The "olden days" were 1996 BTW.

Brilliant...i understood all of that...the fog is lifting.

i have to question the accuracy of CR sometimes: "... Tanta posts here occasionally. ..."

occasionally???

Smile

Yen Advances Versus Dollar, Euro on Bets Investors Fleeing Risk

Fallout of 'SubPrime' melt down is threaten the carry trade.

So the CDOs are threatened by banks running on mortgage originators destroying their 'reserves[capital]' and thus destroying their ability to pay all claimants.

and now

A supposed supply of capital for the CDOs, the carry trade where one borrows in yen and invests in $$$ is getting caught on the wrong side of the trade. Just as their costs of investing go up, their source of funds also goes up. If the investment is long term and not yielding enough to cover the risk and the cost is short term and expensive, then someone is going to get hurt bad.

I didn't see the interview, but Mozilo's comments about a liquidity crisis suggest there is some real fear at Countrywide.

"I didn't see the interview, but Mozilo's comments about a liquidity crisis suggest there is some real fear at Countrywide."

I saw it Brian...he seamed pretty nervous and anxious too. Kept saying that the gov't needs to calm down and not over-react to the situation and he said that he sees a real hard landing ahead...

After that they had someone on from Massachusetts saying that Bear Sterns and UBS have been supposed questioning their ratings analysis on Sub-prime mortgage Cos. (New Century in particular)

correction: Subpoenaed (not supposed) questioning their ratings analysis on Sub-prime mortgage Cos. (New Century in particular)

Anonymous, CR uses the term "occasionally" because he is simply too polite to use the phrase "whenever the hell she feels like it." The joy of being just the assistant part-time co-blogger is that you don't have to come up with something every day on any kind of disciplined schedule. Hell, if it paid, it would be the world's best job.

Tanta,

You were the shy one with terse answers at the edge of the cocktail party, right? Smile

Thank you for that exposition. It answered many a question I've had but not been able to articulate for lack of a historical framework.

If they want to help those who bought houses and now can not pay for them they have to take it via taxes from the people who made money from selling their homes.

Nouriel Roubini gives kudos to CR:
?"But now the subprime and mortgage and credit crunch genie is out of the bottle and no amount of self-serving spin will be able to lock it back in the bottle. So kudos to Shiller, Rosenberg, Calculated Risk, Zelman and a few others who braved early on to say that the housing and mortgage emperor had no clothes.'
RGE - Nouriel Roubini's Global EconoMonitor 

RIGHT ON!!!

and thanks for everything CR & Tanta!

OT: what was the SF Chronicle's motto under its masthead -- "Yesterday's News Today"?

Mortgage Fears Jolt Stocks
Dow dives 242 amid troubles for subprime lenders. AP
Late house payments, foreclosures soar
Downtown SF building fetches record price
Worries rise over high risk lending

Thank you, this is an excellent explanation of the complacency in the system. So basically we have had a technological advance in finance not dissimilar to the old days of tech stocks and dotcoms. Wow I am really showing my age now.

If your dad was a smoker and you had told him for years that he shouldn't smoke because he would get cancer-would you feel glad when he finally got cancer? Would it feel good to say "I told you so"? It wouldn't help, would it? This country is being broken in more ways than can be believed. It is a time for sadness, reflection and change.

CSFB report (Zelman) on housing market now available on Bill Cara's site

Isn't it interesting that the NYSE had to put in place trading curbs to stop the market from plummeting today. Feels like a panic to me.

Neal, I disagree vehemently about it being a time for sadness, reflection and change.

Nothing is smashed yet, just looking slightly less optimistic than usual.
As somebody who has been continuously pilloried for being cynical, I am enjoying being right that this huge housing bubble has proven to be a financial illusion.

Change only happens in this country when enough people suffer and squeal like piggies they have become. Change is good, so embrace it and realize you have been sold down the river with the rest of us. Now bail dammit, not curl up in a ball of sad reflectivity.

Tough words from somebody who actually believes that what comes next will be worse for the masses.

And do let's steal a comment from Roubini's blog:

"As first reported by the excellent Calculated Risk, the best blogger on the housing and mortgage disaster"

More importantly, he is an extremely nice individual - always the perfect gentleman. He wears his obvious brilliance very lightly. That last is a refreshing change from the usual bombast and arrogance one frequently encounters.

Indeed.

Now, back to the regularly scheduled bombast and arrogance of the comment section.*

*Note to the irony-impaired: this is a form of self-deprecating humor.

Brilliant Tanta. Superb exposition.

Quite a few weeks ago, Alan Abelson quoted someone as saying that the trouble with the derivatives/hedge fund world was that it could all unravel in a very short period of time.

I very frankly don't see where the support for higher asset prices is going to come from. The only constituency that can save us is the...

...the envelope please...

Chinese.

But they, let me tell you, are going to want something in return.

The hegemony of the United States is over.

Anthony... Source for that info? TIA

--
March 13, 2007

Countrywide’s Angelo R. Mozilo: “[Subprime Meltdown] Is GREAT NEWS”

In a session with Maria on CNBC Mr. Mozilo could hardly contain his confidence in the future success of his company. While talking about the subprime meltdown he said that it will “cause pain in the economy” and that will make “the Fed cur rates.” This sequence, he said, “is great news.” He is very happy that most of his competitors would be wiped out (some already are in the process). He repeated his prognostication of the great news that lies ahead for emphasis.

In the wonderful world on OZ that the US economy has been ushered into the Fed has the total control as to what it wants to happen in the economy. When the Fed starts to cut rates, to rescue the economy from pain, the while cycle of 2002-2005 will repeat and those were the wonder years for companies like Mr. Mozilo’s. Since the housing has already bottomed the next leg up would follow Fed’s rate cuts.

Is it time to sell my truckload of puts in Hopebuilders and Fraudentials (some prior GTC orders to sell CFC puts did go thru today)? Hell no. The fun has barely begun. My minimum target for puts is 10x since 02/20/07.

Jas

Allen M:

I have mine, I'm well positioned, don't worry about me.

But what I do is that I remember growing up poor in Minnesota- I lived in an unheated house two winters, my mom kept my siblings and me home from school more than once because she figured that the school might catch on that all we had to eat in the house that week was a five pound bag of flour. I still hate pancakes. It sucked, and it will still suck for many others.

"And the whole process is muddled and manipulated by certain folks who have an interest in things remaining “competitive,” which you can bet is quite often code for “unregulated.”

Reminds me of the S&L industry back in the 1980's.

Gold crashed today.

Somebody needs cash really badly.

Okay, everybody, is the euro an asset or an income producer?

It's up today. That means it's not an asset. But is it?

What's the difference between the euro and gold?

I don't have the faintest idea.

I do know that one is up and one is down.

arbogast has it in a nutshell, we are done as a world spanning superpower.

The power of the fisc is awesome when properly employed and ruinious when not. Obviously we are in the not category for reasons that have had entire books written to cover our follies. Well, it shall be interesting to see what shall arise from our ruins.

I see piles of tiles with granite countertops marching across the desert in orderly rows....kinda makes me miss ol' Edward Abbey.

Abrogast,

It's the unwinding of the carry trade that you are seeing. All these guys borrowed in yen at absurdly low rates and bought, gold, oil, CDOs, junk bonds, Icelandic govt bonds, you name it. The carry trade is starting to unwind and all those leveraged speculative assets are being sold. Watch the yen.

arbogast,
China will be an increasing influence on the world. I do believe they will take a haircut themselves on some questionable notes denominated in dollars of lower relative value. I think they already know all this.
Russia is in a position to be a menace in the near future as well, availing themselves of our destructive diplomacy with oil producing states. Who is watching their military, now that they are our friends?

Tanta, Thanks for the great post. With the non uniform loans, inherently complex structure and lack of history the rating agencies had a very tough job to do to evaluate the CDO's and tranches etc.

Fees from structured finance for the rating agencies are very important. (for Mcgraw Hill/S5P 55.4% of 2006 revenue growth)

Tough job, conflicting motives for rating agencies (conservative hurts business volumes) = mistake for investors to rely on ratings.

Outstanding taxonomy of the "new" mortgage markets, Tanta. Please continue posting often! Smile Given the last paragraph of your post, I may see some things a little differently.

In the 1980's, the GSE's survived the "ALMO" credit risk scenario (used in the GSEs' capital regulation), when Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma suffered the oil patch boom/bust. Then, in the 1990's, "steady Freddie" and Fannie made enormous profits by leveraging their borrowing advantage and expanding their retained portfolios enormously, despite steadily decreasing their g-fees.

I understand and applaud your emphasis on standards and efficiency. However, I think having only two "grown ups" in charge of credit standards has led to an enormous concentration of credit and market risk in the portfolios of just two institutions - a serious systemic risk (i.e., Greenspan and Bernanke's comments).

Moreover, the investment banks, hedge funds, etc that have ended up holding the vast majority of the risk from "alternative" mortgage investments clearly understood the risks, even if they chose not to do the required due diligence.

From an "efficient markets" standpoint - full disclosure - I am a finance PhD Smile - I believe the market will self-correct. Investors foolish enough to assume 4-6% appreciation would continue indefinitely will be paying the price.

I suspect borrowers and investors in "traditional" instruments (i.e., "conforming") should not suffer greatly." Alternative" products will become less easily available, and investors will charge a higher premium in the future.

Do you agree with this characterization? Extensions and clarifications of your posts are always welcome. Smile

Nice work Tanta. Problem: This only makes me more nervous aboout the only bond fund available in my company sponsored 401k. It features 25% Treasury notes, 20% Agency notes (which I am somewhat confident the USG will shore up) and the rest is in AAA, AA, A, BBB MBS and other corp bonds of various trashy credit ratings. That's it. I have no choices other than stocks which I want to avoid for a while. I can take some funds out but with a penaly - no more company match for 6mos which stinks too.

YIKES!!!!!!!!!!

Tanta I completely agree with you in your way to assign meanings to terms such as "competitive" or "efficient".

Excelent post.

Barely,

What is the average credit rating? Average bond diration? Is this a bond fund or a money market fund? Can you give us the ticker symbol? Might be a good discussion to analyze 401K bond / money market risk. A subject that is near to my heart (and wallet). I have looked through more prospectuses and SEC filling in the last few months than ..... (insert long period of time here)

OT

I see piles of tiles with granite countertops marching across the desert in orderly rows....kinda makes me miss ol' Edward Abbey

AllenM: Abbey was a special person, can't print what he would say about those granite counter tops!

Tanta, Do you think a holdback concept would be a good idea? A % the value of loans sold would not be paid to the originator till after 1 or 2 years. The amount would be reduced if default performance on the loans was poor.

Moreover, the investment banks, hedge funds, etc that have ended up holding the vast majority of the risk from "alternative" mortgage investments clearly understood the risks, even if they chose not to do the required due diligence.

I disagree with that. I don't know if you come from the world of portfolio management but when you manage a CDO, a hedge fund or a client account, you most often love what you do and believe that you're doing your best, and/or that there isn't more you can do and/or that there is more you can do but it only makes a small dent in your performance. It's wrong IMO to state outright that investors "knew the risk they were taking". Quite wrong.

Tante,

I don't think you understand how new productrs get created on Wall Street. Some young smart guy tries to solve a combination of a client's problems at the same time. Those problems can be taxes, an inability to generate sufficient returns, a mismatch of maturities, average life or duration, a stock price that a capital needing compoany thinks is too low and rating agency concerns. Young smart guy, usually along with other young smart guys, come up with a new product that deals with a specific situation. They model it, run it by outside counsel, an outside accounting firm and the rating agencies to determine that it does what they think it will do while not creating other problems. Often, a buyer will be brought into the process to help price the product. Onlt then does the new product get presented to a potential issuer. If they like it, then the corporate finance guys get briefed on this new product and voila, it gets rolled out nationally in a just a few weeks. What happens next is that the Wall Street competition reverse engineers it (a matter of only a few weeks) and the product very quickly gets commoditized and stops being "new."

In my time on the Street, whenever the Feds/IRS or the SEC made some product no longer tenable (usually after years), it takes the street another few weeks (that's it) to come up with another answer to the same issue, then the cycle repeats. Why do I drone on about this? Here are a couple of truths:

  1. Wall Street smart guys are as a group significantly smarter and more sophisticated and far harder working than the buy side (other than hedge funds), the IRS, the SEC and the rating agencies. All the latter groups can do is get in the way from time to time. The idea that these new prodcuts can in any important way be "regulated" is simply wrong.
  2. The buy side (again other than the hedge funds) in many cases substitutes the rating agencies for their own analysis for cost reasons. Rating agency guys for the most part are several brainpower classes below both Wall Street guys and buy side guys.

Time for my own rant. There is nothing unusual going on here in the mortgage market. It is what markets do. It has a problem, gets oversold, smart guys come in and clean up the mess, make a forune doing so, and it returns in a modified, and better, form. Look at all the investment in fiber optic cable in the nineties by companies that went belly up. Now? It is how we are conversing. As a result of unusual products like the exotic mortgages, more people own homes than ever before. That is inarguably a good thing. Why? Because they chose to buy a home.

If you "regulate" things, you don't punish the rich, you just limit the opportunity for the poor. You can't regulate for the stupid without penalizing everyone.

We'll get throught his just fine, just like we got through the salad oil scandal, the S&L crisis, and a hundred other things like it. It is the price we pay for the benefits of capit

Kyle, I certainly agree that there are systemic risks with Fannie and Freddie, having to do not just with their size, but with the fact that they are where the fixed rate loans go. That's an issue I ignored in my post in part because you can't say everything at once, and in part because it opens a whole 'nuther can of worms. But insofar as the GSEs are very nearly the only participants in the conforming dollar market willing to (designed to) take fixed interest rate risk on 30 year loans, they will be a huge risk concentration, required to find ever more sophisticated ways to hedge that risk, and thus ever more intertwined with the go-go economy of hedgies, derivatives, etc.

I really only wanted to make the point that this is a separate issue from the credit quality of the loans they buy, on a historical view. (I agree, by the way, that they have been shaving down the g-fees to startlingly low levels, at least if you're CFC or WF or BoA or someone. If you're Community Bank of Podunk, you're paying a higher g-fee for what I think are likely either the same or even better loans. I say that as someone who does a lot of due diligence and therefore sees how sloppy the "well capitalized" lenders can be on an operational basis.)

I am not at all sure, however, that I can agree that all the players understood the risks in Alt-A lending. I have talked to to many Street firms, on the buy side or the sell side, who really don't think all this "Main Street" stuff really matters. The arrogance is frequently more than breathtaking, and one of the ways you can see it is actually in the imprecision (to an old mortgage banker like me) of the language they use. Like a lot of people who see everyone else as the sucker, they have a bad habit of thinking of mortgages as the sleepy province of a bunch of nerds, that are of interest to the Street only to the extent that this sleepy little part of the finance world can be "saved from itself" through the miracles of securitization.

I stand by a claim I've made before that there just isn't enough yield in mortgage loans to be able to pay the originator/broker/dealer/rater/insurer/guarantor/investor food chain and still be affordable to the consumer. So one of two things had to happen: either the consumer got a rate it couldn't carry--witness certain current carnage--or the securities just couldn't generate enough spiff, forcing spreads to ridiculous levels. Sorry, but I think of this kind of thing as fairly Banking 101, and the fact that the Street sharpies didn't seem to be able to grasp it suggests to me that they were, in fact, smoking their own dope on this stuff. I'll need further evidence that they really understood that you couldn't endlessly rearrange credit guidelines and keep up the risk layering without completely destabilizing the market. I understand the whole phenomenon of insisting that "It's subprime! Look over there! It's not Alt-A, it's subprime!" to be more or less some ass-covering by some folks who made some stupid assurances to their investors.

Thanks CR for shedding some light that I joke about already with some co workers. "Terminology degredation"

For example, what is a "Government" loan? FHA and VA, right? Well how about Housing Authority? How about Low Income Census Tract? How about ACORN? Or the Teacher/Firefighter/Nurses advanage lending?

Same thing with close of a loan. Do you mean signing date? Docs returned date? Funding date? System date? Booked date? Filled date? The computer has a spot for all of these, and it cares, even if the conversationist wants to gloss it over.

People come up with their own handy dandy assumptions about these standards, and confusion reigns when people from different sides of the industry, (or even from different departments at the same lender), try to converse about it.

Banker, I think you're mostly making my point for me. The Street designs products to meet certain needs. We can all just right now dispense with the delusion that those needs have much to do with homeowners, homeownership, or the provision of liquidity to geographic areas of the country that otherwise have to struggle to be able to have reasonable mortgage credit capacity. The Street wants some rich folks to have tax advantages, and if that screws up the mortgage market for the little people, well **&^^ the little people.

And I still can't believe anyone is willing to make the claim that homeownership is always and everywhere a good thing. That sounds to me like the bullshit I heard a few short years ago about how equity ownership outside of retirement accounts was "inarguably" a good thing for your average household. The hell it was.

Reuters reported on trading curbs on the NYSE at 3.04pm today.

Banker, What does, "We'll be just fine", mean exactly?

Here's my view:

It's clear a lot of people got filthy rich originating and securitizing - The really smart ones. The dopes that lined up to buy this CDO crap, including pension funds that are supposed to support people that put aside their own income for retirement investment are ultimately the ones that get screwed in my view.

The borrowers that took insane risks probably get what they deserve.

We get screwed by the really sharp Wall St kids. Those kids can rot in hell for all I care.

Great Post
That filled in what went wrong. I couldn't buy home 10yrs ago and then when someone told me they could now get me a loan, I just ran. At 60K year blue collar worker in Calif. I know it wasn't possible, but maybe in 2008 a bank might want to give one instead of a toaster.
jo6pac

Tanta, Do you think a holdback concept would be a good idea? A % the value of loans sold would not be paid to the originator till after 1 or 2 years. The amount would be reduced if default performance on the loans was poor.

It's an interesting idea, vicjim, but my immediate response is that it would defeat the purpose that a lot of depositories, at least, have for securitizing their loans: they don't want to have to reserve for them as you must if they're on balance sheet. A holdback is really just another reserve, isn't it?

Thanks Tanta for that exposition of the proliferation of loan varieties and the culture (marketing, administration, regulation) that attends this evolution (devolution, mutation...)[..geeze I'm startin to sound like them].
Once again:
U do a number on unpacking this mess, a growing mess that is generating more heat, and not always more light, from others possessing less equanimity.

The U.S. is not just going to pull out of this
debacle like it has previously.

Banker:

[We'll get throught his just fine, just like we got through the salad oil scandal, the S&L crisis, and a hundred other things like it. It is the price we pay for the benefits of capit]

Then why all the calls to Dodd's office today?

March 13 (Bloomberg) -- U.S. lawmakers will have to consider providing aid to about 2.2 million subprime mortgage borrowers who are at risk of defaulting and losing their homes, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd said today.

Tanta: Thank you for a very clear exposition on these terms and their history. It was very informative and helpful.

Banker: I have to take issue with some of your statements. Specifically, you stated:

"As a result of unusual products like the exotic mortgages, more people own homes than ever before. That is inarguably a good thing. Why? Because they chose to buy a home.

"If you "regulate" things, you don't punish the rich, you just limit the opportunity for the poor. You can't regulate for the stupid without penalizing everyone."

First, those people who "bought" a home using an exotic mortgage most definitely do NOT "own" their home. Sure, they have the legal title (depending on the state), but the lender has a lien on it. And, just look at the news and you see that foreclosures are continuing to rise dramatically. So, for those with exotic (I prefer the term toxic) mortgages that are losing them to foreclosure, they never owned the home (although they might have been delusional enough to think they did for awhile) and now will suffer the emotional and financial carnage that a foreclosure brings. There are millions more who are going to suffer this fate. So, these people did not "own" their homes, and this is not "inarguably" a good thing.

This brings me to your second point about regulation. Have looser lending standards helped some "poor" people buy homes? Sure (and some will even be able to keep them). But, as mentioned above with regard to foreclosures, it has also subjected a lot of "poor" people to additional financial distress. And, by the way, please spare me the line of we're trying to help poor people. Bankers are trying to make money, and they don't give a rat's a$$ about those people they're loaning money to. If they did, then they wouldn't be qualifying borrowers based solely on the teaser rates, with absolutely no regard to the borrower's ability to pay the loan when it resets (basically, just a pre-packaged foreclosure or refi waiting to happen - with the lender hoping for the refi so it can generate more fees from this borrower). Oh, and by offering all of these no down, no doc, teaser rate loans, the lenders merely drove the price of homes skyrocketing by dramatically increasing demand. High prices don't help poor people, but they do help banks who then can loan more money.

And before you think I'm some nutso bleeding heart liberal that wants government to regulate everything - believe me, I'm not. I'm a Libertarian, so I have a strong aversion to government intervention and regulation. However, I also have a strong aversion to people who try to claim that they're just trying to help people out, instead of coming clean and saying that they are creating mortgage products in an effort to drum up more business so that they can make more money. There's nothing wrong with making money (provided that you are not doing it illegally or fraudulently). But, please just a

Banker,

There's a difference between people who have razor sharp wits and those who are deep thinkers. Wall Street finance folks generally fall into the former category. However, I think you're conflating the two groups. Whether someone from the first also falls into the second is completely orthogonal - I know plenty of slow-witted people who produce very deep insights into the structure of complex problems and many seemingly stupendously sharp ones who have no ability to see the big picture.

Banker said - "There is nothing unusual going on here in the mortgage market. It is what markets do. It has a problem, gets oversold, smart guys come in and clean up the mess, make a forune doing so, and it returns in a modified, and better, form."

There are only so many ways to cook a Turkey.

Why on Gods green earth is it necessary to turn finance/investing into an excercise in quantum physics? How many variables can get rearranged before some other 'smart guy' says ... Heeeyyy - I've seen this before !

As a mental exercise, try to envision where all this financial modification/innovation ends.

A wise man once told me ... "you can't polish a turd"

It would be wrong to assume that an Alt-A borrower = subprime high risk. I say this as one whom has been deemed Alt-A and own an investment property and an primary residence. We make our payments and have never delinquent.

Unfortunately, poor reporting in the mainstream media is lumping good Alt-A borrowers with those whom should have been considered subprime in the first place and now my options will be narrowed somewhat but not eliminated.

The subprime market has been a wonderful shell game where everyone made a lot of money on screwing the poor who thought pursuing the American Dream meant paying too much for a house and too much on the loan and on loans that seemed cheap on paper [well at least for a year or two].

Houses will foreclose, credit will tighten, the Fed will likely have to cut rates, the housing stock will be bought on the cheap, the market will stabilize, more money will be made, and eventually lending standards will be less stringent as there is always money to made as mortgage lending has become like stocks, a transaction driven process where the real motivation is to make money on the sale from all parties involved [and there are a lot] and the sale of the loan itself to yet even more parties.

Surely the wholesale lenders and those handling the sales of those securities knew what they were getting into and to state otherwise either means 1] they are lying] or 2] they are just stupid and smarter managers of liquid capital will put them out of business but fast.

I suspect the lenders whose CEOs sold off a lot of stock recently only to complain about the market are just stupid liars, but smart enough to get out before the market corrects the mistake of placing faith in bad financial management that took the route of short term profit over long term investment.

Just looking at the China post back there.

Chinese.

But they, let me tell you, are going to want something in return.

The hegemony of the United States is over.
arbogast

China depends on trade with us as much as we depend on trade with her. This will burn them as much as us. They have mass miss allocation of capital. Rampant overproduction will eat them alive.

They really need to take those cash reserves and buy services from us. Cars, medical equipment, engineering services, boob jobs, hookers. Stuff we got plenty of.

From what I hear tell they could really use the hookers.

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