whoa...good work, lama! high five!

Thank you. I will need to reread it now.

Very interesting analysis. thanks for your work (both of you).

Just to clarify the question I asked yesterday regarding the pool of 100 mortgages worth $ 500,000 each (for simplicity's sake). Let's say this quarter 5 stopped paying. Does the bank write-down $ 2.5 mil? If so, what about the fact that eventually they will foreclose on the houses and sell them for some amount less than what is owed, but greater than zero?

Also, do they then have to say, well if 5 stopped paying, maybe 5 more will stop paying soon? If so, what happens if in fact none, or only 2 stop paying? Also, how, without knowing the borrowers does one distinguish between those who are irreparable vs those who might be able to resume paying if some accomodations were made?

I appreciate your insights and hope you can answer my questions as simply as possible.

Thank you. I will need to reread it now.
Nova | 01.19.08 - 10:26 am | #

You think? LOL
Need MUCH more coffee.

We are not worthy, all hail lama

Reading about accrual accounting while hung over is a BIG mistake.

And low five to bacon dreamz, who managed what no other Calculated Risk commenter or host has yet managed to do, which is draw a pig's tail with Excel. We who are about to fall off our chairs salute you!

One of the things this lets me bring up is the whole regulatory dancing around the issue of the OA as a residential 1-4 family mortgage product. Remember the old Nontraditional Mortgage Guidance? While that document did make some real changes in the way this loan type is underwritten--and some fairly vague recommendations for how to treat ALLL classifications--it did not in any way, shape, or form declare the product itself as not acceptable in a 1-4 portfolio.

That is critical. Some of our commenters have been, in essence, taking the position that the very fact that a loan is negatively amortizing should be sufficient reason to declare it uncollectable (or at least, to declare any capitalized interest uncollectable). What you are really saying there is that neg am should not be allowed. You might, possibly, be right about that. But you really cannot expect the regulators to say on the one hand that the product is allowable, and on the other that any time it does what it is intended to do (negatively amortize) it must be immediately impaired by the amount of the negative amortization. To do that would "outlaw" the product itself: you can't have a mortgage product that is structured to produce write-offs each quarter.

So the regulators basically told banks to 1) underwrite those loans more cautiously and 2) use the fact of negative amortization to classify loans for reserve-setting purposes. That is as close as they have come, so far, to saying that negative amortization reduces collectability.

I don't happen to think that these things have any business in the 1-4 residential portfolio (as I do not believe that investment property loans belong there). That isn't the same thing as saying they should be outlawed. In the case of investor loans, those should go in the commercial loan portfolio (where, among other things, they will be treated for reserve purposes the way other business loans are, not as if they were these "homogenous" resi loans). If you want to do OA, it seems to me, you have to put it somewhere else than in the resi portfolio, because it just isn't homogenous enough and "historical" performance estimates mean nothing. It should probably go in its own portfolio, which would be managed as a kind of hybrid of resi and commercial (more loan-level analysis than resi and not quite as much as commercial).

But that's just my opinion; I suspect pigs will fly before it happens.

lama thanks, good information.

for those who want to get caught up-

"MBIA's surplus notes plunged as low as 70 cents on the dollar yesterday, indicating a yield of about 25 percent, traders said. MBIA fell 67 cents, or 7.3 percent, to $8.55 on the New York Stock Exchange, taking its decline to 48 percent this week. "

Ambac's Insurance Unit Cut to AA From AAA by Fitch Ratings - Bloomberg.com

"The Securities and Exchange Commission is sending out examination letters requesting information from mutual-fund companies about how they value and assess their money-market fund holdings."

SEC Requests Money-Market Data - WSJ.com

"NEW YORK (Standard & Poor's) Jan. 18, 2008--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services
said today that it suspended its 'AAAf' fund credit quality rating on King
County Investment Pool. "

http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/2,1,6,5,1148450802447.html

Bailout?-

""I think the role of the regulator has to be a facilitator. To speed in or somehow facilitate those possible bailouts or transactions, that is our number one goal as a regulator right now," he said."

New York watching bond insurers, may intervene
| Reuters

ok, low five to Tanta.

the mighty

Just to clarify the question I asked yesterday regarding the pool of 100 mortgages worth $ 500,000 each (for simplicity's sake). Let's say this quarter 5 stopped paying. Does the bank write-down $ 2.5 mil?

No. You write the value down to the net present value of what you think you will collect. Unless you think the collateral is really worth $0, you don't write the loan down by its principal amount. You would estimate recoveries in foreclosure, and write down to that.

Also, do they then have to say, well if 5 stopped paying, maybe 5 more will stop paying soon? If so, what happens if in fact none, or only 2 stop paying?

First, you divide your loans into NPA (non-performing assets, or the ones that have actually stopped paying) and current assets. The NPA loans are impaired by definition; you therefore reserve for those based on your estimated recoveries (which may change from quarter to quarter; if you don't FC in 90 days, you may have to write the loan down again at the next reporting period if recovery estimates drop).

On the current loans, you make some estimate of how many you think might go delinquent in the next 12 months, and then you reserve for your estimate of near-term losses on them. As Lama notes, you can use "historical experience" to build your projections of estimated loss on a resi 1-4 family portfolio. (And, as we have noticed recently, you can get burned on that if the loans in question are so far off of what you historically originated that history is a bad guide.)

Yes, if you over-reserved (estimated more losses than actually occurred) then you would "write up" the loans in the future. That's why you do this every quarter, and you consider losses for reserve purposes as only near-term (next 12 months) at each quarter. It isn't a once-and-for-all thing, and you are not expected to be able to reserve at origination for any losses in the life of the loan.

Also, how, without knowing the borrowers does one distinguish between those who are irreparable vs those who might be able to resume paying if some accomodations were made?

This is where the whole concept of a residential 1-4 portfolio enters in.

You are supposed to have underwritten those loans in such a consistent manner, and to have secured them with highly marketable collateral (liquid 1-4 family residences) such that you do not have to review the portfolio each quarter all the way down to each individual loan (as you would with a portfolio of big commercial loans).

The accounting rules for calculating reserves and impairing loans are already assuming standardized and "typical" loan originations. I can't stress that enough. The problems we are having today is "nontraditional mortgages" meeting up with "traditional accounting."

Tanta-Many thanks for your very detailed answer, I think I get what you are saying. One further Q. it seems like some of these banks, especially C and MER were caught with an inordinate amount of these loans relative to their peers. Was this intentional or were they intending to sell them and got caught with a bunch of unsalable inventory?

by the way, Tanta, if you click The Compleat UberNerd link up top, it looks like it hasn't been updated for a while.

"MBIA's surplus notes plunged as low as 70 cents on the dollar yesterday, indicating a yield of about 25 percent, traders said.

Maybe we've all been a little naive about these surplus notes. Maybe it was just a backdoor bail-out attempt by a group of Wall Street firms. Were any of these notes actually sold to investors, as opposed to underwriters? Maybe not.

In other words, the underwriters were expecting to lose money on the notes but figured to make it up on the back-end when MBIA pays out on the collapsing CDOs and CDO-squareds.

Curve- the big brokerages weren't caught with many of these loans at all. They instead held securities backed by residential mortgages. The accounting for securities is entirely different from that for loans. In essence, if the whole world knows that these loans will default in 2 years, you will take the loss know if you hold the securities, but will have to take the loss incrementally if you hold the loans.

Also - for mortgage loans you almost never see provisions for interest income until the borrower has already stopped paying the interest owed. Different places reserve at different times though, so comparing NPLs at institution A vs. institution B should be done with care.

Was this intentional or were they intending to sell them and got caught with a bunch of unsalable inventory?

I think MER's problem is inventory. They were buying up a bunch of MBS tranches to turn into a CDO, and then the market for CDOs went away and they got stuck with this shelf full of loans they were treating as held for sale. Those are the ones getting the big MTM adjustment.

C has a big portfolio of loans held to maturity. There, they're taking impairments because NPAs are up and collectability (recovery estimates) are way down.

The investment banks don't have large HTM portfolios (at least, they weren't planning on it). Banks will have a combination of problems here (an HFS pipeline of loans they originated to sell but now can't find a buyer for and a portfolio of HTM that is deteriorating every quarter).

The HFS problem eventually goes away as you do something with the assets in question (sell them and book the loss or take them to portfolio and book the loss). The HTM problem goes on until . . . maturity. Or foreclosure. Whichever comes first.

Piggy, piggy, piggy!

I love that freakin' pig!!!

OT

To all the bearish investors here, I'd like to say "be careful" in the weeks ahead. So far, this decline is tracking dead-on the one in 2001-02 but moving faster.

There were three significant and sharp mini-rallies in 01-02, all retracing more than half the previous declines. In a real bear, the market grinds relentlessly lower, interrupted by bursts of hope. Charts say we're due a mini-rally in the next few weeks.

But long-term, the way 2008 has begun and unfolding events say this bear market, in total, could be as severe as 01-02 and affect broader market sectors and countries.

A year from now, the economy will still be in trouble and we'll be talking about how to shore up small/regional banks and bail-out FDIC. Keep enough dry powder for the whole bear.

Woops, I didn't know I was "on" today. Ahem,...
Ahead, If those notes are intended to be held (i.e.: in the portfolio), then you would again look to the present value of expected cash flows. You'd have to update your assumptions about what your expectations are; will you have to foreclose on one or more, will you have to write down some others, costs associated with dealing with the borrower in the future would also come off the balance right away.

rich-

now he wants government intervention and a bailout-

and an immediate 100 bps cut-

Mad Money: Game Plan: Feds Need to Buy Mortgage Insurers - CNBC

bacon, thanks, but this all pails by comparison to the mortgage pig.

Woops, I didn't know I was "on" today. Ahem,...

You mean you didn't read the email that I apparently saved as a draft instead of sending this morning? How come?

Sorry. I will just sit back and be the Village Idiot today.

now he wants government intervention and a bailout-

Both Cramer and Kudlow gave big air time last night to lobbying for a federal bailout of broke bond insurers. But it's a lost cause.

They both tried to make parallels with RTC. But there was a significant public interest behind RTC, bailing out federal deposit insurance. There's no perceived public interest here. And the crisis is moving much faster than Washington can move, anyway.

Congress and the President will now focus on stimulus package, not bailout, and that's all they can do at one time.

There is a public interest in this crisis, which is to make sure small municipalities have access to capital, especially for refunding older debt. But that's a longer-term issue.

The fact Cramer/Kudlow would both put so much effort into these pleas shows real desperation.

I can see the mortarboard for the graduation from the Tanta Program at CRU. A dangling pig's tail, in the color of your choice.

do GuestNerds get discounts on their newsletter subscriptions?

The First National Bank of Tanta has been approved for a federal bank charter from the FDIC and is now open for deposits. Additional information about the board makeup will be announced soon. Thank you.

I do have one issue with accrual accounting for OA loans in large portfolios. It used to be that the regulators would beat up a bank if the bank started writing a bunch of single pay loans for long terms (more than one year), and the reason was that since you are getting the interest so much later, in effect you are getting less interest. It's not necessarily an issue of collectibility. It's an difference in the present value of your accruals.

There's a heck of a real world difference between accruing interest that will be paid on a monthly or quarterly difference vs interest that you may not receive for years. Accounting should represent this difference, and accrual accounting doesn't accurately represent it.

A bank can get itself into cash flow problems, not just future collection/collateralization problems.

The answer of this is obviously that the valuation of such portfolios should be adjusted for the present value difference. There is a difference in market value between a loan paying you 5% on principal every month vs one that is paying you 2.5% every month, but at some future date will pay out another 2.5%.

However, it is extremely difficult to do this when you do not know when you'll get the interest. Sure, you can adjust for the recast, but in reality the banks who racked up lots of these were using the 2 or 3 year period as a practical payout, because that was when the individual would refinance or sell the home. These loans, in recent years, were overwhelmingly used by realtors and "investors" with cash flow issues.

When bank portfolios had a small percentage of these loans, it was less of a regulatory issue. Now it is a major issue. I haven't tried to work through the balance sheets of some of the big OA boys, but my guess is that their portfolio valuations on these loans are suspect.

--
Thank you, Tanta, to focus on my favorite subject, or pat peeve – Accounting. America’s looming downfall, from which it will NEVER recover, has a lot to do with accountants turning into whores, or turned into whores via political pressures and lure of all might dollars. One of the great bulwarks of Anglo-American dominance was high degree of integrity in accounting and fairly high standards of conducts among banking officials.

My son was the most decorated accounting graduate in SoCal in 1998 (I thought that it was earlier but I just checked with my son) and as a result I got to seat the table with seven most influential finance men in SoCal (finance chiefs at Sony, etc.). They are agreed, off the records, that there was lot of room for accounting ‘discretion’ to manipulate the results for few years, say up to seven years. The most obvious, they pointed out, was the treatment of inventory. What else is new!

Later the same year I invited my son and three other young accountants for lunch. They all complemented me by saying in unison, “You were right about what you said about accounting practices.”

Father of an accountant, son of an accountant & all-purpose businessman, and grandson of an accountant and self-taught lawyer,

Jas

PS: In may family, integrity & morality of conduct mattered over money without any doubts or questions. To dopes it is the legality, bereft of any morality, that matters. Genes & upbringing matters! Dopes breed dopes and the process terminates badly.

Lama & Tanta - Very nice. One small request if possible...

Can you embed a spread sheet showing a simple example of the transactions... debit here, credit there... end result is [...] How the reserves migrate from journal entry to ledger to final statement. I know it is a lot of extra work but would be wonderful.

I understand things a lot better when I see simple examples. Text descriptions are fine - but 'pictures' are even better.

TIA.

Whoops, I see that Lama woke up and explained that already. Sorry. Great job, Lama!

This is a great post. Congratulations to you all.

tanta/lama,
thanks for that excellent rundown. Now can I ask for more info? what happens when the loan defaults and the bank takes control of the collateral? how is that accounted for and how is the collateral valued? also, are there rules for how long a bank can hold onto the underlying asset (the house) before it has to sell? if it sells at a loss how is that treated in results and on the balance sheet.

Finally, how do the basel rules work If a bank has lent all of its resources and there are enough defaults/repossessions to tie up all of its liquid resources. how does it account for the restoring the balance sheet?

lama, bacon dreamz, Tanta, thanks.. I'll need to read that several times to get it. In the meantime, some clarifications please about the following issues for this algorithms-conditioned mind:

Accrual accounting means you recognize revenue when earned, expenses when incurred. A gas station would not incur an expense when they purchase gas for resale. That station would incur the expense at the time the gas was sold. That’s because the gas’ cost was a cost to produce the sale. In the time between the purchase and subsequent sale, the company holds the gas as inventory as an asset on its balance sheet.

So, am I right in thinking that the other case mentioned, the revenue was earned at the same time, that is, also when the gas was sold ? {Sorry to sound dumb, but the dangling second case stands out to me, like dangling participles to English majors I suppose ).

And since you bring up inventory, what happens to the accounting for that ? I mean it didn't mysteriously appear in the underground tank, you paid for it right ? at delivery or perhaps pro-rata as each gallon is sold ? But we just called it the cost as well - I sense double counting here - I'm now thoroughly confused.. Help! Smile


every asset on a balance sheet has a base and a reserve. The base asset value is the easy part. If someone borrows $100,000, you have a schedule with the $100,000 on it.

What is a schedule ? Is that the same as a balance sheet or a single row on it or ??

Thanks much.

-K

Tanta If you want to do OA, it seems to me, you have to put it somewhere else than in the resi portfolio, because it just isn't homogenous enough and "historical" performance estimates mean nothing. It should probably go in its own portfolio, which would be managed as a kind of hybrid of resi and commercial (more loan-level analysis than resi and not quite as much as commercial.

Amen to that. At the very least, these loans have to be managed differently, reserved differently, and valued differently. Regulators demand that banks that write HOEPA loans have special controls and procedures to handle the risks. These loans should be treated similarly.


They both tried to make parallels with RTC. But there was a significant public interest behind RTC, bailing out federal deposit insurance. There's no perceived public interest here.

Oh yes there is - the muni and and biz capital markets. They absolutely rely on insurance to sell bonds. You'll see a very significant tightening of money available to them if the insurers fail.

It wouldn't be a 'bail out' so much as a 'mop up' afterward... at least until somebody financially healthy like Buffet can step back in to provide a market solution. There isn't likely to be one for awhile if all the insures puke on CDO insurance.

And the crisis is moving much faster than Washington can move, anyway.

Very true. If there is to be an RTC like solution it has to come AFTER the insurers fail (like in the S&L crisis)... The RTC-like institution would come in AFTER the insurers default and pick up the insurance liability on only those accounts where there is a clear public good to see insurance continue - primarily in the muni world & small business.

Hell it would take gov't a year just to figure out what to do next if they started thinking about it this afternoon. But a fresh new market alternative to fill the void will eve take longer. A temporary RTC like op could be beneficial if done right & executed well.

and at that point you record the loan at the lower of cost or market

dumb question...

should the market value of the loan (HTM) drop below cost, you would value it at market (as above), over time, if that market value (finally) reverses and begins to rise, does the cost then become a 'ceiling' beyond which loan cannot be valued higher than ?

Thank you,

That post was like sitting through Managerial Accounting 310 again...only in one sitting. I'm to far away from that class to discuss particulars, so...

How would you like us to discuss the current market with an eye to the current post? Given the fact that some of us have hangovers that could choke a chicken?

A bit of guidance please. (My brain hurts.)

Cheers,

I understood everything up to: To the bank, the loan is an asset and the deposit account is a liability.

Luckily for me, Lama cleared it up later: Assets are Debit accounts, so increases in Assets are Debits, decreases are Credits. Revenue is a Credit account, so increases in Revenue are Credits, decreases are Debits.

After that, it got sort of murky... gotta check my notes... (shuffle shuffle)... I'll get back to you...

My brain hurts too...It's Saturday morning and my IQ is greatly diminished from last night.

Thanks Lama, always appreciate your comments.

sk, the schedule is in some beancounter's hard drive. That's all. I guess after day one of the loan, the original loan balance is just a memo, an FYI.

dryfly

"Oh yes there is - the muni and and biz capital markets. They absolutely rely on insurance to sell bonds."

You mean they rely on it to sell at par. If insurance costs rise above what they'd be rated without insurance, they'd sell without insurance. So by rely...you mean depend on for par sales?

Cheers,

Was this intentional or were they intending to sell them and got caught with a bunch of unsalable inventory?
Aheadofthecurve | 01.19.08 - 10:57 am | #

I think MER's problem is inventory. They were buying up a bunch of MBS tranches to turn into a CDO, and then the market for CDOs went away and they got stuck with this shelf full of loans they were treating as held for sale.
Tanta | Homepage | 01.19.08 - 11:04 am | #

As I recall, the story is even more tortured. MER at first didn't want to hold anything, just make fees off of securitization. That worked great; especially, demand for the lower tranches (with the highest interest rates) was very strong. An unsold backlog of the "best" AAA tranches built up, and in order to keep the machine humming and keep providing these high-rate securities, MER made the fateful choice to keep the "safe" AAA tranches on its books. The rest is history.

sk...as a non accountant, I feel perfectly qualified to take a shot at your questions.

"So, am I right in thinking that the other case mentioned, the revenue was earned at the same time, that is, also when the gas was sold ? {Sorry to sound dumb, but the dangling second case stands out to me, like dangling participles to English majors I suppose )."

Yes... the idea of accrual accounting is to match revenue and expenses.

As far as inventory, when you buy the gas, your assets stay the same, cash goes down and inventory goes up. At that instant there is no revenue, expenses, profits or losses. $'s just move from cash to inventory.

"What is a schedule ? Is that the same as a balance sheet or a single row on it or ??"

I think that if you had an old fashioned loan, you got a payment book or an amortization schedule. Each payment had principal and interest.

Obviously when you get away from fixed rate mortgages, things get more complicated.

Dry, That would be alot of detail. Does this help?

Ignoring the equity section of the balance sheet (ownership, stock), you can look at it this way:

Debits on the Balance Sheet = Good
Credits on the Balance Sheet = Bad

conversely

Credits on the Income Statement = Good
Debits on the Income Statement = Bad

Jas, was your son a Sells award winner? Or, was this an accounting honor society thing?

Congrats on the fine work with your boy.

I'm back. I agree with Zirurrat's responses.

Tanta, enough with accrual accounting.

Please tell us how the Ambac downgrade rolls through the banks and bond market.

Thanks!

Question regarding market value....

You are a bank and you do a mortgage (is do the right word?). It's solid and simple, $100k, 30 year, 6% interest.

Lets say mortgage rates jump up 1% the afternoon after the loan closes. The market value of that loan is now less then $100k.

Do you recognize this?

Tanta, your clarification is useful. I think the answer is just that: Neg Am should never have been allowed. Yes, they followed the accounting rules, but good sense says the product itself is an abomination that never should have been OK'd by regulatory agencies.

When I learned a couple of years ago that they were doing Neg-Am home loans, I knew for sure this would end very, very badly.

Well, it's not a real number, now, and it is very early in the earnings season, but...

...earnings are down 73% year over year!

The Wall Street Journal Online - WSJ.com Log In

Burn, baby, burn!

What is a schedule ? Is that the same as a balance sheet or a single row on it or ??

It's the detail of that which the balance sheet shows the aggregation. Kinda like the schedules that go with your 1040s.

It is one big mother of a spreadsheet with every loan you got listed on it with all the loan-level detail. Nobody but the institution, its auditors, and its examiners will ever see the schedules. The publically-available financial statements include the aggregated numbers so that they don't have to be thousands of pages long.

Come on lama, what's a Saturday morning without several pages of T-accounts? Smile

Ray, There is no ceiling to a loan balance, assuming it's collectible. There are ceilings for many assets. Inventory's max value is:
Cost +
Shipping and movement (including inside your company) +
Cost to purchase (purchasing payroll, etc.)

Oh, and I posted a question last night on when was the last time the markets had a week as bad as this. The answer: July 2002.

U.S. Stocks Post Steepest Drop Since July 2002; Citigroup Falls - Bloomberg.com

Ziggurat,
1. If you are planning to hold it, you'd leave the balance alone unless there were extreme interest rate variations.
2. If you plan to sell, the loan would be reduced (through the contra-asset) either by the marketplace comparisons or the arithmetic of present value.

I've got Tanta politely fixing my half-baked responses, and you want T accounts??
I need another coffee.

I agree Neg Ams shouldn't have been allowed. They are functionally equivalent to a conventional mortgage with a HELOC layered on top, and the additional restriction that the HELOC has a maximum draw per month. A company doing it that way would charge a higher interest rate for the HELOC. Should a monthly limit on HELOC use allow a prime mortgage rate? I don't think so, and I think if it had been done that way regulators and auditors would have thrown down a penalty flag.

Ok I have to vent:
John Mauldin of buy-side consulting fame says today that Senator Dodd is playing politics by holding up Fed board nominations.

I sent him a nastygram saying that the Fed has politicized itself by choosing not to regulate non-depository lenders as it was charged to do by Congress. What does the CR community say, did I go overboard? Read below and give me your thoughts.
Thoughts from the Frontline

You are a bank and you do a mortgage (is do the right word?). It's solid and simple, $100k, 30 year, 6% interest.

Lets say mortgage rates jump up 1% the afternoon after the loan closes. The market value of that loan is now less then $100k.

Do you recognize this?

Old farts like me "write" mortgages. The young ones "do" them or "make" them.

What you do depends on whether you wrote/did/made the loan HFS or HTM (you must decide this before the loan is closed--that is, when it is committed or the rate is locked. You don't get to close first and then decide which it is). If you were intending to sell it into the secondary market, you would (presumably) have a hedge on it: a forward commitment to sell it at the price you originally locked the rate at, or something like that. Therefore you hold it in inventory until sale at market value net of effective hedges (basically meaning you still hold it at the committed price as long as your commitment is valid). The day you sell it, you book the transaction at the settlement price. (Now, the guy on the other side of that trade may have a little problem here, depending on his hedge against the forward trade he made with you a few months ago and just had to honor.)

If you are making the loan for your own portfolio, you will put it on the books at cost (you don't have to worry about intraday volatility). However, let's say you had it HFS, but your hedge blew up and you can't sell the loan at your originally committed price. If you take that loan to portfolio (switch it over to HTM), you will have to reflect the fact that it is now underwater by valuing it at market (rather than cost).

Does that make sense?

A temporary RTC like op could be beneficial if done right & executed well.

There will be no RTC-like op, which means a govt. takeover of assets/liabilities and gradualy workout using govt. guarantee/taxpayer dollars as guarantor backstop.

The problem is that there's two separate sides to this crisis.

Over the short-term, it involves massive hits to asset-backed securities and investor losses when insurer assets run out. Also, it involves ratings downgrades and irrevocable destruction of the bond insurance biz model. All that will be over before Congress can blink.

Then, you get part 2, which is "how can crummy towns and agencies get funding to refi" when there is no bond insurance to prop them up? Since defaults will happen if they can't refi, Congress will step in to create some hardship funding deal. But that's not until late 2008 or 2009.

Thank you Lama! You're beautiful Tanta, why can't I find this top quality writing in the MSM?

the lender is earning income based on what he is owed, not based on how much cash he receives,

Hurray! All those CDO holders are rich, oops! well I guess we can use those balance sheets somehwere, it's not as soft as Charmin but it will do.

re: Zigurrat

Thanks ! That explanation of inventory and its connection to cash produced an "AHA" moment. Cool.

This matching revenue and expenses biz - I assumed that they don't have to synchronous in time - in the example of gas sold, they are of course, as discussed earlier, but it doesn't HAVE to be so, is that right ? 'cos if it HAS to be then my mental picture has to change quite a bit.

Tanta - thanks for the Schedule explanation. Sadly, I do understand Schedules on my 1040.. sad ? I mean infuriated. As an aside perhaps the schedules aren't available to me since there might be trade secrets( which customer bought a lot etc ) discernible in there - or even, as my jaundiced mind would note, some shenanigans to be discerned by looking for the devil in the details ? I shall look at SEC reporting regulations a little harder and understand their requirements a little deeper in due course.

Anyway, I was stuck at that point in the post - I can now move forward.

-K

You guys are fantastic. This blog rocks, but I still can't get over the fact that I'm reading about accounting on a Saturday Morning.

I'll take that second shot in my Bloody Mary now.

sk, in strict cash accounting, you would book the expense when you purchase the gas and book the income when you sell it. Sounds ok for a tiny cash business, but think of the home builders for example. They might start and finish a house in the same year, but sell it the next year. If you saw financials with a loss for the cost to build in year 1, then a profit in year 2 for the entire price of the house, that wouldn't really tell you what's going on.

Not exactly rock blogging...but on topic...I think:

YouTube - Monty Python - Lion Tamer

Cheers,

This blog rocks, but I still can't get over the fact that I'm reading about accounting on a Saturday Morning.

embrace your inner Nerd...

Tanta thus instructs: If you take that loan [HFS] to portfolio (switch it over to HTM), you will have to reflect the fact that it is now underwater by valuing it at market (rather than cost).

Ummmm, "have to" or "are supposed to?"


sk, in strict cash accounting, you would book the expense when you purchase the gas and book the income when you sell it. ...If you saw financials with a loss for the cost to build in year 1, then a profit in year 2 for the entire price of the house, that wouldn't really tell you what's going on.
lama

So it DOES have to synchronous in accrual accounting then ! whereas it needn't be so in cash accounting. Right ? That concept, the concept of synchronous seems to be a key differentiator between cash and accrual accounting. I do need to adjust my mental picture then.

Sorry about belabouring the point.

-K

I have a couple questions to ask. I'm not nearly an expert in this stuff as many of you are, so please bear with me.

Why are lenders just allowing short sales and writing off HELOCs without making more efforts to recover some the losses from the borrowers through asset siezure?

Yes, that is kinda hilarious given that just about everything people have these days is leased or loans but...

Whatever happened to wage garnishment by the courts to repay debt?

Clearly many of these people still have jobs earning income and can easily take a 10% hit now that they are effectively renters and don't have the big mortgage anymore.

Yo rich - Here is a MBI bond buyer at the offer (last couple paragraphs)

Opportunity Knocks With Fannie and Freddie-Minyanville

Not that I am any brighter - closed my mbi and abk bearish positions Weds. Ugh.

Tanta: "Old farts like me "write" mortgages. The young ones "do" them or "make" them. "

Could all the young ones "doing" mortgages be why so many people feel they've been screwed in recent years?

As an aside perhaps the schedules aren't available to me since there might be trade secrets( which customer bought a lot etc ) discernible in there - or even, as my jaundiced mind would note, some shenanigans to be discerned by looking for the devil in the details ?

The kind of "schedule" Lama is talking about here is the equivalent of the cash register tape for every gas sale the gas station did in a quarter. Would you want to see that level of detail in the financial statements? No. You have auditors for that.

There's nothing sinister about this reference to a schedule. The "schedule" is basically "the books." If we were doing cash-basis accounting, that'd be that. But since we're doing accrual accounting, those schedules don't just get summed up and totaled on the balance sheet.

I can promise you there are no "trade secrets" in a mortgage general ledger.

OT: Rich,

I think Tuesday might be ugly, as market looked poised for a selloff yesterday afternoon, just held back by Op Ex. I believe historically, the day after a long weekend often continues the trend as well.

Rest of month I am looking out for a rally as well.

What the bond insurers need isn't a bailout but a referee. Somebody has to parcel out their assets so that it's fair to all insured parties.

For example, let's say the total projected losses on all insured bonds and counterparty guarantees is $200 billion. But the insureds only have $50 billion of combined capital. So, the payout would be 25 cents on the loss dollar. You can't just let the first-to-fail grab all the capital. Regulators want to make sure there is something left for muni bonds that fail in the future.

The referee will be the NY State Insurance Commissioner, and it will work best if all bond insurers are consolidated into the same receivership process under him.

If you are a workout lawyer and you want good work for a long time to come, move to Albany.

OT but really important.

Did that monoline raise their capital? They had until midnight last night.

CR, Tanta, anyone?

Ummmm, "have to" or "are supposed to?"

Look, that's the whole point of the LOCOM rule (lower of cost or market).

No, I can't say that nobody is flagrantly violating accounting rules. You can't say they all are.

But this is a very clear one. There are jillions of situations of shades of gray in this business, but not when it comes to taking a mortgage loan out of HFS and into HTM. The reason the rules are so clear here is that back in the really bad old days before the thrifts blew up, that crap did go on. Your investment portfolio became a place to hide losses. And since there was no penalty for moving a loan into the portfolio, there was an inclination not to hedge the HFS pipe enough or at all. We used to call that the "FDIC Hedge." Or "running naked and letting the FDIC pick up the tab if it doesn't work."

So this is one of those things that would be a very "flagrant" violation if someone ignored it. You can get into arguments all day long about reserve levels and forecasts and stuff like that. But no auditor is going to let you dump the HFS into the HTM in a down market without a LOCOM adjustment unless they want to go to jail.

The schedules themselves are not sinister. It's the assumptions used to calculate the asset valuation adjustments that might be called sinister (or hilarious, depending on your point of view).

Re: net present value of what you think you will collect. Unless you think the collateral is really worth $0, you don't write the loan down by its principal amount. You would estimate recoveries in foreclosure, and write down to that.

Assumptions and discretion dressed in the clothing of false and misleading lies and FASB helping accountants hide the truth.

All hail to Enron and FASB solutions for better accounting

Where is FFDIC's comment on the FDIC hiring?

Re: The Securities and Exchange Commission is sending out examination letters requesting information from mutual-fund companies about how they value and assess their money-market fund holdings."

IMHO, I think the SEC will ignore the reality that a lot of mutual funds and money markets are disguised as hedge funds and that they are at the extreme limits of accounting fraud.


Did that monoline raise their capital? They had until midnight last night.

ugh

No answer to that from me and you won't see it in SEC filings either - I just looked - they filed a 15-12b on 1/16, which is a suspension of duty of file, and the reason is they now have only 61 shareholders of record - the threshold is 300 I seem to recall.

-K

I am pretty impressed by that pig's tail!

As fascinating as accrual is, I have an off topic question for the sports fan out there.

A fair amount of ink has been expended regarding the Treasury mortgage freeze about how it rewrites the contract with investors who now will not the get the interest income they are entitled to when rates adjust. What I wonder is just how much of that interest did they actually expect to earn?

Let's take as an example the 2/28s. While I acknowledge that anecdote is not evidence, there is strong appearance that these mortgages were designed to be refinanced at reset. Certainly, many of the borrowers claim that that is what they expected to do based on the advice of their brokers/lenders/realtors. The prevalence of pre-payment penalties may argue against that, but I think the expectation of the lenders/brokers would be that these would rolled into the new loan and provide some gravy to the lender.

My question is, do we know what assumptions were made about pools of these loans, when either held for investment or securitized? What were the assumptions about how many would prepay, i.e. refinance, and how many adjust to higher rates, and again how many would prey at 2nd, 3rd, or fourth adjustments? What percentage of these folks did investors truly expect to be paying a a double digit interest rate over the course of several years? I assume such assumptions needed to be made to price them, as well as assumptions about future interest rates. Were these supposed to be shorter term investments, that are turning out to be longer term investments as borrowers are unable to refinance and thus prepay?

Of course there is no one answer for what exactly investors/lenders were assuming other than houses would continue to appreciate, but presumably their models had t had to start wit some basic assumptions, and I wonder what some of those consensus assumptions were.

sk, you've got it. One more thing, you can manipulate cash accounting as well. Having a good year? Don't want to share it with the IRS?? Just buy several months worth of stuff at the end and pay for it all on Dec 31st. Poof, there goes your income.
This is why the IRS requires some business types to be accrual based taxpayers.

I went ahead and booked all the knowledge in this post. Haven't read the entire thing yet though. I may have to restate some of my comments at some point in the future.

You shall accrue what you sow.

quartz,
The accounting valuation would be based on defacto or assumed outcome, not the letter of the note. If the bank would expect a prepayment on 50%, they would book those loans as such. They would likely have to wait until the borrower actually prepaid to book the income on prepayment penalty. Conservatism...defer revenue, book future losses now.

This blog rocks, but I still can't get over the fact that I'm reading about accounting on a Saturday Morning.

It's a good warm up for me. The new semester starts on Tuesday. Having failed a couple of the actuarial exams in the fall (which I will be retaking at some point), I decided to add accounting to my list of things I can fail tests on. So, it's Introduction to Managerial Accounting on Tuesdays, Intermediate Financial Accounting on Wednesdays, and Insurance: Theory and Practice on Thursdays.

Don't my next 17 weeks sound thrilling?

While we're at it, can someone explain the whole M1 and M2 thing that some people on another thread were fretting about yesterday?


Don't want to share it with the IRS?? Just buy several months worth of stuff at the end and pay for it all on Dec 31st. Poof, there goes your income.
This is why the IRS requires some business types to be accrual based taxpayers.
lama

I got reminded about this once upon a time when the software budget at company X, department Y, was wayy underspend and as April approached, I was really pressuring the DEC saleman to bill me NOW - we'll take stuff later. To his credit, he refused and as I told him about the calumni that will descend upon him, the secretary told me - "Errr. I think its illegal" - not the calumni but the "pay now buy later" concept.

I did get round it - interdepartmental stuff can be innovative but...

Of course, DEC did decline and fall in the end - though I'd like to think it was technology missteps not the honesty of their staff that caused it.

-K

GOVERNOR SPITZER LEADS FIRST MEETING OF COMMISSION TO MODERNIZE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES

Press Release 01/18/2008 - Governor Spitzer Leads First Meeting of Commission to
Modernize Regulation of Financial Services

sk, those big companies' departments work like government entities sometimes. Use the budget or lose it. I've shipped defects off at year end. I booked a credit to "Due to Customer" instead of a credit to Revenue on that transaction.

I have to go out. Hope some of that made sense. Thanks for the help on responses Oh Great One.
What's next? Statement of Cash Flows?

Write-downs reflect current estimates of future losses. The actual future can't be written down today because its not yet known (think ARM resets over the next 6 months). So the write-down process must proceed in stages. Those who are impatient with this must be impatient that the future hasn't arrived yet.

Thanks for the help on responses Oh Great One.

hey, no problem!

Those freaking greedy saver's. Must be some way to ding them to recapture those costs.

Re: Some of you--bless your lovely hearts

Thanks for thinking of me dude!

sk: Of course, DEC did decline and fall in the end - though I'd like to think it was technology missteps not the honesty of their staff that caused it.

It's called hubris. Sure, their shit was tight but times change. Suddenly they're just a bunch of bankrupt punks. Happens all the time. They were hurt pretty hard by the latest newcomer-come-deadbeat Sun. Next up Oracle, then Microsoft. Go ahead and pat yourself on the back while I'm eating your lunch. Free Lunch in the corporate cafeteria! Yum.

OT on a government bail out of bond insurers (as proposed by Jim Cramer and others):

These guys don't understand what the RTC was all about. First, the government already backstopped the thrifts through the deposit insurance system. In other words, the commitment to bail out DEPOSITORS existed prior to the crisis -- legislation just had to deal with the best way to go about this. Second, the RTC existed to dispose of collateral backing mortgages. Its goal was to maximize the recovery of written-off assets, not to avoid writing off assets.

Fast forward to today. There is no government commitment to the holders of insured debt. Imagine Congress creating that commitment! Sure it could be done, and if I were a Congressman I'd saddle the legislation with as many other commitments, bail outs and other "goodies" as I could imagine in my crafty little head. Not a can of worms we want to open.

More important, the path to disposition of the collateral backing insured bonds is a thorny one. Imagine an RTC entrusted with maximizing recovery on defaulted ABS-backed CDO's. Where do you start? Tanta? I'm not sure I even want to imagine that process.

The fact is the private markets can already purchase the "good" (i.e. muni) commitments from the bond insurers. All you need to do so is a triple A rating, and Berkshire has it. What about the "bad" commitments? These should be written off by the insured: i.e., they should recognize that insurer capital is (and always was!) insufficient to cover defaults, and the insurance is worthless. The insured should reflect the CDO's as part of their "net" exposure and disclose it to investors. Next, they should mark the exposure down. It is that step that Cramer so desperately wants to avoid.

And if you think its difficult to bail out bond insurers, imagine the even larger bail out that is necessary for undercapitalized CDS writers -- I'm talkin' about the hedge funds!

As someone that like fine print, I'd like to know if The Pig ever had long pants?

Re: ... done the same way since The Mortgage Pig wore short pants

Do any of the uberbrains here have anything to say about changes in maturity assumptions for the HTM portfolios? Average maturity was at one time in the low teens and more recently was in the 7-8 year range. What's been happening there?

dr. strangemoney,

"They were hurt pretty hard by the latest newcomer-come-deadbeat Sun. Next up Oracle, then Microsoft. Go ahead and pat yourself on the back while I'm eating your lunch. Free Lunch in the corporate cafeteria! Yum."

Go Go Google aps.

Cheers,

Any chance we could get an UberNerd (or GuestNerd) post on accounting for CDS and couterparty risk? I keep reading articles with numbers in the form "$XX billion of [toxic waste], net of CDS" and am wondering what might happen if, e.g. one major player in CDS game is asked to pay off but can't. Did those bearish hedge funds that made 7000% return last year actually get paid, or are they simply holding IOUs that nobody will be able to make good on?

This post is making my brain hurt. I never did dorm room accounting geek talk whilst passing the bong around...although I know those who did.

I preferred the Star Wars/Star Trek rooms. Probably why I switched from accountancy/finance to economics/finance. It made it easier. I did not have to try to quantify fantasy.

Cheers,

David Pearson: There is no government commitment to the holders of insured debt. Imagine Congress creating that commitment!

If it happens I will be stunned, but I won't be surprised. Can we get a blog tagline?

Calculated Risk
Always Stunned, Never Surprised.

Can we get a blog tagline?

How about, "We're all Insured Now."

Tanta: How about, "We're all Insured Now."

How about, "We're all Insurers Now."

How bout-

"when your counterparty fails"

"Can we get a blog tagline?"

Bring out your dead.

Cheers,

stock lending and your counter party-

"Should cash have to be returned the lenders face the possibility of having to liquidate positions and potentially realize losses on positions that have been devalued as a result of the credit crunch."

Institutional Investor

Great work, all of you! The CR Team is a never-ending learning experience.

Big, yellow, rubber ducky award to the person that can name the largest stock lenders.

risk capital: To me that sounds more like a magazine article. Nice and scary... jumps out at you while in line at the supermarket. The summer blockbuster is Counterparty. Next summer, it's something lighter... Counterparty 2 starring Chris Rock and Alan Greenspan as odd-couple Fed Governors with comically different styles of regulation.

David:

Good post.

It isn't exactly analogous, but there were calls for a bailout of holders of insured mortgage insurers in the 1930's. The result was not a bailout of either the insurers or bondholders but rather a structure led by the New York insurance department to manage the liquidation in an orderly fashion. There are links in the NY Times archives, but it is a paid subscription (I do the puzzle on line so get 100 free hits/month). Although it isn't expecially useful -- I find it fascinating.

strangemoney-

(:- chris rock and ag

the strangest relationship I have seen is Cramer and Spitzer, this reminds me of Jesus and the Anti-Christ warming up as bedfellows.

Zigurrat: Have you seen Wordplay, the crossword documentary? Good movie.

OT regarding:

credit analysts^reserves^estimates, HTM, HFS (what about held for investment?), etc, and all the great blog efforts there which are great

Any thoughts out there on BOA & Countrywide and how that accounting deal will shake out? The market thinks BOA overpaid, even with tax loopholes; what think?

Re: There appeared to be a big obstacle for a Countrywide takeover after the Federal Reserve approved Bank of America's acquisition of LaSalle in September. The combined bank grew to hold 9.88% of the country's deposits. Federal law prohibits a bank-holding company from controlling more than 10% of U.S. deposits after acquiring another bank.

But the law includes an obscure caveat: The 10% limit doesn't apply to federally chartered thrifts, meaning a bank-holding company may control more than 10% of deposits in the U.S. following a thrift acquisition. Since a Countrywide subsidiary called Countrywide Bank is a federally insured thrift, that may give Bank of America room to maneuver around the deposit cap.

Bank of America is the only bank that has ever neared the 10% deposit cap. Many seasoned banking attorneys were not familiar with the caveat, as no bank has ever tried to acquire a thrift to vault above the 10% limit.

"This could be the biggest loophole in the world," said Gilbert Schwartz a partner at Schwartz & Ballen LLP and former Fed attorney. It was unclear when or how the loophole first became known to the banks.

The Future of Real Estate: Countrywide Seeks Rescue Deal

" accounting for CDS and couterparty risk?"

I would be interested in hearing from an expert. There is material on the BIS website. About BIS

Their technical stuff is readable and they seem to be ground zero for counterparty issues.

"a prime counterparty for central banks in their financial transactions
agent or trustee in connection with international financial operations"

Re Taxpayer bailout of bond insurers, I will paraphrase A WSJ article about W. Buffet's takeover of a Reinsurer.

"It took four years to whittel the business from 23,218 contracts (swaps & deritatives) to 197.
Doing so involved tracking down hundreds of counterparties including a Finland bank and a small loan co. in Japan. One contract was designed to run for 100 years.
We lost over 400 million on supposedly safe and properly priced contracts. If we had to do it in one month, who knows what would have happened?"

This taxpayer is terrified of a bailout which no one has any idea of the final bill.

.

Calculated Risk, home to:
The Counterparty Party
Over 114 billion served since 2007

Dr. Strange...

Wordplay was a really great movie. Probably the best film I saw last year.

I'm a total amateur at puzzles, and by thursday am in over my head.

Tripleplay,

I posted a bunch of stuff in the comments board (parade of writedowns story) yesterday related to the following, which is well worth reading:

Introduction
The failure of Penn Square Bank, N.A. (Penn Square), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, still
ranks as one of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC’s) most publicized,
most difficult, and most colorful bank resolutions. Penn Square failed July 5, 1982, with
$470.4 million in deposits and $516.8 million in assets. By aggressively making large
and speculative loans, especially to the oil and gas industries, the bank had grown from
$62 million in assets in 1977 to $520 million in assets by mid-1982.1 Penn Square then
sold majority interests in those loans to other banks (in the form of loan participations),
but retained the responsibility for servicing the entire loan amount.2 At its failure, Penn
Square was servicing approximately $2 billion in loans.

FDIC: Error 404 - Page Not Found 03.pdf

"OT on a government bail out of bond insurers (as proposed by Jim Cramer and others):

These guys don't understand what the RTC was all about. . . . "

Oh, I think they do. They (in the rantings of Cramer) just want to see their own version of corporate socialism adopted.

He might as well be saying: "Losses are fine so long as they are the other guy's losses. When my book is hurting, the government needs to step in and cover my losses."

But, since socialism doesn't sell well here, we need a major impending event to prompt the desired action and that is the financial meltdown that will occur if mortgage insurers go BK and some banks fail as a result.

Well, excuse me, but I think we need to muddle through this problem without the government absorbing private losses in the process.

Doc....

Penn Square was a real mess. There was a great book by Mark Singer on it titled 'Funny Money'

For deep background, I like the BIS publication, Bank Failures in Mature Economies.


S&L fiscal cost was 2.1% GDP (PDF file; table 6)

Interesting section on earlier subprime problems.

The thing I can't understand about counterparty risk on CDS's is why there isn't a system to disclose them and to compare the valuations.

You can have disclosure without regulation. The biggest problem being, in my opinion, the lack of anything close to mirror accounting. Both parties to a transaction can book an immediate profit, and probably do. The aggregate impact of this would be to overstate profits and capital.

From a long time ago, a foreshadowing:
discuss@picayune: [1011] in RISKS Forum

Barnaby J. Feder, Sophisticated software set for exotic financial
trades, New York Times, 30 March 1993, pages C1, C5.

This article concerns "a marriage made in techno-geek heaven" between computer people and high finance, specifically software for analyzing and administering complex financial transactions based on so-called "derivatives" (see Risks 15.66). ... such systems allow derivatives to be traded in much larger volumes, and in much more complex ways.

.... The potential trouble comes when massive financial edifices are engineered badly.

When a steel-and-concrete building falls down, the earth is there to catch it and a limited number of people get killed.

But that's not how financial engineering works -- one collapsing structure has the capacity to take others down with it (again, see Risks 15.66). Obviously it's in their interest to be careful, but let's hope they know what they're doing.

Phil Agre, UCSD

New developments in clearing and settlement arrangements for OTC derivatives

Since the publication by the BIS in 1998 of a report on OTC derivatives: settlement procedures and counterparty risk management, the markets for OTC derivatives have continued to expand and develop rapidly, while risk management practices have evolved and significant changes in market infrastructures have occurred.

In early 2006, the CPSS set up a Working Group, comprising representatives of its member central banks and prudential supervisors of major derivatives dealers, to analyse existing arrangements and risk management practices in the broader OTC derivatives market and evaluate the potential for risks to be mitigated by greater use of, and enhancements to, market infrastructure. This project complemented an earlier supervisory initiative that at the time was focused primarily on confirmation backlogs in the credit derivatives markets.

The Working Group conducted interviews with some 35 major dealers in OTC derivatives in the G10 countries and Hong Kong SAR. It also met with industry groups and providers of post-trade processing services. Finally, upon completion of the report, it discussed its findings in a roundtable with these entities.

Simply the best thread ever! Thanks Tanta and Lama for a virtuoso performance.

I was contemplating nibbling on some financial stocks next week, but given the unknowns on the balance sheets, I think I'm going to wait until later in the year after the majority of resets come into play.

Best to all,

Really, the entire NegAm arrangement was a disaster just waiting to happen, and it's the SEC's fault -- Post Enron. Today we have a condition where there is still a cushion unter the recast cap and already deep underwater loans are piling on more NegAm accrued interest that will never be repaid.

In fact, booking this accural as earnings should not be permitted at all. There should be some other accounting treatment. An interesting parallel is PoC accounting, done in large construction projects and then used liberally elsewhere when executives found it a convenient way to sell their options at inflated values. Basically it's possible to book unbilled revenues as earnings. It's not too tough to spot as cash flows go massively negative.

Look at EDS in ~2003. They eventually had to re-state prior earnings and take massive writedowns when it became clear they would not be able to collect. The same should happen to OptARM specialists... IMB, DSL, FED... Their cash flows will never improve and they'll end up in receivership IMO.


I'm a total amateur at puzzles, and by thursday am in over my head.
Zigurrat

OK, here's some reward for educating me:

Retaliatory celebrations amongst the troupe ? Definitely ahead (3,12,5).

-K

J. Michael Neal don't feel too bad. My wife just got her FSA last year. She'd never failed an exam in her life but she failed 200.

Can we get a blog tagline?

Calculated Risk: Embrace Your Inner Nerd...

Hank and Zig, anyone, Tanta, et al

Pension reform and computer modeling and obviously risk management and accounting, ok... false and misleading discretionary adjustments, collusion....I know, no one cares, but look at a link if you have 10 seconds:

Hearing on Computer Model Investment Advice Programs for IRAs

[Notices] [06/20/2007]

Hearing on Computer Model Investment Advice Programs for IRAs [06/20/2007]

Re: After carefully reviewing the information received to date, the
Department has decided that it would be beneficial to solicit
additional information by means of a public hearing.

(however): The Department is also interested in knowing whether the scope of
relief from ERISA's prohibited transaction provisions afforded by the
statute is adequate to facilitate the use of computer-based programs
for IRAs should the Department determine that such programs are
feasible.

Attention: Computer Model Investment
Advice Programs For IRAs--Hearing.

Ok then, the heart of this matter, for those out of the loop, is the connection between DOL and the forces of evil, AKA >>> "underwriters" that are granted on-going exemptions relating to prohibited transactions...its a very long story, but it is worth time and of course, not related or on topic here.

Zig, thanks for those ideas above!

OT:

did anyone see Maria Bartiromo a few days ago in the Tonight Show with Jay Leno talking about housing bubble busting, dollar sinking, Sheiks buying US companies.....

all of it while wearing a really clingy red dress and um ... no bra?

Ain't no party like a counterparty 'cause a counterparty don't . . . oh, crap.

Richard Suttmeiers Weekly email arrived a moment ago.
"The Regulators of the Finance Sector are Running Scared" (to put it mildly IMO)
"The FDIC has stopped providing timely data on the condition among the 8,560 FDIC-insured financial institutions. (I'm not aware of this other than FDIC's typical bag of examiner tricks-of-the trade. Anybody have details?) Banks are heavily exposed to higher loan loss provisioning. (Old news) How will the FDIC administer a tsunami of bank failures, which are highly likely over the next two years? (That has been my main question for well over a year. Staffing is low due to FDIC RIFS and retirements.) Remember that president Bush told the public that the government will not bail out lenders. (Flip-flop!)"

"FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair in a speech given at a Bear Stearns Conference on Thursday. The FDIC Chair told the audience that housing starts are sinking, the unemployment rate is going up, and the risk of recession is clearly rising. (Old news.) Foreclosures are on the rise in communities across the country. (More old news.) With falling real estate values, refinancing is not an option. (Ditto.) The number of resets is simply way too big for the industry to handle one-by-one. (As Dennis Hopper says - YOU NEED A PLAN!)"
Wikipedia: Dennis Hopper:
Dennis Hopper - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

FT - Calm surface disguises turmoil beneath (Good/bad article about ACA Capital)
FT.com / In depth - Calm surface disguises turmoil beneath

After a three year investigation, DOJ decided to drop the case against GenRe in July. Political interference? Who knows. I keep wondering: do the latest reinsurers have similar side letter agreements as those used in GenRe?

Off topic, but I still can't understand why anyone would invest in an investment bank. I recall thinking this for the first time about a decade ago, watching first Bank of America and then Fleet regret buying Robertson Stephens.

The employees demand obscene bonuses. Never take a hit when there are losses (from their previous bonused work), and then bolt to another firm at the first sign of pain.

Great to be an IB, bad to invest in one.

Having skimmed through these posts, I have concluded that Doc Holiday is talking to himself and calling himself Zigurrat. There are medications for that sort of thing nowadays.

status check....

How u doin?

Gonna tell us who you are now?

Are you Ken?

or , how is Kfisher doin?

To those who don't want government involvement:

  1. We are getting it right now except it's from the governments of Kuwait, UAE, Singapore, China, etc. These entities are not accountable to their own citizens, let alone US citizens. All in all, if the banks are insolvent and need a government takeover, better it be by the US government, which is at least marginally accountable. Keep in mind, that the government can take equity positions that someday when the banks are back on their feet could actually be sold off at a nice profit for the Treasury.
  2. When discussing bailout costs keep in mind the costs of serious economic dislocations to the Treasury-lower tax revenues from wages, capital loss write-offs for businesses and individuals and higher payments for unemployment, welfare, etc. I would prefer an out and out bail out to this bogus fiscal stimulus. Even a trillion dollar bailout would be money better speant that the disgusting mess in Iraq. Moral hazrd can be dealt with through the criminal law. The fat cats fear jail more than they fear getting fired.

Speaking of reinsurance...earlier this week:

Florida Insurance Commissioner Suspends ALLSTATE Insurance CO.

Today's decision by the commissioner follows Tuesday's action when he abruptly halted the scheduled two-day hearing into the Allstate Companies’ reinsurance program, their relationships with risk modeling companies, insurance rating organizations and insurance trade associations.

OK, that does it. I gotta have a Mortgage Pig t-shirt.

Re Cramer's call for a bail out of monolines. Three weeks ago he advised underwater borrowers to walk away from their mortgage loans. Now he's begging for a government bailout of his wall street cronies. The man is insane.

Re post. As a hungover former bank accountant/auditor now retired 5 years, I can only say Ugh! I thought I'd never have to read this stuff again.

OT

Chris Burba, Standard & Poors- "Any multiday or near-term upturn should be considered as an opportunity to liquidate any long-term bullish positions and initiate bearish positions in securities that pace the broader market," Burba wrote.

Go Bears!

Grumblings of a Bear Market

Professor Krugman:
The real sin, both of the Fed and of the Bush administration, was the failure to exercise adult supervision over markets running wild.

It wasn’t just Alan Greenspan’s unwillingness to admit that there was anything more than a bit of “froth” in housing markets, or his refusal to do anything about subprime abuses. The fact is that as America’s financial system has grown ever more complex, it has also outgrown the framework of banking regulations that used to protect us — yet instead of an attempt to update that framework, all we got were paeans to the wonders of free markets.
OP-ED COLUMNIST; Don't Cry for Me, America - NY Times

Moral Corruption & Bigotry In Accounting

People, or groups within a broader society, become aware of their environment and how it may affect them and they learn to deal with it or adapt to the reality as best as can.

I became aware of certain reality that I was completely unaware of until 1998 when my son and his friends were to graduate and start looking for jobs. My son’s best friend back then and now is a Pakistani (98%+ are Muslims as is he). There were also some other Pakistanis in the class. What was known to many was that persons of certain ethnicity would have little problem getting a job with the firms they wanted to work for and persons of certain ethnicity would have very hard time getting jobs at certain firms, especially, the Big Six (or it could be soon after it became Big Four). My son interviewed with Arthur Andersen and got an offer AQAP, fully expected, which he accepted. But, his best friend, almost as good in accounting but brighter than my son, didn’t think that he would have a chance so he was not going to waste is time applying for the Big Six/Four. Some professors, as it turns out, were also aware of the problem. One of them, a white Christian woman, called my son’s best friend and asked him to apply to Big Six of his choice (more than one if he wanted) before the campus recruiters come and she will make sure that he gets interviewed. Then she called people (I assume her former students) at Big Six and pressured them to interview this guy and make him an offer (he was that good, easily in top 2%). He did apply to Arthur Andersen and Delloite and did get an offer, a bit late, which he also accepted. But, it took a conscientious person with knowledge of the problem and willingness to intervene to get the “justice” done in one case. The other Pakistanis didn’t apply to the Big Six or any of the firms with certain names.

Everyone knows what later happened to Arthur Andersen. My son left when the firm was dissolved and had no problem finding another job. The Pakistani went on his own and is doing extremely well. I still have Arthur Andersen T-Shirt and sweatshirt that I wear occasionally.

BTW, do you know who came up with the ideas, or “schemes,” that Arthur Andersen recommended to its clients, including Enron? Bankrupters and Fraudsters of New York City! Most of the schemes originate in the real sin city in America – NYC. Even the supposed sin city is dominated by the former “Gangs of New York” and Gangs of Los Angeles, which were transplants from New York City. Las Vegas’s politics and the main business is dominated by these gangs who took control.

In our economic system, accounting is the barrier between morality and immorality when it comes to finance. The stock market was turned into the Scam Market because of the forced compromises that were made by accountants under political pressure.

The financial and gambling, or “entertainment,” gangs that dominate NYC, Vegas, Boston, LA, etc., will destroy Am

FT Woods,

IMHO & limited opinion, I think buffett is among the biggest cons out there was his non-derivative infinite/reinsurance complexity, linked to his shareholder interest in bond rateing agencies and now going to open his own rating agency; very suspect stuff and with $33 billion in goodwill, his company can not rely on his ahh shucks, Im just a small town boy and Charlie and I got lucky routine fit for the very finest of snakeoil sales pitches!

Ahead of the curve,

Why is it that bail out plans have such damned attractive logic? What makes them so hard to argue against?

They are like gravity. You're a liquidationist, in a stable orbit, minding your own business and expecting others to mind theirs. Then you feel the first tug. Before you know it, you're accelerating, then hurtling, towards the sun.

"Do you really want all those people to lose their jobs? What would be the point?"

Uh, well, no, I don't want those people to lose their jobs, but why should we bail out Jim Cramer's friends?

"This can't be about moral hazard. People's livelihoods are at stake! We'll deal with moral hazard later."

Uh, well, I guess we could help out some subprime borrowers. You know, ones that might lose their homes.

"No, no, no. Not enough. We have to rescue to bond insurers. Its all about the bond insurers! If you don't rescue the bond insurers, all of us are toast."

Bond insurers? Okay, I guess, as long as we stop there.

"Stop there? What about all those hedge funds that wrote CDS? We need to buy those CDS from them. If we don't: 10% unemployment."

Hedge funds?! Aren't those rich people?

"10%!"

Well sure, no one wants 10% unemployment. So we buy the CDS, and that takes care of the...

"Consumers aren't spending! They need to spend or this'll make the Great Depression seem like a party at Paris Hilton's house. We need deficit spending, ultra-mega-low rates for savers, and, and -- I know! -- the government needs to guarantee credit card ABS and auto loans!"

And so on...

--
Continuation...

The financial and gambling, or “entertainment,” gangs that dominate NYC, Vegas, Boston, LA, etc., will destroy American economy, first, and then the political system that is also controlled by these gangs. It was not a surprise that the sub-prime and other toxic mortgages originated in SoCal and some of the players came from NYC, Boston, etc.

In capitalistic system one must always be on guard against financial gangs. Americans didn’t and now that must pay the price.

Well, the reason that Americans weren't on their guard is that Americans were turned into dopes with the success of the propaganda machine that began roughly a hundred years ago. With the birth of the so-called baby boomers America was turned into a Dope Factory!; hence, the term that I use -- Baby DOOMERS. They were BRED to lead to America’s doom and they will succeed. They have done all the hard work. Now, we just have to wait for the time bomb to go off. The trigger is the next depression.

Jas

I dont know if people here have run across examples of what I would call, circular derivative accounting as with Enron or Citi, maybe Countrywide, but some of these explanations from corporations as to how they engineer financial confusion can be entertaining, and as accounting complexity increases -- I think its helpful to understand why risk management is so important now (for investors). Some of the REITs have these diagrams, but I dont have an example off hand, and just wondered if anyone has seen a good example.

Venn diagram - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

As a long-time lurker and learner, I just wanted to send a heartfelt thanks to the writers of this post.

Well-written and extremely valuable...

Thought on financial engineering and accounting:

Stephen Hawking said: “Any sound scientific theory, whether of time or of any other concept, should in my opinion be based on the most workable philosophy of science: the positivist approach put forward by Karl Popper and others. According to this way of thinking, a scientific theory is a mathematical model that describes and codifies the observations we make. A good theory will describe a large range of phenomena on the basis of a few simple postulates and will make definite predictions that can be tested… If one takes the positivist position, as I do, one cannot say what time actually is. All one can do is describe what has been found to be a very good mathematical model for time and say what predictions it makes.” (The Universe In a Nutshell , p31) (However, the claim that Popper was a positivist is a common misunderstanding which Popper himself termed the 'Popper legend'. Popper in fact developed his views in stark opposition to and as a criticism of positivism and held that scientific theories talk about how the world really is, not, as positivists claim, about phenomena or observations experienced by scientists.)

Me too OC smokes - Not sure I get it all, but cleared up a lot of questions. And the point of further write-downs hit me like a brickbat. Don't really see the financial pundits making that point a lot, do you? Makes me wonder why anyone would dare call a bottom. Thanks to the guestnerds and the blog they rode in on!

btw all the news of these finance guys getting karma-lized keeps reminding me of a 'Wizard of Id' cartoon I read as a kid -went something like:

King to court visitor: "You want to reside in my kingdom? What is it that you do?"

Visitor: "I am a nobleman, sir. I do nothing."

King to court official: "Put him in the fields with the rest of the nobility"

Lama...good basic explanations here.

What about the FASB 133 derivatives and hedging? Any comments on that?

Picking up the bachelor's in Accounting I pretty much learned all this. (I'm in the process of getting my masters for information systems/accounting) What would be more interesting is to hear your opinions on how all this works, especially reserves. It's that iffy ethical area that they don't teach you about as an undergrad.

"The issue isn't the accounting rules for non-cash income; the issue is what assumptions went into estimating how much of that deferred interest is ultimately collectible."

Yep those estimates that get argued with the auditors about. Well, depends on your relationship with them... Hell, it took our company 4 months after fiscal year end to estimate our contingency liability on shoddy project performance and fraudulent lawsuits. It ain't easy, and when people's bonuses, investments, client relationships and etc are on the line often the more liberal estimates are used. There's no doubt about that, I don't care if you're private or public. Probably more pressure if you are public to fudge em (the numbers).

Accounting is, for the majority, rather simple when you get the basics down, until you get into the reserves area...whether it's some kind of warranty reserve, collectable accounts, estimates of NPV, etc. It's all up to debate, speculation, and how buddy buddy you are with your auditors. 'Course it helps to have hired some of your old auditors to help you estimate your numbers....

(pardon me for spelling/grammar errors. It is Saturday night and I'm a bit buzzed and too lazy to correct)

I know this may a bit OT, but got in on the Ambac thread too late....

If the monoline guys like Ambac, etc go down, which seems more likely every day with the Fitch downgrade from AAA to A of Ambac on Friday afternoon, what would you say is the best place to put your assets? Sell all stocks & keep in cash, buy gold and/or commodities, etc?

I have a good chunk alread in cash, but some still in the market (should I dump it all now?) and am torn between inflation going crazy with Fed cuts and $$$ printing (eg: buy gold and/or commodities) or deflation setting in due to much lower demand due to recession (keep cash).

Thanks for any input you have.

After slogging through that entire post, I have only one thing to say:

"Eyestrain...I Haz It!"

You realize, of course, the mortgage industry has enabled the transfer of wealth from the middle (and lower) class of the USA to the Chinese and Arabs. Thanks for that!

Next time, stay home and leave America alone.

The Ballad of Narayama shows how one family is affected by social rules stipulating that the elderly must be left to die in order to preserve food for the young.

Sorry Lama - if this is supposed to be bank loan accounting for dummies, it does not come close to what Tanta has done for mortgages.....go back to the drawing board and speak a little more english (its actually harder to put things in plain english).

Nevertheless, I appreciate the effort.

risk capital,

The largest stock loan guys have got to be

Goldman Sachs (the purchase of SLK made them huge in the clearing space)

Bear Stearns

Morgan Stanley

Citigroup

Merrill Lynch

and then the rest of the IB's

Dear Jas Jain,the conduct of the B and F's of NYC you rail against is known formally as " Amoral Familism".It is not restricted to NYC or even the USA.There is even speculation that it may occur on the Indian subcontinent from time to time,and that it may in fact "Natural" behaviour among some human groups.Any practical suggestions to mitigate the damage would be much appreciated but the rants wear thin with time,and detract from your very real contributions.

--
Some may enjoy this piece I wrote more than 10 years ago when I was working at Cisco. BTW, I had read all the three books that Prof. Briloff wrote about accounting problems in the US. Enjoy! -- Jas
-x-x-x-x-
Sermons for the Nerds

Sunday, May 03, 1998

Unaccountable Accounting!

Warning! The references to the female anatomy by Prof. Briloff were within the Generally Accepted Articulation Practices (GAAP) of the period. Those with today’s heightened psychic sensitivities might find them objectionable.

This time we look at another actor in this theater of the absurd, the rambunctious bull-market of the 1990s, the accountant, who has to bless the sometimes “doctored” or “made over” financial statements of the public corporations. At the end of the last bull market of 1960s there were Big Eight accounting firms, which have now become Big Five (the attempt at the Big Four seemed to have failed recently) in the present incarnation of the bull. The excuse is to be more efficient and to better serve their clients. May we hazard a prediction of the Big Two during the next bull market and, finally, with the return of Ceaserism, or Socialism, only one King Arthur, or Queen Aretha, with no more room left for wasteful duplication! It is nothing but a coincidence that my son, Kapil, who is graduating soon with accounting major, will start working for Arthur Anderson in July. Accounting runs in the family. I am the black sheep.

I have been suspicious of the accounting practices of several well-known companies for more than a year now. Two areas where I clearly saw intent to throw wool at the eyes of the investing public was in the drive for acquisitions (for things which could have been “acquired,” i.e., developed internally) and accounting of the stock-options-exercise expenses. Then, few months back, articles started to appear in the Barron’s, the WSJ and the NY Times about these subjects; e.g., the CFO of GE admitting to guiding and managing the earnings; Microsoft revealing $26B options liability for the coming four years (exceeding profits handily); and the Mickey Mouse accounting by Disney. The last was authored by none other than Prof. Briloff. Also, one anchor on CNBC confronted the CEO of Cendant Corp., Mr. Henry Silverman, whether he needed to continue acquisitions to keep the stock moving up by being able to “show” better earnings as a result of acquisitions? Mr. Silverman said, no, emphatically. Few weeks later the company lost $13B in the market cap in a single day when the news of accounting “error” relating to acquisitions was announced. Ever wonder how come these “errors” are never the other way around?

Prof. Briloff was a gadfly who never ceased to attack the fancy footwork of the corporate financiers and their natural accomplishes, the accounting firms. He authored three classic, but unpopular, books exposing the specifics of their incredulous performance, or lack there of. Let us have a peek at some ent

Cont.. The BEST PART...
Prof. Briloff was a gadfly who never ceased to attack the fancy footwork of the corporate financiers and their natural accomplishes, the accounting firms. He authored three classic, but unpopular, books exposing the specifics of their incredulous performance, or lack there of. Let us have a peek at some entertaining excerpts from the first chapter titled, “2 Plus 2 Equals…” from Unaccountable Accounting, published in 1972:

“…The owner assured the underwriter that most careful and objective study was made [in search for the auditors]. As the partner of each firm was interviewed, he was asked, “What does 2 plus 2 equal?” Each of the respondents replied “Four, of course” –that is, all but the one from the lucky Arthur firm. His answer, after some serious reflection, was, “What number did you have in mind?”

“…A balance sheet is very much like a bikini bathing suit. What it reveals is interesting, what it conceals is vital. …First we [the accounting profession] were able to help by permitting the new breed of management to relax the old corsets, and then with the women’s lib vogue to discard them all together –revealing corporate voluptuousness in full splendor. And then when the prurient (as distinguished from the prudent) investor cried for more, the couturiers were able to provide padding and falsies to generate even greater excitement. It may, of course, be mere historical coincidence that this evolved with hot-pants era –when it became fashionable to expose assets with greater daring to produce the highest level of excitement and exhilaration.

“And the investor was conditioned to believe that only widows, orphans, and numbskulls sought cash dividends. In view of the tax cost incurred on receipt of dividends, the “sophisticated investor” avoided dividends as he would plague.

“…The general counsel for one of the giant accounting firms reiterated a statement he made earlier, that management takes initiative in looking for flexibility (or “creative” accounting) under existing rules.

“There has been a ‘recent explosion in the profit revisions,’ a phenomenon which Eckstein attributes to the following causes (to the extent here relevant): ‘…If all the differences in the figures were due to loosened reporting practices, it would imply that all of the profit increase between 1966 and 1969 was due to looser accounting, not to any improvement in real earnings. The stock market rose 30% over this period, and then lost all of this gain in the decline of 1969-70. Had earnings been as flat as they now reported to have been, the stock market boom and bust would have been milder and economic boom would not have become so overheated.’

“The phrase “game plan” implies a preconceived strategy for accomplishing certain objectives –and that Savoie sees management acting, with a helpful assist from their independent auditors: ‘In corporate financial reporting … the game plan is to show a steady rising earnings-pe

BEST PART continues...

“The phrase “game plan” implies a preconceived strategy for accomplishing certain objectives –and that Savoie sees management acting, with a helpful assist from their independent auditors: ‘In corporate financial reporting … the game plan is to show a steady rising earnings-per-share, thus stimulating investor demand for shares, with consequent rise in their price, and creating a favorable atmosphere for issuance of new securities in case additional capital is needed.’ …This means that where there is a choice of reporting methods (and we will soon be introduced to the plethora of such choices), ‘a strong inclination arises to choose the method which will produce the most favorable results.’ …Game plans come in two kinds –offensive and defensive. The offensive predominated during the late 1960s when the stock market was high, conglomerate mergers were commonplace and prosperity reigned. Game plans then were designed with style and finesse, using “funny money,” pooling of interests, deferral of research and development costs, stretched-out depreciation, front-end loading of installment revenue of doubtful collectibility, and so on. …Not everyone playing the game is a knight on a white horse, be he corporate manager or CPA. This fact becomes especially significant when a company is, as you might say, “shopping” for the accounting principles which best suit its game plan. The company’s present auditor may stand adamant against what the management wants to do, so management begins looking for an accounting firm that they hope will be more accommodating.

“We know the myth which prevails among masses of our society. They infer from CPA’s certification a nihil obstat [certification from a Roman Catholic censor stating that a work contains nothing contrary to faith or morals] and imprimatur; the masses assume that the auditors have pursued their task diligently and have ferreted out all aberrations with their gimlet eyes and red pencils; then, having discerned the good and true (even if not the beautiful), they proudly proclaim the fair presentation of the financial condition and operations of the corporation which they have thus scrutinized. These masses, with their trusting guilelessness, are confident that if the auditors failed to act consistent with this noble program and objective, then most assuredly the SEC, if not the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), would manifest its wrath, and would move diligently to discipline the scoundrels, possibly even to deprive them of their professional prerogatives lest they do further damage to the body economic. In fact, the realities are otherwise. No, in this context at least, God is not in His Heaven; sweetness and light do not prevail.

“But then, as Santayana informed us, we are destined to repeat the mistakes of history since we don’t read it. …I have first sought to describe those aspects of the corporate environment in which the auditor i

On account of the mortgage pig's presence:

Have you seen the little piggies
crawling in the dirt?
And for all the little piggies
life is getting worse,
always having dirt to play around in.

Have you seen the bigger piggies
in their starched white shirts?
You will find the bigger piggies
stirring up the dirt,
always have clean shirts to play around in.

In their styes with all their backing
they don't care what goes on around.
In their eyes there's something lacking
what they need's a damn good whacking.

Everywhere there's lots of piggies
living piggy lives.
You can see them out for dinner
with their piggy wives
clutching forks and knives to eat their bacon.

"With the birth of the so-called baby boomers America was turned into a Dope Factory!; hence, the term that I use -- Baby DOOMERS. They were BRED to lead to America’s doom and they will succeed. They have done all the hard work. Now, we just have to wait for the time bomb to go off. The trigger is the next depression."

Well, Jiz, that's a real intellectual contribution you made there. If those comments reflect the sort of values you taught the son you were fawning incessantly about earlier in this thread, he's probably not half the man you claim him to be.

cd

David Pearson- I think the test is a simple, practical one. Greatest good for the greatest number. If the cost to society of a bailout is less than the cost of not bailing, then bail away. Hedge funds are not essential to a financial system, since the financial system funtioned for centuries without them. So I wouldn't lift a finger to help them. Banks, on the other hand, have been integral to the financial system since its origin, so bail them out. We will end up bailing them out through FDIC anyway. Bond insurers- if their going under costs thousands of municipalities a lot of money then it may be cheaper to bail them out. I'm certainly not expert enough in municipal finance to know that.

My point is that moral hazard should not be the driving principal. That is what the criminal laws are for. However, if you want to make firing of management and BODs a condition of the bailout, you will get no argument here.


There is even speculation that it may occur on the Indian subcontinent from time to time
Tom Stone

LOL ! Say it like it is - and if data is needed to back that up -- hmm... lets start in the Bollywood field( The Kapoors, the Khans, the Dutts, the Johnny-come-lately Bacchans, then move on to the political field - the Nehrus( latterly known as Gandhis), the Bhuttos, then there are those industrial houses of Tata and Ambani to name a couple; all the way down to even a job as a tea-boy I'm sure.

Talk about the mote in one's own eye. Jeeeez.

-K

--
cd,

This is the conclusion I have reached by studying Americans' beliefs and habits and the origins thereof. I know that it is not very popular and I am not selling anything to anyone. I don't have to.

I am sure that you don't like my conclusion. I am further sure that you think that I have the problem and you don't. What else is new?!

Jas

PS: I have an intellectual curiosity -- How is a dope to know that he, or she, is a dope?

"If you are a workout lawyer and you want good work for a long time to come, move to Albany."

Well, that will help keep the value of my house up. On the other hand, more lawyers? That's quite a choice...

Who typically sets reserves for loan losses? Do banks use P&C actuaries?

Re: reinsurance
I hope it's not too OT.
I just find the similarities striking: what the insurance industry has been practicing and what's going on in the mortgage industry...it just doesn't look like a coincidence.
And if it's not a coincidence, if the same accounting practices have moved from one industry to another, why wasn't it caught much much sooner?
General Reinsurance was getting subpoenas back in the fall of 2003.

Looking for an UberNerd Accountant to explain this from the Federal Reserve. Look at the bottom of the text and note the non-borrowed reserve figures. If this means what I think it means, the banks are now totally dependent on TAF borrowing and have nearly no cash reserves that are not borrowed. Please tell me I'm wrong and ignorant.

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H3/hist/h3hist4.txt

P.S. I looked at the data all the way back to 1959 and couldn't find anything like this. Google "h.3 federal reserve" to find this stuff on your own. Thanks for checking it out.

I do very involved financial models, which are fortunately not related to real estate or mortgages.

A guideline which I have in designing any transaction is: Figure out the cashflows and risks first, then figure out the accounting. This produces a much lower rate of problems in the real world related to believing the accounting treatment.

If I can show the cashflows and risks clearly, the accounting is an afterthought. Accounting rules can lead to very bad instincts in certain types of transactions.

Who typically sets reserves for loan losses? Do banks use P&C actuaries?
BJC | 01.19.08 - 8:22 pm | #

I'm not in the financial industry but:

When I think of actuaries I think of insurance - though the field has definitely been broadening . Loan losses for banks (the estimated reserve or contra asset ) is mostly a struggle between management and the "external" and independent auditors. If you know your industry and your vendors and customers - you should be able to estimate the losses "reasonably" well. But that depends on the size of your business, the rate of growth, turnover of employees, etc and etc. But, when you have lots of investments that you aren't sure what is contained in them (like structured investments and structured credit) you may need some external risk management services provided by actuaries to cover your arse. It's the "insurance" for the upper financial officer's and management decisions.

Just MHO...

Great post and comments. Two thoughts:

  1. I'm not an accountant, but I think LOCOM can be a bit... nefarious... because IIRC banks are allowed to take the LOCOM on a pool. I'll oversimplify to illustrate. Assume I have three mortgages of varying market quality, the first two are high quality and the third is garbage for whatever reason.

Mortgage 1 has cost of 99 and market of 101
Mortgage 2 has cost of 99 and market of 101.5
Mortgage 3 has cost of 99 and market of 95.

At all banks I've seen, the portfolio will be at 297 -- the aggregate cost, b/c the aggregate cost is lower than the aggregate market of 297.5. If you read this post too literally, you'd think the pool would be at 99+99+95 = 293. It's LOCOM on the pool, not every single loan. And to extend that, if Mortgage 3 was worth 90, then you'd switch to market and the value would be 101+101.5+90 = 292.5 -- again it's not 99+99+90.

  1. wrt OAs, yes they were insidious when opened up to the masses (although World Savings had a heck of record with them for a generation). Note however that if the Fed dramatically lowers rates and keeps them down for some time, that will relieve some of the OA pressure from the difference b/t the teaser rate and the IO rate. And, yes, I know that doesn't solve the fundamental issue.

I suspect that we will know the dope's by their proclivity to declare their own intellectual superiority... Wink

--
"...and independent auditors."

What country do you live in? More importantly, who make the rules that auditors can't challenge?

How about an "independent" President who can't be owned by Bankrupters and Fraudsters of New York City? LOL! Only a certifiable money whore can become a US President (I swore not to vote after 2000 election, even though I did vote for W and funded his campaign; it was the last made).

The problem with a thoroughly corrupt system is that all the important people get mostly corrupted. Then, we have corrupt persons being overseen by a corrupt bureaucracy (auditors are part of the bureaucracy). The problem becomes hopeless when people are turned into dopes so that they cannot understand the root causes and ENDLESSLY debate the details. Do you see what I mean?

Jas

Help. This has probably already been answered somewhere else so I am sorry if it is OT.

I have been following Countrywide on and off for a few years never understanding how their tactics were ok but whatever.

It is constantly talked about in the press that BofA is buying CW for 4 billion, what about the debt?????

A "buyout" used to always say "1 billion and assumption of debt".

If BofA is going to be allowed to buy the good parts of CW and not have to assume the debt this will be the biggest screw job ever.

Has anyone seen anything about the debt, possibly 100 billion + of which exists???????

TYIA

Anonymous and others who have expressed concern about very low yielding conservative investments - I have been able to avoid that in taxable fixed income in recent years with callable CDs. They are conservative in the sense that they are CDs - and federally insured. But they usually have pretty long maturities (15-20 years). So you are taking on interest rate risk. They have mostly been issued by outfits like Lehman Brothers and the like to do mortgage investments - so it is possible that the market will dry up as mortgage issuance dries up. It's easy to put together a less than $2-3 million portfolio with the usual suspect issuers - especially if you're working with IRAs - where maximum FDIC insurance is $250,000 - or a couple with maximum FDIC insurance of $200,000. Of course - if you're talking about $5-10 million+ - the investment won't work very well. Last issue I bought was HSBC - 6% for 20 years with 2 years of call protection - last week in December. Anyway - if you're inerested - let me know - and I can give you more details. Note that these are illiquid investments - not suitable for people who may have to sell before maturity. OTOH - for older people - they do have "death puts" (if the owner dies - you can redeem the issues at par if you care to).

Investment bank traders might miss out on 7 figure bonuses or lose their jobs, and we should be concerned about that? After they spend day and night working on progressively more devious schemes to fleece normal working American (and others) of every dime they can turn into bonus money? What is it they actually do? Left sufficiently unchecked, it's pretty obvious they are not up to anything of benefit to society.

If they all were out of work for a while America would be a better place.

Aheadofthecurve,

You call for a bailout of all banks. Would it not be more effective to allow the poorly run banks to fail (i.e. C, WM, CFC) and then come in via the FDIC to redistribute their assets/liabilities to better run banks/management. Saving poorly run banks reward poors managers with a bailout that allow them to remain in business to screw it up again, does it not?

Last issue I bought was HSBC - 6% for 20 years with 2 years of call protection - last week in December.

That insurance is only for the principal and they don't say when you get you principal back. Some people have different ideas about conservative.

Mr. Shark,
You are correct. Most accountants will tell you that the statement of cash flows is the most important of the 3 financial statements.
All business transactions cycle back into cash.
When I looked at Citi's income and then bloated balance sheet, I knew something was wrong. The statement of cash flows tells you what's wrong.

Price,
Just one thing. It's the pool of loans you're valuing. If you have a "heads I lose, tails you win" scenario, you end up with undervaluation, which is just as deceiving as overvaluation. Undervaluation is the way companies keep "cookie jar reserves" to use in a future year when they might need to cover a down year.

I'm off. Good night all.

We're a little downthread but I'll take a shot at the CDS counterparty risk question.

Hedge funds will typically trade CDS with the AAA rated affilite of a major investement bank. CDS functions as an insurance contact.

One party sells insurance on a "reference entity", such as a certain corporate bond. The seller of such insurance will receive a quartely premium payment whose rate is expressed as a spread over a benchmark rate such as LIBOR.

The counterparty will buy the insurance and be liable for the quartely premium payment. Should the bond default, the buyer of protection will be entitled to a payment of the principal on the amount of the reference bond that was insured. The contract that governs the default events is the ISDA, most recently updated in 2005.

CDS spreads are actively quoted and traded so mark-to-market gains and losses are recognized in trading PLs every day.

When considering the CDS market one should envisage a hub and spoke network, with market participants like hedge funds as the spokes, and major IBs as the hubs. If my fund has bought protection on a bond from Goldman Sachs it's likely GS has hedged the trade by buying protection from a seller elsewhere.

The concerns about the CDS market revolve around what would happen should there be widespread defaults on bonds that serve as reference entities on commonly traded single name CDS or reference entities that serve as components of CDS indices. If my fund has bought protection from Goldman Sachs on a defaulting reference entity, I'll expect to collect the full amount of my notional from them. GS in turn will likely be looking to another fund for the same compensation. The worry is that many ultimate sellers of protection are naked, are weak hands, and won't be able to pay up when needed.

The CDS market was tested a few years ago when Adelphia defaulted on it's debt. That event took quite some time to work through. What we have not seen yet, but could trigger another wave in the ongoing crisis, is a rash of corporate defaults.

If I can show the cashflows and risks clearly, the accounting is an afterthought.
Mr Shark | 01.19.08 - 8:41 pm | #

Perhaps "afterthought" is a bit strong, but this reinforces the first lesson of running a small business: cash is king. Get that wrong, and nothing else matters.

Lama, an explanation of understanding cashflow statements next would be a nice follow-on. Thanks!

Re: Dope Factory!; hence, the term that I use -- Baby DOOMERS

Im thinking "Baby Dopers"

Some numbers for your weekend pleasure:

Below is a list of the 10 banks with the biggest exposures to ACA, according to estimates from Oppenheimer's Whitney. They are based on her assumption that the carrying values of the insurance contract will be marked down to 20% of their value. However, she cautions that the bonds being insured have widely varying credit quality, ranging from zero value for CDO squared assets (CDOs issued on other CDOs) to 70 cents on the dollar for high-grade assets.

BANK EXPOSURE TO ACA (IN $ BILLIONS)
Potential Markdown
Bank Est. Exposure @80% Discount
UBS $1.76 $1.41
Citigroup $1.75 $1.39
Merrill Lynch $1.65 $1.33
Wachovia $0.854 $0.68
Morgan Stanley $0.736 $0.59
Lehman Brothers $0.734 $0.59
Bank of America $0.574 $0.46
Goldman Sachs $0.550 $0.44
Deutsche Bank $0.310 $0.25
Royal Bk Scotland $0.340 $0.27
Source: Oppenheimer, Dealogic

-By Jed Horowitz, Dow Jones Newswires; 201-938-4047

DCRogers | 01.19.08 - 10:20 pm |

Financial statements only make sense within a specific industry. You shouldn't compare airlines to retailers to banks.

Cash is important, but don't forget about leverage. A company with a huge stash/inflow of cash for the fiscal year end isn't necessarily a good investment (equity wise).

A company should be investing their "extra" cash either for ROA or ROI. They have to put it to good use. But it all depends on the industry of course. For example, banking companies only require a fraction of the cash on hand to cover deposits...if they have too much on hand, why aren't they putting it to good use?

Gee, Citi waist deep in the mire again.

Hoodagest?

Have they come out on the right side of a trade in the last 400 days?

To see the dimensions of the looming bond insurance failure, compare it to the previous largest failure. It happened in 1991, when six large life insurance companies failed due to high-risk investment strategies. The companies and the book value of their assets in billions were

Mutual Benefit Life ($13.5)
Executive Life ($10.2)
Executive Life of NY ($3.2)
First Capital ($4.5)
Fidelity Bankers ($4.Innocent
Monarch Life ($4.5)

The total assets of all six was about $40 billion. Of this, a conservative estimate of losses was about 10% of assets or $4 billion.

Estimates of the excess of bond insurer liabilities over assets range from about $100 to $200 billion (but of course could be higher in a severe recession). In any case, that's 25X to 50X more than the previous debacle in 1991. If you adjust for inflation, maybe ten to 20 times larger.

I googled sitka pacific capital management, and I can't tell that they are even a real company. I doubt very seriously if they even have ten bucks in the bank. Google sitka pacific capital management, all you will find is a generic webpage. No articles from reuters, or marketwatch, or any reputable news organization. You will find this statement over and over: "Mike Shedlock is a registered investment advisor for sitka pacific capital management...". I don't even know what the hell that means. I think mish and his buddies are snake oil salesmen who don't know anything or anybody of consequence.

Anecdotal evidence for recession:

Foot traffic down at the Barret Jackson car auction this year. Maybe about 25% less. The average price at auction is much lower as well, with both the "normal" cars and the super exotic items. Only a few have been in the million dollar range. Hemis of all sorts seem to be selling for about 3/5ths of what they did last year. This year's hot item are Carroll Shelby items.

Barrett Jackson sales totals:
2007: $100mm
2006: $62mm

2008? I guessing under $50mm

"Some may enjoy this piece I wrote more than 10 years ago when I was working at Cisco."

Some?

OK, show of hands. Who wants to hear Jas read his paper? OK, who would like to hear my car alarm?

Right, I'll go get my keys.

I did vote for W and funded his campaign... --Jas Jain

What the hell were you thinking?

The fact that American let W into the White House (and even let him stay for a second term!) tells us how corrupt this country has become. It also foretells the bleakness of our future.

OK, every once in a while somebody intelligent presents an interesting bull-market case. See Louis-Vincent Gave on Financial Sense Newshour (tonight's eddition).

Ask the Expert 2008 - Financial Sense Newshour

I disagree with him, but at least he makes some coherent arguments. However, in my mind he fails to give enough weight to the main force at work in this financial climate. Namely, the collapse of the largest credit bubble in history. Calling US equities undervalued due to their strong earnings is kind of missing the point. Their strong earnings are about to disappear as their driving force disappears.

aotc,

You make two dangerous assumptions:

1) That there's any chance a "bailout" would actually change where we're headed; and,

2) That TPTB would have a clue as to what's "best for everyone". Hitler, Stalin and others always claimed to be working in the people's best interest. Furthermore, TPTB are the characters that got us into this mess.

The real beauty of the American system has been that failures are allowed to happen, that bad ideas yield bad results. If the current economic disaster is indicative of anything, it is that interfering in this process is fraught with danger.

This is the endgame for the "Greenspan Put", an abject lesson in the concept of moral hazard.

Wednesday, January 16, 2008

TALLAHASSEE, Fla. - Florida Insurance Commissioner Kevin McCarty today announced that he is suspending the certificate of authority of Allstate Companies to write new insurance in Florida until they fully comply with the subpoenas served Oct. 16 by the Office of Insurance Regulation (Office).

"It continues to trouble me that Allstate has not complied with our subpoenas and is not willing to explain to us their relationships with rating agencies, modeling companies and trade groups and how these relationships might have influenced the huge rate increases they have requested. This clearly cannot be in the best interests of Florida consumers."

This is the first time the Office has suspended a company for failure to "freely" provide documents as required by Florida law.

Public Service Of DH Enterprises

Dang it, why did Jeb have to go get a job with Lehman, now the insurance companies are trapped in a pool of lies

As the White House and congressional leaders discuss a potential stimulus plan to stem a national recession, California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger says his state's economic slowdown can be reversed by a quick release of bond funds.

About $29 billion worth unallocated bond funds slated for public works, to be specific.

"Speeding up construction of roads, schools and levee repairs will help our economy continue to grow and keep more people working," Schwarzenegger said on Friday as state officials released California's jobs report for December.

Follow to to that:

http://www.cbp.org/pdfs/2007/070110_govproposedbudget.pdf

Revised January 12, 2007

GOVERNOR RELEASES PROPOSED 2007-08 BUDGET

Governor Schwarzenegger released his Proposed 2007-08 Budget on January 10. The following update
provides a “quick and dirty” summary of key provisions of the Governor’s Proposed Budget

GO bonds must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Legislature and a majority of the voters. The SGP would
place the proposed GO bonds on the 2008 and 2010 ballots. Lease-revenue bonds require a majority vote of the
Legislature but do not require voter approval. Revenue bonds must be authorized by the Legislature, but are generally
not subject to voter approval. Revenue bonds are repaid with revenues produced by the projects, such as toll bridge
revenues. According to the LAO, after adjusting for inflation, each dollar borrowed will cost the state approximately
$1.30. Debt service on the $29 billion in GO bonds proposed in the Governor’s 2007 SGP would cost approximately
$1.9 billion per year over a 30-year period.

1) That there's any chance a "bailout" would actually change where we're headed; and,

2) That TPTB would have a clue as to what's "best for everyone". Hitler, Stalin and others always claimed to be working in the people's best interest. Furthermore, TPTB are the characters that got us into this mess.

Tj Agreed, but I think we are headed there. BTW thanks Lama. I appreciate your work.

even the Chinese know that the decoupling theory is a complete farce-

"'If US consumption weakens, our country's exports will be very much affected very much,' said Zhang at a financial forum sponsored by the 21st Century Herald newspaper.

Zhang's remarks reinforce previous central bank warnings that US consumption could be due for a significant adjustment.

In December, central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan said the US has a problem with 'overconsumption,' and added that the subprime crisis might be an occasion to address this issue, by encouraging a higher US savings rate, among other responses to the crisis."

China continues to be dependent on US consumption - central bank - Forbes.com

Jas,

The combination of your positions is curious, and I think they might fill a nice page of your own. I'd follow your link at least once.

Below is a list of the 10 banks with the biggest exposures to ACA

Zac, interesting article off of DJ on Friday about ACA...
CNNMoney.com: 404 Page Not Found

Catch this paragraph at the end..
Customers like Merrill Lynch and others that have already written off their ACA business may have an incentive to refuse to grant ACA a collateral waiver, said Donald Light, an analyst with Celent LLC, in an interview Friday.

"They don't have an incentive to agree to forbearance because they have already taken the hit," Light said. But refusing to waive the collateral agreement would force competitors who have not yet written down the holdings to do so.

Squeeze play !

Aheadofthecurve,

You call for a bailout of all banks. Would it not be more effective to allow the poorly run banks to fail (i.e. C, WM, CFC) and then come in via the FDIC to redistribute their assets/liabilities to better run banks/management. Saving poorly run banks reward poors managers with a bailout that allow them to remain in business to screw it up again, does it not?
RThomas | 01.19.08 - 9:40 pm | #

RThomas: That is what is most likely to happen and that's fine. It is the banking system that is necessary to a functioning economy not any bank in particular. I think the issue for the bond insurers is that they are all insolvent, so the model where a strong party buys up a weaker one is not in the cards for them. Therefore, if they serve a necessary function (and there seems to be some argument as to that) then a bailout a la Cramer needs to be considered.

By the way, just to be clear, I am not proposing socializing losses and privatizing gains. In exchange for their bailout or whatever you want to call it, the government would get an equity position in these entities. Once they are back on solid ground, the government would divest that equity at a profit. This model has been used in many other countries. The Government of Canada for one has made money divesting stakes in Crown Corporations like Air Canada, Petro Canada, CN Rail, etc.

As for Hitler and Stalin, last I checked, they are dead. Unless we are discussing mass murder, they, along with their pals Mao and Pol Pot, should be left in the graves they so richly earned. Unfotunately the Rwandan genocidaires and the butchers of Darfur are still alive and urgently merit our attention. Bad news for Jas Jain-their crimes may be more serious than those of crooked accountants.

"That insurance is only for the principal and they don't say when you get you principal back. Some people have different ideas about conservative."

Rob - FDIC insurance covers both principal and accrued interest up to the maximum FDIC coverage. Interest does not accrue after the date of an FDIC takeover. You are correct in saying that the FDIC can pay you when it wants to - but my experience with numerous S&L failures was that everything happened very fast (like overnight). And - you have as much risk in this regard with a 3 month CD as a 20 year CD.

BTW - one thing FDIC insurance does not cover is any premium paid on a brokered CD (there's a secondary market and you can pay - for example - 102 on a CD with a par value of 100).

Another point is that any institution which takes over the deposits of a failed institution isn't obligated to honor the original terms of your CD. So if - for example - Bank of America took over a failed Countrywide Bank - it wouldn't have to honor the high interest rates. It could say - you have the option of taking 2% instead of 5% - or getting your money back now (that's happened to me before when S&L's failed).

IMO - an FDIC failure to pay off insured deposits would be tantamount to a default by the United States on its debt obligations. And I don't see anything like that happening anytime soon.

So what do you see as "conservative" investments? Roby

Gravatar I did vote for W and funded his campaign... --Jas Jain

What the hell were you thinking?

The fact that American let W into the White House (and even let him stay for a second term!) tells us how corrupt this country has become. It also foretells the bleakness of our future.
unirealist | 01.20.08 - 1:26 am | #

unirealist - that's a little strong. I'd say the fact that our options as voters the last two elections have been W vs Gore and W vs Kerry leads me to think there is something very wrong with our political system, and I don't see any prospect for much improvement in the next election.

Carl- I'm not sure I understand that FDIC chart any better than you do, but the non-seasonally adjusted non-borrowed reserves total being negative scares the crap out of me. Did anyone who followed that link have a less disturbing explanation for what it means?

carl, mattj

3 regulars here were raising this same issue about a week or two ago...ndk, dryfly and one other (maybe sk or sa?)

i have been told twice that the downdraft in non borrowed reserves is related to the "dutch auction" at TAF window but i have not understood the significance.

let's keep asking because the numbers appear unprecedented.

"This year's hot item are Carroll Shelby items."

Don't know how closely you follow cars but...Cobra roadsters have finally climbed back to where they were in the late 80's. The huge run up to me is in the Boss 429 Mustangs. 300k for one ??

I am finally starting to see someone able to purchase a car for less than the restoration/build cost. That is a sign a bunch of speculation has left the building.

2008? I guessing under $50mm
Alec | 01.19.08 - 11:46 pm | #

Alec...

Maybe a little more due to the increase in number of vehicles ???
I thought i saw they were actioning 20% more this year ??

Chris

MattJ: the Fed chart showing non-borrowed reserves at 200 million has not yet been explained by anyone here as far as I've seen. Someone did at first suggest a clerical input error, but the WSJ ran it as is, also.

If it is correct, the implications may sink in to investors over the weekend, and watch out Tuesday.

As for my W comment, I was merely astounded that Jas (who rightly rails against the rampant corruption on Wall Street) supported the current WH resident, whose administration has redefined corruption. Not trying to start political debate, just stunned by the incongruity.

Cramer:the end of the world – or at least another 2,000-point decline in the market, which in my view is about the same thing.

When the "world ends" it would be nice if Cramer tagged along.

RThomas: That is what is most likely to happen and that's fine. It is the banking system that is necessary to a functioning economy not any bank in particular. I think the issue for the bond insurers is that they are all insolvent, so the model where a strong party buys up a weaker one is not in the cards for them. Therefore, if they serve a necessary function (and there seems to be some argument as to that) then a bailout a la Cramer needs to be considered.

Cramer wants the gov't to step in and prop up the insurers as is. Ban moral hazard. That isn't going to happen - as Rich pointed out way above - there isn't enough time... they'll fail too fast for action.

If there is a role for gov't it would be to be ready with the mop to force a rapid clean up so the 'system' survives as you suggest above but no one party being guaranteed of survival.

The reason it could get messy without a forced mop up is that you have insured parties with little risk who are worth something and those that are hopelessly in default (some of the CDOs held by SIVs & MMFs). But they are both insured by the same failing parties.

If you owned insurance on one of the defaulted accounts and you saw gov't stepping in to back up the safer muni's and other 'low risk' accounts but not your own - all as part of a 'global bailout' of your insurer - you'd have your lawyers in there the next day trying to block it to try and make them pay your claims too.

That's a bailout for sure.

So instead let the inurer fail - go into BK and the let a BK court appointed entity parcel off the pieces (as usually happens in BK). Because there is no 'strong party' going in as you pointed out I could see the gov't setting one up as part of the BK proceedings and forcing a triage and liquidation of the business. Then you could separate CDS accounts from munis and such...

Again - it wouldn't be a bail out as much as it would be a mop up with emphasis on trying to save the system quickly as opposed to a long drawn out process full of private court challenges.

JMHO.

Sebastian, An outstanding money making opportunity for you! InTrade odds of a recession = 69%. You and the WrightB can wager an unlimited amount. GO ahead!

Intrade Prediction Markets

I offered in 2 threads already that I am willing to wager a subscription to CR on an '08 recession. Ready?


carl, mattj

3 regulars here were raising this same issue about a week or two ago...ndk, dryfly and one other (maybe sk or sa?)
...
the downdraft in non borrowed reserves is related to the "dutch auction" at TAF window
mock turtle

I rephrase the issue as an INCREASE in BORROWED reserves and indeed last week we showed convincingly that that amount exactly matched the TAF; so its the TAF usage as showing up.

That simply changed the question to : "ok, then, where did the money they had go that they HAD to borrow" - I theorized that it went into our pockets, so to speak, an increase in money out "THERE" but ndk refuted that by pointing to the little changed vault cash number.

So, my new theory goes like this - at the FED the TAF "injection" was balanced by a $30b redemption of Treasuries (i.e. a draining of money) and a reduction in the total slosh created by their regular temporary open market operations. For the 1st case, then did the redeemed treasuries end up (in "newer issue" form ) at the banks - so we should see a corresponding increase in a holding of treasuries - but I don't know where to look for that in the Fed releases ( yet).

For the second, TOMO operations, we should see a reduction in primary dealer holdings somewhere - again I don't know where to look for it yet.

That at least would get the "money balance( cf mass balance equations ) right. But of even in a nuclear explosion the mass balance ALWAYS works so making the equation balance is not the same as understanding it !

My personal thinking is that a simple reduction in lending going on at this prevailing FFR and showing up in a variety of forms in the above stats - I'd like to be able to tie in the above stats into the AMB numbers to demonstrate that ( or show I'm wrong somewhere ) - all in due course.

-K

@MattJ:"...the Fed chart showing non-borrowed reserves at 200 million has not yet been explained by anyone here as far as I've seen. Someone did at first suggest a clerical input error, but the WSJ ran it as is, also."

I don't think it's an error. The FRB has added a column for the TAF credit, which isn't reflected in the WSJ page. The total reserve of $41577 million is the sum of 200 non-borrowed, 40,000 TAF credit, and 1,377 total "other" borrowings from the Fed. Clearly, if you look at the Dec 07 (monthly) and Jan 2 08 (weekly) numbers, the same methodolgy was used...TAF credits are being used to offset NBR as part of the total depository reserves.

FRB: H.3 Release--Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions--December 3, 2009 

So is the whole banking system now subprime??

cd

dryfly-I think I get where you are coming from on the bond insurers. Putting the details aside, my main point is that I'm all for letting the private sector have a first go at things. However, when they can't fix the problems (particularly problems that the government had a duty to prevent by regulatory action) then the government should step in. What I am proposing is rather than simply bailing out losses or throwing money out for poeople to buy big screen TVs, that they take an equity interest in the troubled entities, whether they be banks or bond insurers. That interest at least has a chance of being worth something at some later date. Why is it OK for the funds of foreign governments (and autocratic ones at that) to do that, but not the US government?

http://www.lvcva.com/getfile/ES-Nov2007.pdf?fileID=37

Look at the gaming revenue for Las Vegas versus last year. I guess the home equity loans aren't getting spent in Vegas anymore...


Why is it OK for the funds of foreign governments (and autocratic ones at that) to do that, but not the US government?
Aheadofthecurve

Err, because they have the funds and the US govt doesn't ? Smile

In fact nothing would change - the government IS broke - they don't have the money - their borrowing would increase to fund the equity stake and who would the government borrow from ? Who's buying US treasuries ?

-K

On the non-borrowed funds numbers:

One thing people miss is that the Fed is having difficulty managing monetary policy in a rate-targeting regime. At 4.25% there is simply no demand for funds by the system. The way targeting works is that system demand for funds forces Fed Funds UP, and the Fed injects to bring it back DOWN to target. No demand, no need to inject.

The lack of demand is why the Fed keeps having to sterilize TAF auctions. The auctions create less demand for Fed Funds, and to stop the rate from falling below target, the Fed is forced to withdraw liquidity.

Bottom line: you can target rates or the money supply, but not both. My sense is the Fed will abandon rate targeting in the next few months. It will first try to lower and create demand that way. If lower and lower rates produce the same result, the Fed will move to quantitative easing: effectively targeting a money supply growth objective instead of an interest rate. The 64k question is whether, at that point, long bond yields go to 1% as they did in Japan, or whether they spike. The behavior of gold would imply a spike is on its way.

One of the next big shoes to drop will be large, unexpected declines in federal tax revenues from many sources. When you combine that with one or more stimulus packages/tax cuts and War in Iraq, we could be looking at significant increases in federal deficits. From about $9.2 trillion now, federal debt clock could grow by $2 billion over the next two years, to above $11 trillion. It would put downward pressure on U.S. dollar and upward pressure on inflation.

There is great truth told by the many voices on this board about economic issues. And there is great truth here about what will happen politically.

For example, John McCain has ZERO chance of winning a Presidential election in November, because he is so closely tied to the Iraq War, is too stubborn to change position, and by November most Americans will know that continuing in Iraq = going broke as a nation.

I have mixed feelings about Ron Paul

but,

here's a relevant article about non borrowed reserves at a supporters site.

seems to somewhat intelligently explain some of the dynamics behind the plummeting reserves at depository institutions.

Has the Bank Bailout Begun? — Non-borrowed Reserves Turn Negative for the First Time! | Ron Paul War Room

To Anon. who posted the reply that contained this:

The counterparty will buy the insurance and be liable for the quartely premium payment. Should the bond default, the buyer of protection will be entitled to a payment of the principal on the amount of the reference bond that was insured. The contract that governs the default events is the ISDA, most recently updated in 2005.

Thank you

The gaming data is amazing; Laughlin has a 7% drop in visitors, yet gaming revenues are only down .1%. The Boulder strip numbers suggest the local casual gambler has really cut back but the degenerate gamblers still hang out on Fremont St.

"For example, John McCain has ZERO chance of winning a Presidential election in November, because he is so closely tied to the Iraq War, is too stubborn to change position, and by November most Americans will know that continuing in Iraq = going broke as a nation."

I'm sure he'd have Charles Keating's unqualified endorsement.

cd

Dear CR and Tanta,
I would like to know why the Fed Funds rate that is likely to be lower by a 1/2 to 3/4 of a point in the near furture....Perhaps at the Jan meeting.... is not specifically earmarketed for the Mortgage market rather than funneling it to the banks for them to use as they so desire....By all indications this much needed money is not going to go for mortgages as would be needed to restart the housing industry but could be selectively channeled to offload other failing entities on their books....I cannot believe that someone in the "power seats" would not make this a mandatory aspect of cutting the rate....thanks for your wonderful site...the LOrd bless you all....

Cramer wants the gov't to step in and prop up the insurers as is. Ban moral hazard. That isn't going to happen - as Rich pointed out way above - there isn't enough time... they'll fail too fast for action.

Actually, I believe there's another reason.

The investors who will bear the losses on insured bond failures are very diverse and dispersed. They don't have the ability to get together and lobby together for a bail-out. They include hundreds of pension plans, banks and insurance companies plus millions of mutual fund investors. Probably half of them don't yet even realized they face a big problem.

And there's another reason for no bailout -- the inability of ratings agencies to deal with the crisis in real time.

Imagine you're a Congress person and some lobbyist comes in your office to beg for a taxpayer bailout of Triple-A rated bonds by S&P and Moody's. How fast would you put a boot in his ass?

What I am proposing is rather than simply bailing out losses or throwing money out for poeople to buy big screen TVs, that they take an equity interest in the troubled entities, whether they be banks or bond insurers

Better to just start over with new entities picking up the pieces of the failures and trying to get those pieces into the hands of the the private market as soon as possible rather tan the gov't buying and propping up the existing players even if the gov't had equity in them afterward... I mean if those companies had net value the gov't wouldn't have to step in anyway.

My fear of a gov't entity is that it become permanent - like the GSEs but worse. At least in the RTC daze they had the discipline to sunset the thing. And I'm not a market-only-uber-alles type... I just don't see a public good for a GSE-like bond insurer but can see how the gov't might be able to help bust the log jam via some kind of RTC-like solution if all the insures simultaneously fail and there is no functioning market for liquidation.

But I'm even conflicted with that concept considering the current gang in charge of the shop. I can all too quickly imagine an innocent looking RTC-like liquidator become a Haliburton franchise.

Probably half of them don't yet even realized they face a big problem.

They will know soon.

Davos-

"As striking is the large contingent of senior US regulators and policymakers – a reflection perhaps of the pressure the US financial community feels to convince the rest of the world that it has the country’s banking woes under control. For while Hank Paulson, US Treasury secretary, has had to cancel a planned appearance due to the looming US fiscal package, Timothy Geithner of the New York Federal Reserve, Christopher Cox of the Securities and Exchange Commission are among those in attendance."

FT.com / In depth - Economic uncertainty to dominate Davos

For example, John McCain has ZERO chance of winning a Presidential election in November, because he is so closely tied to the Iraq War, is too stubborn to change position, and by November most Americans will know that continuing in Iraq = going broke as a nation.

If I were in Vegas I'd take McCain vs Hillary any day... heck I'd even give points (electoral votes). They both have problems with support of the Iraq issue. They both have strong pro-establishment corporate positions... but McCain isn't a Clinton & I believe 'Clinton fatigue' will hurt Hillary big time.

If Bloomberg steps in as an indy I'm even more certain McCain wins - in that case I can't even see Hillary winning NY state - Hillary & Bloomberg split NYC & McCain takes 'Up State' and suburbs - winning.

The only caveat is Ron Paul... if he runs as an indy then some of the western states that McCain would count on might 'split off' from GOP. I don't see RP running indy though... I see RP going back to the HOR instead. Or off into the sunset...

Hillary has better odds against some of the others, say Huckabee or Romney. The other GOPers are toast as are all the other Dems besides Obama.

The most interesting match up would be Obama vs Huckabee - I have no clue how that would play out.

JMHO.

Probably half of them don't yet even realize they face a big problem

From what I read at IHT this afternoon, the treasury and congress don't yet realize the nature of the problem they face.

Economists debate the quickest cure for U.S. ills - The New York Times

Clinton/Obama vs McCain/Hucabee Dems win because of recession.

aotc,

Nice of you to consistently avoid responding to the substance of an argument.

Meanwhile, the U.S. isn't into nationalizing industries, either. If private investors -- including SWFs -- aren't interested, Uncle Same sure as hell shouldn't be.

tg | 01.20.08 - 3:37 pm | # "Clinton/Obama vs McCain/Hucabee Dems win because of recession."

i vote tg is right, BUT, as long as there is no "october surprise"

I don't think Clinton would or should pick Obama as a running mate. Richardson would be a much better choice. Because the Hispanic vote is "in play" and the African-American vote isn't. A Clinton/Richardson ticket could carry a "purple" state like Florida. Roby

Tanta wrote: "No. You write the value down to the net present value of what you think you will collect. Unless you think the collateral is really worth $0, you don't write the loan down by its principal amount. You would estimate recoveries in foreclosure, and write down to that."

Tanta, thanks for the info. So, at the time of default, you would estimate recoveries in foreclosure, and write down to that. I assume that's not the final step in the process, though... when you have the numbers for the actual recoveries from foreclosure (i.e. when the REO properties have sold), I would assume you would write down any additional loss (or write up any gain) at that point.

I ask because I see this as another potential source of larger-than-expected writedowns. Historically, banks may have estimated a 20-30% (or whatever) loss from foreclosure. But considering these factors:

  • Declining home prices
  • Record foreclosure levels further depressing prices in the REO segment
  • Additional damage done to REO homes in many urban areas due to copper stripping
  • These three factors magnifying each other

... I wouldn't be surprised if banks are underestimating foreclosure losses. Does this make sense?

The Mortgage Pig looks very regal in profile.

Please add this to The Compleat UberNerd section. I may have to re-read it several times.

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