...some mortgage brokers and borrowers tried to circumvent tougher restrictions by inflating borrowers' credit scores and appraisal values...

I don't think borrowers can fake their credit scores and the houses' appraisal values... must be the brokers then!

This is the thing that a lot of our politicians just don't get: you cannot "return to sane lending standards" and still prevent the "insane" loans from earlier vintages from ending up in foreclosure.

The Law of Conservation of Insanity?

Trichet get it....

Trichet: Price stability is the only 'needle in our compass

I can't wait for the sequel - Q1 2008, Q2 2008.

OT: Wal-Mart growth down?

Expired

This bodes not well...

"This is the thing that a lot of our politicians just don't get: you cannot "return to sane lending standards" and still prevent the "insane" loans from earlier vintages from ending up in foreclosure."

Yup, and that is why they are going to end up pushing this wreck right off the cliff. Look out below.

Love this. The end of insane lending creates the problem.

Explanation for the trends I have been blogging about - but done more neatly than I could.

J

Is there any data yet on the performance of 2008 vintage loans? I wouldn't be surprised in the least if these have even WORSE performance characteristics than either 2007 or 2006. The people buying in 2008 have almost certainly seen no appreciation, leaving even less of an equity cushion to work with than in previous years.

WSJ wrote: "Freddie Mac reported Wednesday that 1.38% of the 2007-vintage loans it purchased were seriously delinquent after 18 months compared with 0.38% of 2006 loans at the same point in their life."

I agree with Tanta's point that 2007 might look worse because it is the bagholder year (refis kicked can down road, music stopped in 2008, insert other metaphor).

For all the people asking, "Isn't it great that Fannie/Freddie took over the the market to keep the Ponzi scheme going a little longer" the answer is no.

So the refi game shifted to the Fed window (TAF, etc.).

Is there any data yet on the performance of 2008 vintage loans?

Not much. And it really won't be meaningful for a while.

I fully expect the older vintages to catch up to the 'quality' of 2007

Nemo

The Law of Conservation of Insanity?


The gross level of Insanity in a given population is a constant; the distribution of insanity over individuals and groups can vary over time.

"This is the thing that a lot of our politicians just don't get: you cannot "return to sane lending standards" and still prevent the "insane" loans from earlier vintages from ending up in foreclosure."

My blog spent last year trying to shoot down the idiotic contradiction of "tighten standards" but "make mortgages more available" and "keep people in houses."

People do not get this. Look at the anonymous Hillary supporter commenting here: Not One Cent: Hillary Clinton's Billion-Dollar Housing Bailout and Economic Illiteracy

A really sensible post. The conclusion here is pretty bleak, however, because there seems to be a reinforcing cycle going on that's very destructive. The ultimate solution here isn't to lend less, it's to lend more. Only by actually lending can any institution make enough money to offset the price of its bad past decisions. And what I mean is not lending stupidly, but prudently and liberally. But lending is being cut back across the board, and not only in housing.

So the real solution to get housing to slow down its price descent is to have enough lending going on to spur demand, and therefore flatten out prices. This lending has to be, however, done the "old way". You know with real money down, decent credit and in areas that aren't still freefalling but somewhat slow. There are plenty of people out there that fit this slice and are waiting for signs of stability. So the mortgage spigot needs to be opened.

So in my mind the solution for the GSEs here, unlike what most are saying, seems to be BUY as many well-written loans as possible. The solution is the same for all entities in the securitization market. And the government, if it is doing anything at all, should toss resources as this end by providing money to enable this. There are two things that will happen: GSE numbers and revenue will get better because of the offsets, and it will put a floor under the housing market by fueling demand.

I hope this gets circulated where it's most wanted.

Committees don't get it. Representatives don't get it. Candidates don't get it.

I know anecdotes aren't data, but what you've put up here makes perfect sense in what I've been seeing in my group of acquaintances who are in trouble with their loans. It appears that no matter the vintage, they're all coming to a day of reckoning now that money's tightened. The future doesn't look good for any of them. A couple will definitely lose their homes, others will wish they had.

In the big picture all we can hope for is that few folks lose their lives and after the excesses get wrung out of the system, most folks survived and start again to prosper

My 2007 vintage equitites haven't done well either...

they're all coming to a day of reckoning now that money's tightened

I think the financial institutions are really coming for it too, because of what they are doing. What is going to happen to the auto industry now that loan standards are tightened, lease options removed, and prices high due to employee and materials cost? Where is the housing market going to go when prices keep dropping because the loan standards won't support giving most people a mortgage where they can buy?

Hey even I would think about buying some McMansion that is now 30% or 40% less if someone would write me a loan, and someone would write a loan for the person that would buy my house. And that's what this all needs...a floor. I keep saying it's the uncertainty that is the killer here. And the government could provide ways, NOT to bail out the banks, but to inject money only if it is used to LEND.

Imagine if the Fed said "Hey step up to the window, but whatever you borrow has to be lent out during the term it is borrowed for, and here are the loan parameters...". And, btw, you can only lend it out for a max of 2 point above what you borrowed it from us for.

It is possible to have a rising roll rate but a more stable delinquency rate: the loans you still have on the books get worse (roll to a more serious delinquency at a higher rate), but if at the same time a lot of loans that were mildly delinquent last month paid off this month, your total percentage of seriously delinquent loans can be unchanged or rise at a much slower rate than your roll rate.

one useful performance measure that corrects for some of these problems is cumulative first time 60+ DQs as a % of original balance, in which any loan that has ever touched 60 days DQ or worse goes into the numerator and stays there regardless of what happens to the loan subsequently. if you look at subprime performance, for instance, using this metric, the 2007 vintage tracks almost right on top of 2006 (just slightly worse).

Couldn't agree more with your post. Some lenders reacted faster to the market than others. I wonder if the distribution of bad loans is more concentrated among a smaller group of players. The market share growth leaders of 2007 might be the real losers.

Wow, Tanta. Every time you write, I learn. A lot. Merci beaucoup.

Imagine if the Fed said "Hey step up to the window, but whatever you borrow has to be lent out during the term it is borrowed for, and here are the loan parameters...". And, btw, you can only lend it out for a max of 2 point above what you borrowed it from us for.

ipodius | 08.07.08 - 10:17 am | #

So we have banks start writing 30 day mortgages (Or 6 month or whatever the terms are for all these new 'facilities'? And don't forget the banks need all the money from the Fed on their books to meet (come closer to) reserve requirements.

John Pierpont Morgan is rolling over in his grave...

J. P. Morga - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Ok, Tanta and fellow blogsters, I'm getting scared. Really scared.

In the news was a story about a building that was being shut down because of garbage piling up. Piling up to the rooftops. Reason was, there were so many foreclosures, that not enought fees were generated to pay to haul the garbage away. For months. A client calls me. Seems that this is a building he used to own, and couldn't condominiumize because there weren't enough parking spaces. He sold it for a slight profit, and then lo and behold the buyer managed to condominiumize it and make oodles of money. In spite of the fact that no new parking spaces were acquired. I investigated for him, but told him tho I was sure there was something fishy, I didn't have the authority of the gov't behind me and really couldn't do anything about it. Now it's being investigated; rampant fraud found.

That's not the scary thing.

The scary thing this is becoming common.

Client comes in; bought in '05. Low rise condos, 4 to a building. No particular fraud. Water common to all 400 or so units. Water turned off; so few paying 100s of thousand owed on water. (Now on again.) He got a bill for 2k to make up for everyone else, along with the others who are still paying.
He can't afford that. They threatened a lien. Meanwhile the unit is now worth 100k and he paid 150k for it. It is current now. I told him to walk. This is money being thrown down a black hole. He hears that there are lots of other associations in the same fix. He's been putting a couple of hundred in to make up the difference in the rent.
The assn is going to be needing more and more money to pay to make up for the foreclosures. And perhaps worst of all, there is no hazard insurance, and we are going into hurricane season.

What would all you righteous ones advise? Yeah, the bank is owed the money. The banks aren't paying the maintenance either. Shouldn't they bear the consequences of this?

This is going to be a disaster of biblical proportions.

Ipodius,

Your "floor" occurs at the point where the average US household, whose wages are plummeting in the face of inflation, can eat, go the the doctor and pay their taxes in a timely fashion on the salary they are getting paid. Whatever is left over after the necessities goes to debt service, including the mortgage. Thats the way it works, and that's the way its going to work until the day we start calling each other comrade.

In other words, the "uncertainty" you're talking about comes from lousy fundamentals and structural economic issues, and no extension of credit, whether from government or private entities, can fix them.

An excellent post. I have a pounding headache after reading it, but excellent nonetheless.

I have trouble with all these reports, charts, graphs and testimonies.
To find the truth is like digging an ant out of quicksand with the regulators and banks. The last rumor I read is that bank earning statements are unreliable mainly due to under the reporting of loses.
I have come to believe that these financial institutions dealing in mortgage loans require to be regulated effectively because basically they are dishonest in their dealings. Consumer regulations must be passed to give the consumer the right to question, object or to contest any problems that cause the borrower concern with the institution that has his loans, deposits etc. The analogy here is that the consumer acts like a smoke detector in a house. Where there is smoke the detector sounds the alarm. With there is a financial transaction that is wrong or dishonest, it is the consumer that finds out first. Accordingly when the consumer has redress in the regulatory system with his bank, it can be tracked, much like the FDA tracks Voluntary Consumer Complaints looking for smoke. The Regulatory system in this country is too independent and self serving. The Congressional oversight is a joke. People know when they are being lied to or “spinned”. This meltdown will get worse. It will happen again and again. Our regulatory entities of government have under performed with the present financial crisis. These government entities do not appear to have the balance and checks to ascertain the credibility or integrity of the financial system. What is scary, is the Congress. These people went on vacation.
We have almost 4 million homeowners that are facing extremely serious situations affecting their very lives. There are another 2million projected for year end 2009. Congress displays an attitude that these foreclosure victims are nothing more than an aggravation.
The Congress is fat with money, power and all the perks. Rome is on fire. I think I hear a violin.
The information we are given is basically self serving for those who have something to hide.
Freddie Mac is like a soap opera. Pee Wee Paulson at Treasury tells us so many stories he could write a children’s bedtime story book. I seldom see, hear or read my Ohio Senators Sherrod Brown or George Voinovich regarding these problems in any form of the media.
The bottom line is all these people that write all these comments to all these blogs are venting their frustrations. The question is why tell me……tell the people you elected. Ladies and Gentlemen, we have a real problem, you need to standup, tell these elected prima donnas what you think, and more importantly put your name on it. We need to change the way we do business
in this country. We need to hold people accountable. The rich and famous went over the top this time.

Michael LittleBig

[But very few if any 30-day or 60-day loans get workouts. Loans that "cure" from a 30-day or 60-day delinquency are almost exclusively a matter of the borrower making up missed payments from his or her own funds, whatever the source of those funds. ]

Would you say that's still true today in light of all the "early intervention" efforts and "identifying at-risk loans" before they default?

One thing that may have been missing in 2006 vs. the last half of 2007 is a sense of desperation.

And another thing - although anecdotes aren't data if one waits until there there is sufficient data to support a decision it is all too often the case that the decision has been rendered moot.

Life moves quickly.

I fully expect the older vintages to catch up to the 'quality' of 2007

You are expecting the time machine to be invented any day now?

We are talking here about performance of the 2007 vintage in its first 18 months, compared to earlier vintages at 18 months.

The earlier vintages' 18-month performance history is now history and will never change or "catch up" to the 18-month history of 2007.

Quite possibly the lifetime performance of earlier vintage years will be the same or worse than 2007's. But we can't make any useful generalizations about the lifetime losses of 2007; it isn't anywhere near old enough.

This is why data on 2008 vintage as a "vintage" isn't going to be available yet. As a vintage, 2008 isn't old enough to have comparable measurements--only half of the loans originated in 2008 are even old enough to have a 90-day delinquency.

I wasn't quite getting it until the musical chairs metaphor. The 2007 loans that went bad early are the first ones without chairs. Worse, earlier vintage loans that go bad now won't have chairs either.

I don't see any way around just letting it play out and taking our medicine. The amounts are just too huge for a bailout to be possible even if it were a good idea.

There is no point in trying to prevent the declines in housing prices. It cannot be done. The attempts being made to "save" housing are like standing under a safe falling from a 25 story building. Gravity always wins, trust me on this.

The only way forward is to allow prices to find their own level as expeditiously as possible. Only then can the process of lending and purchasing begin again, under "normal" conditions.

Of course the bailouts now being considered are largely for political purposes. They will not work. Indeed, they cannot work, because the problem is too expensive to fix. Let prices find their lows, and if we end 2009 with several less investment banks, then so be it...

We should be thinking about saving our currency and social security instead.

Last?

Tanta, not sure if you're going to see this since it's so late in the thread, but thanks so much for this blog entry. Your knowledge and insight, willingness and effort to share it, are greatly appreciated.

i want to make one more point about about the relationship between roll rates and serious delinquencies. i understand the point Tanta is making above about the impact of credit availability and the housing market on roll rates and delinquencies, but her example also highlights the fact that you literally have to look at every roll rate in order to determine the impact they have on serious delinquencies.

for instance, if the 60 to SDQ roll rate is increasing, you can't determine what impact that will have on SDQs without looking at all the roll rates that impact the 60D bucket, which in turn depends on the 30D roll rates, and so on and so forth. so even if there is a high 30 to prepay roll rate and a high 60 to prepay roll rate, if the 30 to 60 roll rate is flat, and the C to 30 rate is flat, SDQs are going to increase quickly. in order for the percentage of SDQs to be unchanged or increase much slower than the 60 to SDQ rate, you'd need the C to 30 rate to slow, or the 30 to 60 rate to slow, or the SDQ to liquidation rate to speed up (or any combination of the above).

in any event, i agree with Tanta's point.

[But very few if any 30-day or 60-day loans get workouts. Loans that "cure" from a 30-day or 60-day delinquency are almost exclusively a matter of the borrower making up missed payments from his or her own funds, whatever the source of those funds. ]

Would you say that's still true today in light of all the "early intervention" efforts and "identifying at-risk loans" before they default?

Yes, I would.

Take a look at that 30-to-60 roll rate in the Freddie charts. At the absolute worst, the rate was 21%. That means that 79% of 30-day DQs either cure completely (go back to current) or don't get any worse by the following month. Actually, most of them cure completely.

It is just a giant waste of time and energy to send loans that are 30 days down into the workout process when 80% or more of them will cure themselves.

It's a little bit like the flu. Most cases are self-limiting and will go away in a week. A few cases will get worse and end up as pneumonia or serious respiratory distress, and will need serious medical treatment.

But doctors don't respond to this by hospitalizing everyone with the flu. They say, "call back in three days if you aren't better."

You're probably thinking of things like the Hope Now deal where subprime servicers were going to do "teaser freezers" on folks who weren't even delinquent yet. Some of that did happen, in subprime. But the reason why it was such news and so controversial was that it did offer modifications much earlier in the process than is usual. Certainly I do not believe that any Freddie Mac loans are being modified at 30-days down to resolve the 30-day delinquency. If there are a few loans being worked out that early, they are cases like the verified death of a breadwinner or something of that nature where the evidence is overwhelming that the delinquency will never be resolved short of a workout.

Emma Anne, I think the issue of 30-60 roll rates is relevant to a point you raised the other day in the thread about the borrowers suing WaMu. They claim WaMu said they couldn't get a workout until they were at least 50 days DQ, which they interpreted as being advised to stay DQ so they could get a mod.

Your point, I think, was that WaMu shouldn't have said that.

I of course don't know what actually happened, but I can easily imagine a borrower who is only 30 days DQ being told that they have not yet exhausted all of the other possibilities they have for coming current, and that it's too early for them to be referred to the workout people. When pressed, WaMu might have said that they don't even refer you to Loss Mit unless you are at least 50 days down.

The borrowers may have misinterpreted that as an invitation to stay DQ, because they already have a misconception about what a mod is and when you get one. They think it's just a matter of "qualifying rules."

Imagine the analogy of the flu and your doctor: you go to the doc and say, I've been sick for two days, I think I need to be in the hospital. The doc says no, you don't need to be in the hospital unless this lasts for a week. Call me in a couple of days if you aren't better.

That is not a doctor encouraging you to stay sick or get worse so that you can "benefit" from being hospitalized. Only a hypochondriac would think that.

Our problem with the WaMu borrowers is that they think of a defaulted loan workout as a "benefit," so they just want to know what you have to do to get one. They would be more like the patient who intentionally exposes herself to the flu virus because she thinks going to the doctor is a lot of fun. If she also thinks being hospitalized is a lot of fun, she'll be sure to still be sick in a couple of days when she can then call the doc back and demand treatment.

ot sure why they would compare the first 12 months of 2006 vintage vs first 12 months of 2007 vintage,..unless they want to look at data that is heavily skewed.
why not compare the first 12 mo of 2007 vintage with the first 12 mo of 2004 vintage. makes no sense.

the first 12 months of a 2007 loan experienced an economic environment of much more layoffs and also of home price drops in the 15 to 40% area depending on location.

The end of insane lending creates the problem. Sort of like "Detox" for the financial system.

According to SF writer Larry Niven "the majority is always sane". Yes, I know its a polemic statement.

"not sure why they would compare the first 12 months of 2006 vintage vs first 12 months of 2007 vintage,..unless they want to look at data that is heavily skewed."

"why not compare the first 12 mo of 2007 vintage with the first 12 mo of 2004 vintage. makes no sense."

Comparing a sequence of annual vintages at equal ages is the soundest way to monitor trends in performance. The second slide in this presentation shows the pattern for several years (then makes adjustments as explained in later slides):
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/salomon/docs/DRP/slides-Van%20Hemert.pdf

ormally i would agree, as i understand its usefullness...however i believe the last 12 months is highly unique given the drop in home values.

Other than the market dynamics mentioned, I think it is also important to understand how the definition of prime changed from 2006 to 2007. In 2006 there were plenty of monoline subprime and Alt-A originators originating for sale and securitization. By early 2007 these players were all gone. As the subprime and then the alt-a volumes dried up, prime volumes increased. Clearly much of this volume went as alt-a to Freddie and Fannie, but some of it also ended up on bank balance sheets as prime and some of it also probably snuck into Fannie and Freddie prime programs. I would guess that this goes a fair amount of the way to explaining differences in experience across "prime" in the two vintages.

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