dont know how to make sense of the U shape. One hypothosis is that the market expects lower rates in teh near future, due to a soft economy, but for inflation to pick up later on. I'm just trying to think this through, my gut says there is some significance to this. MP could you get conjure to weigh in on this, seems like the sort of conundrum he gets to the heart of pretty quick.
maybe evercore has a point... but it shows you how far down we've gone
"certainly at times when the market was said to be 'good'."
See but on this site I don't expect outrage anywhoo, I generally expect good analysis and a healthy bit of snark. Cramer, I expect outrage from, of course I expect it much to late for me to make money off of so that's why I don't watch him.
Ackman has been hammering the Monolines for years. He seriously would come in and do a little presentation about it for anyone that would listen. I know he is a true believer that they are crap, but like many true believers he operates on faith alone. I'm going to assume he made up all the theta he pissed down the drain shorting them for so long. You may want to check up on his misadventures with Gotham Partners before assuming he has an honest agenda however.
I'm not going to say things are hunky dory at MBIA or AMBAC but they certainly not as glum as recent stock price would indicate. In fact I probably shouldn't be using the two in the same sentence as they are in different positions with respect to their exposures (MBIA has about 2/3rds the structured finance CDO exposure of AMBAC). The only thing keeping me from going long at this point is an unwillingness to invest in a company that's business plan is predicated on thoughtful analysis from a rating agency.
ac,
What does the chart in Leverage-O-Meter portend? Are we heading for a crash?
Oh, I just made that up.
Since it's an index of stocks of materials comapnies, I figured it was a good combined measure of equities and commodities.
I figure if just one asset class is going down, it could be a movement out of, say, stocks into commodities. But if everything is falling in price, to me that suggests a broad-based unwinding of leverage.
That has the potential to turn into a self-reinforcing rout of margin calls and more selling.
But I think the Fed might step in to keep it from getting out of control like they did in August.
Basically the Leverage-O-Meter predicts that the sun will rise tomorrow.
rich
i'm not so sure i agree with u on that. my sense, from my chair here on the W.Coast, is that it seems to be generally accepted that there will be no decoupling. yesterdays and todays resilience in EEV reflects that. ur right in the sense that there's going to be a crapload of stimulus coming. i'm actually waiting for SRS to lift off again as there is an increasing realization about problems with CMBS, as seen at Markit, and in the MSM.
Dirk van Dijk,
I'll take a shot. The U-shaped curve implies to me that the market is predicting that the next 3 years are going to be extremely interesting (read: rough). Credit will be tight in the near term before the before the buy short/lend long bank credit game works again. In my opinion therefore, the market is pricing in a 3-year slowdown...
Just an informed guess
Moody's says considering downgrade of MBIA ratings
Moody's says considering downgrade of MBIA ratings - MarketWatch
Dirk,
Sounds like the deflation/inflation thesis - short term cash is king due to big leverage unwind, then we get lots of inflation due to policy response - just my guess...
I think the boomer herd is getting nervous. Their home wealth and equities are evaporating. I am just waiting for the herd to break and run.
"Do we want the communists or the terrorists to own the banks?"
Highlarious!!!
RowdyRoddyPiper,
I was short MBI and ABK on and off and Ackman may have some holes in his thesis, but I believe the basic idea that regulators and capital providers will sacrifice the holding company in favor of the insurance sub. Also, I don't think CDOs are the only problem. I genuinely believe in municipal debt problems, even though they may be minimal. Whatever the issue, a stock that goes down 20-30-40-50% two days in a row is probably doing so for good reason.
Dirk van Dijk --
I agree with energyecon. This shape is consistent with Ka-Poom Theory.
Except... The "U" shape should be more pronounced, especially at the longer durations. If the Fed really is planning to dump gasoline on this fire, why are long-term yields and the TIPS spread so low? (Or in Fedspeak, why do inflation expectations remain well-anchored?)
Definitely worth watching how that curve evolves.
RowdyRoddyPiper,
Ackman did not so anything too crazy at Gotham. He lost a lot of his partners' money and he spiraled into an desperate unfortunate way of dealing with the situation. He could have done it differently, more gracefully. But overall this was very far from being one of those "fraud hedge fund cases" and certainly the SEC found nothing wrong. Furthermore, Ackman has already been proven right with respect to many of his MBIA predictions, and also I would point out that when somebody's short a stock for 6 years, he only questions himself more and more. So he should be more confident, not less, and the proof is he keeps pouring money into it.
Oh and one last thing, the proeeds of his MBIA short are for charity.
Stocks do funny things all the time. Again I think a lot of the drop has to do with the spectre of a ratings cut, which effectively shutters their business or forces them to retool dramatically.
I have a hard time believe that a short term efficient market exists for a company with a decent portion of revenues tied to insuring bonds that no one claims they can understand or properly value. May just be me though.
Took the biggest loss of my life... I have no problem admitting defeat. Congrats to the shorts. I don't think the game is over but you guys likely will cruise to a win... I still think the bond insurance industry is viable but none of that matters for the time being...
SivaramVelauthapillai,
My condolence for your loss. Glad that you're moving on. That's the spirit!
Hysterical. Now I know we're in a recession.
When I graduated, i passed up jobs at solomon (debt capital markets) and ambac (structured credit) to start a career in real estate.
damned if i did, damned if i didnt, damned all the way around
(but PS, no seriously, things aren't THAT bad here for me, just you know, recessionary)
What does this mean?
"Citigroup announces $31.62/share preferred stock conversion"
Not that I spit in the face of anyone donating their own scratch, but this news came out after MBIA had traded off. Additionally it's his personal share, not his funds share. Admirable all the same but it's not as though he hasn't had an agenda for nearly 6 years.
If you think he didn't do shady shit at Gotham, that's your business. Shareholders in FUREE and Hallwood would beg to differ.
I have a hard time believe that a short term efficient market exists for a company with...
I know, I agree on a general level... but we're talking about huge declines here. I mean with respect to RDN, MTG, you might be right, but the actual 2 stocks that are directly affected? hmm... there has to be some efficiency in there.
But as you say, this is also an earnings power issue, not just a book value thing. Anyway, if Buffett does his thing right, there should be enough winds to knock out the two. As you said, if your business model is to insure something based on the opinion of a quasi-actuary who works at Moody's, AND the future behavior of this actuary...well...good luck
Ok i just did a search for Hallwood and Gotham. I concede - you are right that this he is fishy. Up until today I was only aware of the demise of the hedge fund, which if I recall correctly involved an illiquid golf course investment and a parking lot operation...anyway...
I just wish O-Joe had a blog, with his recommendations.
Thanks, SV for sharing yours with us. Not everyone has the cojones to do that, especially after biting the dirt.
SV
my condolences to you as well. my earlier remarks were not meant as any disrespect for u. its sometimes tough to tell who's sincere here on the blog vs. a hedge fund person talking his book.
Amazing. Jim channels that mix of Dos Passos and Big Bill Haywood while taking calls from an apparent Marxist on the floor of the CME. Meanwhile everyone else at the table looks at each other like its business as usual, and asks the same inane questions.
I think Cramer has to be taken at his word on this one, if only because he's been driven 'round the bend by the limp dishrags he has to sit with.
The U means the market expects interest rates to drop for the next 2-3 years, and then rise but remain low. The low long yields show no significant inflation is expected. This is basically a prediction of Japan in the 90's.
REBear - It means: "oh shit!" This stuff is priced through the roof. It means they GOT TO get the deal done right away.
Was this really part of the original package - or was it / is it a desperate move to shore up the books. Worse, it means they are shy of cash (now).
The premium is out of this world.
NEW YORK, Jan 17 (Reuters) - Citigroup (C.N: Quote, Profile, Research) is expected to sell $2 billion of convertible preferred stock Thursday evening, with a dividend between 6.5 percent and 6.75 percent, according to two sources that had seen the deal.
The securities are expected to be convertible into Citigroup shares at a 24 percent premium, the sources said, speaking on the condition of anonymity.
A Citi spokesperson was not immediately available for comment.
Citi announced plans to sell the convertible stock on Tuesday, as part of an effort to raise at least $14.5 billion of capital. (Reporting by Dan Wilchins; Editing by Brian Moss
complained about their plans to raise costly equity capital
Maybe this has already been posted; if not here it is. Better Ambac throw in the towel than try to save itself. Know when to commit suicide, as it were.
Here's a funny story. It is always good fun to see a stock guru gored by events:
Buy Some Insurance - Forbes.com
Sure buy Ambac and Mbia since it's all just "exaggeration."
Well, there's monoline, and then there's monoline.
A story's just come across Dow Jones on the failure of one of MBIA's reinsurers, ChannelRe.
The failure shouldn't come as a surprise, since according to the report the reinsurer "was set up in 2004 to exclusively reinsure some of MBIA's risks. At the end of September, it reinsured $8.4 billion of exposures for the bond insurer."
"MBIA owns 17.4% of the Bermuda firm, while RenaissanceRe owns 32.7%. PartnerRe and Koch Financial are the other investors."
So they set up a "reinsurer" whose sole purpose was to reinsure their risk (thus reducing capital requirements), then took a substantial equity interest in the reinsurer.
Guess that's what's meant by "spreading of risk."
Nothing new under the sun, I suppose, but it's still nauseating.
RowdyRoddyPiper
My evaluation of MBI (I've never owned or shorted it) and probably many other investors was hugely impacted by the Channel re-insurance news. This deal guarantees I would never buy the stock without new management.
My numbers indicated they are not AAA but would probably survive.(Before losses on any "funny" accounting? hidden liabilities? or reinsurance related liabilities)
"And those that paid 3X will get murdered, because their bonds are crap without insurance and refunding. At the same time that insurance goes away, the bond refunding market is drying up. There will be another round of writedowns in the billions on 3X bonds. Some muni bond dealers may have to write down big inventories."
I'm curious who you think is going to get hurt by this. I don't think the bond dealers will be surprised. 60% of munis are held by individuals and the rest by insurance companies and banks. They don't need to be marked to market if they are intended to be held to maturity, as far as I can see.
The default rate on them has been low and mbi has/had reasonably strict underwriting policy regarding munis.
When mbi's monoline subs lose their AAA as long as they remain investment grade, so will the bonds.
One of Ackman's arguments is that you don't "need" insurance if you have a diversified portfolio. The economic justification for bond insurance is that it is cheaper then the frictional costs of active management of a portfolio.
As far as new bonds are concerned, if it is needed, Buffett will insure it for an appropriate price (from his perspective).
I am just wondering if I am missing something, since to me, the issues are in structured finance and I don't see it having a big impact on munis.
In addition, to the extent that interest rates fall, and people anticipate higher tax rates post election, the value of munis, excluding credit risk will increase.
RowdyRoddyPiper:
I agree that you can lose money without fraud and malice. I have worded for companies that have lost billions. It is just part of capitalism.
Also, Ackman's comments about running out of cash at the sub level strikes me as implausable. Cash flows in insurance are the opposite of most businesses and they collect cash first and pay it out over time. An insurer can be insolvent for years without running out of cash.
Suggested thread song:
"Knock-Knock-Knockin'...."
GUNS N ROSES - KNOCKING ON HEAVEN'S DOOR Lyrics
.
YouTube - Knockin' On Heaven's Door
ZIGGURAT: "The default rate on them has been low and mbi has/had reasonably strict underwriting policy regarding munis...When mbi's monoline subs lose their AAA as long as they remain investment grade, so will the bonds. "
Yes, you are right. The way I see it, the only ones impacted by the municipal bond downgrades would be banks that have to mark-to-market, and mutual/hedge funds whose rules call for them to only hold AAA-rated bonds. Since almost any insured bond likely had a sub-AAA rating originally (otherwise what's the point of insurance or credit enhancement), many bonds will likely fall back to their underlying rating (likely AA or A).
So most of this only impacts people who can't hold AA and hence will be forced to sell the AAA-insured bond which drops to AA. This will still cause a mass sell-off in the bonds that were downgraded to their underlying rating.
As for Ackman... well... I think he will be proven wrong in the long run. I have no credibility given my bad decision but I still believe that the bond insurance business is viable. I really don't think you are going to end up with a Berkshire monopoly.
Even the structured side, which is where the problems are, will likely exist in the future. Death of CDOs have been greatly exaggerated IMO.
It's just that the insurers didn't price things properly. What happened with the monolines is no different than how many of the smaller reinsurers went bankrupt after Katrina. This didn't mean that mega-catastrophic insurance isn't a viable business; all it meant was that the pricing by some of these companies was incorrect.
SV, "all it meant was that the pricing by some of these companies was incorrect"
That may be true. But that's what made the model work, the pricing. If the insurance pricing reflects actual risk then any company with assets will get priced out by those without assets since they can sell the AAA rating cheap, like ACA, with little consequences, thus forcing every other insurer in a race to the bottom.
I think structured credit is dead for the foreseeable future.
It's just that the insurers didn't price things properly.
Maybe the model is worable (which is why Buffett got in) and maybe something significant is even workable at a AA rating, but I don't see how you equate that with a belief that the holding company's common stock won't go to zero.
Someone needs to say something about this! http://www.fakepaycheckstubs.com IS THIS LEGAL? No wonder why we have the subprime mess we have when lenders USE FAKE DOCUMENTATION to help PUSH the loan through Quickly SO THAT EVERYONE DOWN THE FOOD CHAIN (from loan processor to the loan officer to the actual lender) can make the commissions they "WERE" making during the booming 90's!!! Now we are BAILING OUT THESE CROOKS....SOUNDS LIKE the good ol' 1980's Savings and Loan BAILOUT DAYS to me! http://www.fakepaycheckstubs.com see it with YOUR OWN EYES!
PROBERT: "...but I don't see how you equate that with a belief that the holding company's common stock won't go to zero."
The holding companies CAN go to zero. However it is uncertain at this point. I might be biased since I'm a shareholder but it comes down to a couple of points that Martin Whitman made in his commentary:
(i) actual losses
(ii) recoveries
Even with the huge mark-to-market loss that Ambac took, the book value is around $20 and the adjusted book value is around $50 (or somewhere around that).
Ambac can stop writing business today and just wait to see if the mark-to-market losses become real. The shorts, such as yourself, obviously believe that the mark-to-market will be the real losses. But I am hopeful that is not the case. I would imagine that the insurers have some expertise in picking some good deals over the bad ones. Furthermore, when an investment bank or a hedge fund writes off a loss on a tranche in a CDO, they are nowhere near the super-senior tranche that monolines generally insure. The markit ABX index, as well as losses incurred by investment banks, do not have the protections that monolines generally have (eg. super-senior tranche with acceleration rights).
The fact that monolines don't have to pay losses right away also means that they can buy time by waiting if they can generate revenue from new business (say from their muni bond business). Of course, if they lose their AAA rating, then the muni bond market is almost completely gone (although there will still be some A and BBB muni bonds that mononlines can enhance).
The only thing that can real blow up for monolines is CDO-squared (since the underlying collateral is generally mezzanine CDO, and I have no hope for anything mezzanine). Monolines also don't seem to have much control over the CDO-squareds.
So, yeah, the monolines can go bankrupt but it's not clear...
BARLEY: "If the insurance pricing reflects actual risk then any company with assets will get priced out by those without assets since they can sell the AAA rating cheap, like ACA, with little consequences, thus forcing every other insurer in a race to the bottom. "
I have a somewhat radical view that is different from all of you...
In theory, I would imagine that investors will not invest in a company that takes imprudent risks. In your scenario, who will finance ACA? Such companies will not survive. The reason cmopanies like ACA (or even Ambac and MBIA) exist right now is because no one thought they were taking imprudent risks (we were wrong obviously in hindsight).
Furthermore, if things are really out of whack, then the monolines won't write new business or look elsewhere. Consider catastrophe insurance. There are many cases where insurers simply won't write insurance. In some areas they will never write flood insurance for your home. In other areas, they won't write anything if hte price is too low. I'll admit that this takes discipline and is hard to do but that's why Berkshire Hathaway is the best.
"I think structured credit is dead for the foreseeable future."
It's going to decline but I'm not sure if it will die off. There are other non-mortgage related areas (eg. credit card debt, auto loans, commerical loans, student loans, etc) so it will depend on how those areas shake out.
Although this isn't a fashionable view riht now, but I think it makes sense to package risk and offload onto investors. This is just my guess but watch the US economy not do as poorly because the risk is spread out. If all the risk was held by Americans and American corporations, I think the current housing meltdown will definitely result in a depression. However, that's not the case. Banks in Germany are absorbing some losses; Chinese funds are taking some losses; investors in the Middle East are taking losses (haven't heard of any yet but I'm sure they have som exposure); investors in Canada are taking some losses (me
).
Spreading risk seems to be a good thing and, as a free market guy, I think it is a natural advancement of capital markets. Where I think they went wrong is when it was taken to the nth degree. Things like CDO-squareds are crazy (small movement in price wipes out the whole thing).
I also think that what made the whole thing a disaster is not the structured product itself but the DECLINE IN THE COST OF CAPITAL! Basically there was too much money sloshing around, depressing returns everywhere. Needless to say, investors invested in assets with low yields and high risks. If they had been investing in high yields and high risk, it wouldn't be so bad. The risk premium on all these risky assets was too low. Sadly for me, the monolines wrote insurance without charging enough (as Buffett remarked). This likely happened because the market itself was accepting these assets with a lower yield.
The revised assumptions announced by the RMBS surveillance group reflect the growing economic consensus that U.S. home price declines will be larger than previously forecasted and that the U.S. housing market slump may last far longer than previously expected.
Previously forecasted by whom? Previously expected by whom?
By those who had a vested interested in keeping the party going, that's who.
Man did Cramer finally find jesus? I have had zero respect for that guy....but that was classic. It makes you wonder what he has really been thinking all along. I remember a few months ago him calling for the Fed to cut faster because all his poor cronies on Wall Street were going to lose their cushy jobs. But this is something entirely different. It's amost if he said F*** it...I am telling it like it is. It's almost like he is daring them to fire him. Remember...GE pays his salary....
"So most of this only impacts people who can't hold AA and hence will be forced to sell the AAA-insured bond which drops to AA. This will still cause a mass sell-off in the bonds that were downgraded to their underlying rating."
Who are these people? There may be some, but how many? Furthermore, since everyone has had time to anticipate this, the people that absolutely have to have AAA credits have had time to actively manage their portfolio.
A few weeks back, when Buffet made his announcement that he was getting into the credit insurance business, I posted on PBear that he he just signed the death sentence for the impaired monolines.
Better yet, he could have set in motion cascading failures (countery party risk) in the credit markets that prove his own views about derivative balances being powder kegs waiting to explode. Instruments of mass financial desctruction I think he has called them. We guess what...he himself lit one of the matches.
Things get really interesting when the monolines lose their AAAs. There are only a few choices that I see:
"Who are these people?" - Zig
They are pension funds, and other similar entities....like say CALPERS...and they are the BIGGEST players in the debt markets! They are THE BOND GODs.
"Who are these people?" - Zig
They are pension funds, and other similar entities....like say CALPERS...and they are the BIGGEST players in the debt markets! They are THE BOND GODs.
BrantW | 01.18.08 - 12:51 am | #
Calpers can buy common stocks and, in fact, just decided to include a larger dose of hedge funds in its investment portfolio. It is also a government entity, making it unlikely to buy tax free bonds, e.g. munis. Obviously common stocks are riskier then any investment grade bond.
So is this your opinion or is it a fact?