You've probably seen the news already, but don't miss the immolation at Ownit Mortgage, which just shut its doors virtually overnight. I've seen the subprime industry implode before (back in 1998) and we could see something similar this time if the debt markets start tightening up.
Thanks for your thoughts Mike. Now, would you say that 'poof' is what actually happened (I'm sure the employees who were phoned at 5pm the day before telling them not to bother coming in the following morning feel this is accurate --not terribly much notice.) or what management was willing to concede to the public? How much information had to be concealed and for how long by these guys who were having trouble with cash-flow? Was there a particular event that sacked them and gave them hope that there would be 'luckier' days ahead?
Meanwhile back at the stockmarket ranch, I see insider's dumping stocks at record or near-rates.
I think the problems in the subprime industry have been a long time coming ... and it's relatively common knowledge that lenders are having problems. Several companies have discussed the surge in first-payment/early payment defaults and I've seen news stories about end investors putting a lot more loans back to originators. Bloomberg also had a story or two about how spreads on higher risk mortgage bonds are widening. And of course, this week, both the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times reported on how subprime mortgages are performing very poorly. Who knows exactly what the details (how long management knew about the problems, for instance) are in this case. I certainly don't. But I will say that in 1998, when things last blew up in subprime-land, the timeline from initial trouble to outright shutdowns/office padlockings was very short.
"Ownit ran out of cash needed to meet its obligations to repurchase loans from investment banks and others who bought them in the secondary market, people in the industry said. The banks, which convert the loan payments into mortgage-backed securities for sale to investors, can force the original lenders to repurchase loans if the mortgage borrowers default."
Merrill Lynch happens to own a 20% stake in Ownit? Merrill Lynch the investment bank?
Yes, repurchase requests can make an undercapitalized counterparty go "poof." I imagine somebody's checking some pools to see how many Ownit-originated loans are in there.
I'm just, say, tickled by the fact that the crisis appears to be caused by investment banks pushing defaults back onto . . . originators owned by investment banks. Man, that First Franklin deal is sounding really brilliant now, isn't it?
And WAMU and Wells Fargo have made big noise of late about their strategic decisions to focus on subprime. Why not? The competition is . . . disappearing.
Mike in Florida. Thanks for
the news on Ownit. This development could be highly significant since it should make purchasers of new sub-prime backed mortgage securities much more cautious as well as decreasing the price of existing securities.
On the other hand the strong prices of mortgage insurers like PMI argue for a relatively modest problems.
I'm suspicious problems will be significant and will invest on that basis if that is confirmed by weaker share prices for some of the lendors such as New Century Financial and Countrywide.
Is this graph saying that Household Mortgage dept increased each quarter by the height of the bar? That is is the total Household Mortgage dept the integral of this picture?
Anyone who doesn't know that this is completely unsustainable can only be described as living in deep fantasy land. Further since none of the fundamental drivers of home value (population, income, jobs) show anything like the same rate of growth, it is clear that someone is getting conned.
VoiceFromTheWilderness, yes that is the quarterly increase in household mortgage debt (not annualized or seasonally adjusted).
Household mortgage debt has increased $622 Billion over the first three quarters of 2006 (compare to $791 Billion in '05, and $730 Billion in '04 for the comparable period). And you are correct - this is not sustainable - and I expect equity extraction to slow significantly going forward.
"Yes, repurchase requests can make an undercapitalized counterparty go "poof." I imagine somebody's checking some pools to see how many Ownit-originated loans are in there."
Tanta, perhaps you can help me with something that's been bugging me re: the '05 vintage (or older). All of this vintage I'm guessing is too old, by its terms, for repurchase enforcement, but I'm wondering if the investors holding this paper may ask their lawyers to explore other avenues to enforce a buyback. Perhaps something along the lines of originators ignoring sound lending standards, "should have known" kinda stuff.
Do these contracts contain repurchase provisions based on negligence on the part of the seller? Gross negligence? Fraud?
Doesn't this increase in mortgage debt reflect the effect of inflation and real estate prices in some hot markets? Factoring that out how much of the increase is left to explain people taking on too much debt? Not at least correcting these graphs for inflation is very misleading.
winjr, the average mortgage loan sale agreement has 30-50 specific representations/warranties regarding the loans, and I've seen more than that. (This doesn't count all the other reps/warranties regarding the lender, etc.) The thing that makes EPDs so different, and so icky, is that an early payment delinquency is, in most contracts, sufficient grounds for repurchase. You don't have to have farkled anything up. It goes bad in the EPD period, you take it back. Once a loan is out of the EPD period, a delinquency is not in and of itself grounds for buyback. But.
There are potentially jillions of other reasons why you would have to take back a loan "for cause," as it were. Failure to follow the guidelines required. Misrepresentation and omission. Negligence and fraud. Sloppy stupid stuff like a screwed up mortgage document that could potentially cloud title. Failure to get an MI policy cert. There are two things about these kinds of repurchases: they are at least arguable, and investors and originators negotiate/rebut/work things out all the time--or at least, they do in a normal market. My impression of the last 12 months is that investors are pushing really hard. The other thing is that unless the contract specifies otherwise, and it generally won't, your repurchase liability is life of loan. The investor is under no obligation to "find" these problems in a timely fashion. They usually don't get "found" until the first late payment, when the loan goes through an automatic full-dress QC review.
So we're probably through the EPDs for 2005, but the uglies of that vintage will continue to crawl out from under the loan files for some time.
The other thing is that unless the contract specifies otherwise, and it generally won't, your repurchase liability is life of loan. The investor is under no obligation to "find" these problems in a timely fashion. They usually don't get "found" until the first late payment, when the loan goes through an automatic full-dress QC review.
Wow! That's a real heads-up! Seems to me that the last thing you want in your portfolio right now is a subprime lender/originator.
"The other thing is that unless the contract specifies otherwise, and it generally won't, your repurchase liability is life of loan. The investor is under no obligation to "find" these problems in a timely fashion. They usually don't get "found" until the first late payment, when the loan goes through an automatic full-dress QC review."
I bet for a good number of the loans made in the past few years there will be nobody around to repurchase them. Is there insurance/re-insurance to cover that possiblity or will the default come out of the note holders' hide?
"So we're probably through the EPDs for 2005, but the uglies of that vintage will continue to crawl out from under the loan files for some time."
Pretend I'm Mr. Burns ... Excellent!
So when an outfit like WaMu slips into their 10Q the teensy little disclosure that 75% of their Option Arms written in 2005 were qualified using the wrong interest rate ... I can infer that MAY or MAY NOT be a nit with the folks who bought the loans. Har.
I may or may not be from Cleveland. However, I have very good nose. FirstFrank deal is 50/50 to close right now. Long long meetings going on with legal teams right now on Lake Erie.
I'm an escrow officer in Nevada and I signed a woman about 3 weeks ago to a loan from OwnIt (you guessed it, Option ARM)....these guys put servicing notices (for those who don't know, that's the provision that tells you that the loan's being sold to an investor) in the loan docs at closing!
I don't know how long they've been like that but it begs the question of how many of their loans they've ever held...no wonder they went under if potentially every loan they've ever done is a potential clawback...wonder it took this long heh
I bet for a good number of the loans made in the past few years there will be nobody around to repurchase them. Is there insurance/re-insurance to cover that possiblity or will the default come out of the note holders' hide?
It's called "counterparty risk" and the Street is supposed to be expert at dealing with it. The un-put-backable default comes out of the residual tranche's hide. Then the mezzanine's. Then then the senior's. If you're holding AAA senior tranches, you're probably doing OK. If you're a hedge fund who made a market in the subordinate unrated junk . . .
"Insurance" is so last week, Tom. We now use opaque CDS transactions where the protection seller is one of those rock-solid federally-regulated capitalized and loss-reserved . . . hedge funds.
Originators do have some Errors and Omissions and Fidelity Bond coverage that put some limit on losses from negligence. The road to hell, of course, is paved with the hides of noteholders who thought that would be a sufficient hedge against counterparty risk. I will only observe that there is no practical or effective insurance against fraud. You might be able to recover something in the courts--if you are not, actually, the guilty party--but after costs and over time you won't recover much.
Go back and re-read the Nontraditional Mortgage Guidance part regarding wholesale lending operational controls. That part didn't get the play that the underwriting guidelines did, but there's a reason why doing due diligence on your counterparties is a "safety and soundess" issue for da banks.
Lowest 3Q since 01. Still ~4x the pre-tech-boom average. Plenty of room for further declines.
You've probably seen the news already, but don't miss the immolation at Ownit Mortgage, which just shut its doors virtually overnight. I've seen the subprime industry implode before (back in 1998) and we could see something similar this time if the debt markets start tightening up.
Here's a Marketwatch story on the topic:
MarketWatch.com
Here are my thoughts ...
Interest Rate Roundup
Thanks for your thoughts Mike. Now, would you say that 'poof' is what actually happened (I'm sure the employees who were phoned at 5pm the day before telling them not to bother coming in the following morning feel this is accurate --not terribly much notice.) or what management was willing to concede to the public? How much information had to be concealed and for how long by these guys who were having trouble with cash-flow? Was there a particular event that sacked them and gave them hope that there would be 'luckier' days ahead?
Meanwhile back at the stockmarket ranch, I see insider's dumping stocks at record or near-rates.
I think the problems in the subprime industry have been a long time coming ... and it's relatively common knowledge that lenders are having problems. Several companies have discussed the surge in first-payment/early payment defaults and I've seen news stories about end investors putting a lot more loans back to originators. Bloomberg also had a story or two about how spreads on higher risk mortgage bonds are widening. And of course, this week, both the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times reported on how subprime mortgages are performing very poorly. Who knows exactly what the details (how long management knew about the problems, for instance) are in this case. I certainly don't. But I will say that in 1998, when things last blew up in subprime-land, the timeline from initial trouble to outright shutdowns/office padlockings was very short.
From the Marketwatch piece on Ownit:
"Ownit ran out of cash needed to meet its obligations to repurchase loans from investment banks and others who bought them in the secondary market, people in the industry said. The banks, which convert the loan payments into mortgage-backed securities for sale to investors, can force the original lenders to repurchase loans if the mortgage borrowers default."
Merrill Lynch happens to own a 20% stake in Ownit? Merrill Lynch the investment bank?
Yes, repurchase requests can make an undercapitalized counterparty go "poof." I imagine somebody's checking some pools to see how many Ownit-originated loans are in there.
Tanta,
I think most of the big investment banks have their figures in this pie. Who said they can't be foolish?
I'm just, say, tickled by the fact that the crisis appears to be caused by investment banks pushing defaults back onto . . . originators owned by investment banks. Man, that First Franklin deal is sounding really brilliant now, isn't it?
And WAMU and Wells Fargo have made big noise of late about their strategic decisions to focus on subprime. Why not? The competition is . . . disappearing.
Mike in Florida. Thanks for
the news on Ownit. This development could be highly significant since it should make purchasers of new sub-prime backed mortgage securities much more cautious as well as decreasing the price of existing securities.
On the other hand the strong prices of mortgage insurers like PMI argue for a relatively modest problems.
I'm suspicious problems will be significant and will invest on that basis if that is confirmed by weaker share prices for some of the lendors such as New Century Financial and Countrywide.
Is this graph saying that Household Mortgage dept increased each quarter by the height of the bar? That is is the total Household Mortgage dept the integral of this picture?
Anyone who doesn't know that this is completely unsustainable can only be described as living in deep fantasy land. Further since none of the fundamental drivers of home value (population, income, jobs) show anything like the same rate of growth, it is clear that someone is getting conned.
VoiceFromTheWilderness, yes that is the quarterly increase in household mortgage debt (not annualized or seasonally adjusted).
Household mortgage debt has increased $622 Billion over the first three quarters of 2006 (compare to $791 Billion in '05, and $730 Billion in '04 for the comparable period). And you are correct - this is not sustainable - and I expect equity extraction to slow significantly going forward.
Best Wishes.
LEND is having a bad day.
"Yes, repurchase requests can make an undercapitalized counterparty go "poof." I imagine somebody's checking some pools to see how many Ownit-originated loans are in there."
Tanta, perhaps you can help me with something that's been bugging me re: the '05 vintage (or older). All of this vintage I'm guessing is too old, by its terms, for repurchase enforcement, but I'm wondering if the investors holding this paper may ask their lawyers to explore other avenues to enforce a buyback. Perhaps something along the lines of originators ignoring sound lending standards, "should have known" kinda stuff.
Do these contracts contain repurchase provisions based on negligence on the part of the seller? Gross negligence? Fraud?
Doesn't this increase in mortgage debt reflect the effect of inflation and real estate prices in some hot markets? Factoring that out how much of the increase is left to explain people taking on too much debt? Not at least correcting these graphs for inflation is very misleading.
winjr, the average mortgage loan sale agreement has 30-50 specific representations/warranties regarding the loans, and I've seen more than that. (This doesn't count all the other reps/warranties regarding the lender, etc.) The thing that makes EPDs so different, and so icky, is that an early payment delinquency is, in most contracts, sufficient grounds for repurchase. You don't have to have farkled anything up. It goes bad in the EPD period, you take it back. Once a loan is out of the EPD period, a delinquency is not in and of itself grounds for buyback. But.
There are potentially jillions of other reasons why you would have to take back a loan "for cause," as it were. Failure to follow the guidelines required. Misrepresentation and omission. Negligence and fraud. Sloppy stupid stuff like a screwed up mortgage document that could potentially cloud title. Failure to get an MI policy cert. There are two things about these kinds of repurchases: they are at least arguable, and investors and originators negotiate/rebut/work things out all the time--or at least, they do in a normal market. My impression of the last 12 months is that investors are pushing really hard. The other thing is that unless the contract specifies otherwise, and it generally won't, your repurchase liability is life of loan. The investor is under no obligation to "find" these problems in a timely fashion. They usually don't get "found" until the first late payment, when the loan goes through an automatic full-dress QC review.
So we're probably through the EPDs for 2005, but the uglies of that vintage will continue to crawl out from under the loan files for some time.
The other thing is that unless the contract specifies otherwise, and it generally won't, your repurchase liability is life of loan. The investor is under no obligation to "find" these problems in a timely fashion. They usually don't get "found" until the first late payment, when the loan goes through an automatic full-dress QC review.
Wow! That's a real heads-up! Seems to me that the last thing you want in your portfolio right now is a subprime lender/originator.
"The other thing is that unless the contract specifies otherwise, and it generally won't, your repurchase liability is life of loan. The investor is under no obligation to "find" these problems in a timely fashion. They usually don't get "found" until the first late payment, when the loan goes through an automatic full-dress QC review."
I bet for a good number of the loans made in the past few years there will be nobody around to repurchase them. Is there insurance/re-insurance to cover that possiblity or will the default come out of the note holders' hide?
"So we're probably through the EPDs for 2005, but the uglies of that vintage will continue to crawl out from under the loan files for some time."
Pretend I'm Mr. Burns ... Excellent!
So when an outfit like WaMu slips into their 10Q the teensy little disclosure that 75% of their Option Arms written in 2005 were qualified using the wrong interest rate ... I can infer that MAY or MAY NOT be a nit with the folks who bought the loans. Har.
I may or may not be from Cleveland. However, I have very good nose. FirstFrank deal is 50/50 to close right now. Long long meetings going on with legal teams right now on Lake Erie.
Take it for the 2 cents its worth......
I think most of the big investment banks have their figures in this pie.
Bob - that is one of best malaprop-typo's I've ever read. If it wasn't intentional it should have been. I'm jealous.
Longtime lurker here:
I'm an escrow officer in Nevada and I signed a woman about 3 weeks ago to a loan from OwnIt (you guessed it, Option ARM)....these guys put servicing notices (for those who don't know, that's the provision that tells you that the loan's being sold to an investor) in the loan docs at closing!
I don't know how long they've been like that but it begs the question of how many of their loans they've ever held...no wonder they went under if potentially every loan they've ever done is a potential clawback...wonder it took this long heh
Just my $.02
I bet for a good number of the loans made in the past few years there will be nobody around to repurchase them. Is there insurance/re-insurance to cover that possiblity or will the default come out of the note holders' hide?
It's called "counterparty risk" and the Street is supposed to be expert at dealing with it. The un-put-backable default comes out of the residual tranche's hide. Then the mezzanine's. Then then the senior's. If you're holding AAA senior tranches, you're probably doing OK. If you're a hedge fund who made a market in the subordinate unrated junk . . .
"Insurance" is so last week, Tom. We now use opaque CDS transactions where the protection seller is one of those rock-solid federally-regulated capitalized and loss-reserved . . . hedge funds.
Originators do have some Errors and Omissions and Fidelity Bond coverage that put some limit on losses from negligence. The road to hell, of course, is paved with the hides of noteholders who thought that would be a sufficient hedge against counterparty risk. I will only observe that there is no practical or effective insurance against fraud. You might be able to recover something in the courts--if you are not, actually, the guilty party--but after costs and over time you won't recover much.
Go back and re-read the Nontraditional Mortgage Guidance part regarding wholesale lending operational controls. That part didn't get the play that the underwriting guidelines did, but there's a reason why doing due diligence on your counterparties is a "safety and soundess" issue for da banks.