Fannie Mae Push-Back

Doubling the fraud reviews oughta cover it(their fannie). Right?

Tanta,
How does this work? If Fannie exercises their put and forces the originator to take back the loan at what price does this occur? The price Fannie initially paid for it less any P&I payments received.

Thanks

I'm wondering if Fannie will be able to see a gain on assets they've already taken losses on.

First to pop open a beer this morning?

"and are on track to double our anti-fraud investigations this year."

So investigations will go from 4 to 8?

In addition to BOA, WAMU and WB can't be too pleased with more reviews.

Will Freddie follow suit?

What sort of government guaranteed/purchased loan products will be available in 2009?

To be less oblique, what are the implications of this decision for the more bubbly housing markets?

I hear they are hiring McGruff the crime dog.

Fraudsters....the bell toles for thee.

Good for Fannie.

Now I want to hear that the DOJ is shifting staff to help Fannie deal with the fraud.

How many excutives have jumped ship so far? Watch for more to leave due to "personal reasons" after this announcement.

No No, it's "To spend more time with my family"

Fannie could offer a bounty for people to bring particular instances of retail fraud to their attention.

The real interesting part is whether the banks institute this policy as well. There may be no value in rescinding many loans but I imagine BAC has lots of low interest rate fixed loans they would dearly love to recast higher.

How does this work? If Fannie exercises their put and forces the originator to take back the loan at what price does this occur?

If "it" is actually still a loan--that is, pre-FC, then the repurchase price is always par (current balance including accrued interest).

Here, specifically, they are talking about post-FC reviews. There is no longer a loan to buy back. They could make the servicer buy the REO at par, or they could make the servicer pay all actual losses, damages, attorney's fees and so on that are incurred because of fraud. The latter is strictly speaking an indemnification rather than a buy-back.

BTW I am really excited for FDIC Friday!!!

I got my money on Silver State Bancorp (SSBX)

Are there any numbers on how many of these they have actually done so far this year (forced buy bacck)?

No No, it's "To spend more time with my family" And less time in federal lockup.

Fannie could offer a bounty for people to bring particular instances of retail fraud to their attention.

False Claims Act 

This law has been used recently by third party whistleblowers alleging Medicare/Medicaid fraud against the government. The question will be whether the GSE's are technically the government.

"and are on track to double our anti-fraud investigations this year."

Any tracking information on how many convictions so far or projected? What is the sentencing?

FNM CEO: "more prevalence on misrepresentations on Alt-As (investors posing as first residents)."

who suffers the losses in case of misrepresentations? original lenders (the loan originator?). Does private mortgage insurance ever pick up the bill even in case of misrepresentation?

i don't understand how this misrepresentation works. once Fannie finds a misrepresentation, puts a flag on the loan and every single party knows about it?

The only real loan volume the last year has been GSE purchases. With 99% of all mortgage brokers nothing but con artists I would imagine this will be like shooting fish in a barrel for FNM.

FYI: One thing that happened a lot in the private investor world, and that I suspect may well have happened with Fannie, is that in the last couple of years when somebody's regular QC on newly-purchased loans found an icky problem and the investor sent a buyback demand, the originator bargained instead for an indemnification. This usually was only allowed if the loan was (then) performing.

That meant that instead of buying the loan back at the time, the originator just agreed to indemnify the investor against any loss related to the problem or defect, usually for life of loan, and the investor would keep the loan.

My guess is that a lot of originators thought that was clever of them at the time, and are now staring down the barrel of some ugly indemnifications.

There won't be more fraud cases--Bushies always claim this and do nothing.

who suffers the losses in case of misrepresentations? original lenders (the loan originator?). Does private mortgage insurance ever pick up the bill even in case of misrepresentation?

The seller of the loan to Fannie Mae is always the party making the representations, and therefore always the party making any misreps.

MI companies are very good at refusing to honor policies that were issued under misrep.

If Fannie Mae finds the misrep, it will certainly tell the MI about it if the loan is insured, and the MI can cancel the policy. This will always force the lender to repurchase the loan from Fannie, since it's now high-LTV no-MI.

Nobody insures against fraud. Not ever do the MI companies eat fraud losses.

Thanks Tanta!

Is lying on income or assets (inflating it) a misrepresentation? I guess it was very widespread on Alt-As, will this lack of verification come to hunt the lenders?

"MI companies are very good at refusing to honor policies that were issued under misrep."

Especially when they were solvent.

What happens if the seller of the fraudulent loan to FNM/FRE turns out to be IndyMac or a IndyMac to be? Is the FDIC left holding the bag?

So, anyone want to take a shot at the order of magnitude of the funds recovered?

4000 per month x (percent misrep'd) x (avg amt recoverd) = ?

say the last term is $150K,
any guesses on 2nd term? my WAG = 30% (they choose well for their 4k)

= $180M / month
~ $2B / year

Please correct as needed.

BTW Tanta, why did you single out BOA?
Not that they're undeserving...

The FNM pushback makes no sense and my guess is that this is more fluff and hot air and won't last long. For the pigmen bankster rats to recapitalize the banking system and steal from the Treasury (JSP), they need to write covered bonds against the very best GSE assets in a fake attempt to "rescue" the GSEs and then allow FNM/FRE to implode anyway, thereby looting the assets for pennies on the dollar. Greenie mentioned this the other day when talking about several new companies that would be created to take the place of the GSEs.

Bankster rats get great new banks with good assets and JSP gets stuck with the bill. A more aggressive and combatant FNM doesn't fit into the pigmen's scheme.

"BOA" is either BAC or BofA please.

BofA is the new name for Countrywide and in this environment of witch hunting it looks like yellow pelted mozilos are in season. The sins of the adopted are haunting the adoptive family.

Usually you don't pursue a civil claim against poor defendants, because they are judgment proof (ie you'll never collect anyway). I suspect most of these fraud cases would be judgment proof as well. Forget the money. Just file criminal charges and stick all of them in tent prisons in the middle of BLM land in Nevada.

Is lying on income or assets (inflating it) a misrepresentation?

Well, yes.

But the issue is who repped what to whom when.

If a borrower lied on income or assets, then the borrower misrepresented to the loan originator.

If the loan originator closed that loan and sold it to Fannie Mae, the loan originator repped as part of the loan sale transaction that no loan in the pool is fraudulent.

If Fannie Mae finds evidence of fraud after the sale, Fannie can force repurchase of the loan by the originator.

Then the loan originator has to go try to make good the loss by squeezing it out of some lying borrower. (Good luck. That's like trying to collect from some two-bit mortgage broker.)

Any investor, including but not limited to Fannie, can be fairly tolerant and forgiving if they really think the originator used reasonable due diligence and was the innocent victim of fraud. They might, at their sole discretion, decide to share the loss or negotiate something.

But they always have the right to send that stuff back if there is fraud, whether the lender is "innocent" or not.

One thing that does tend to work against lender claims of being "innocent" victims of fraud is, of course, finding a couple hundred of these loans from the same lender. I would never ever assume that just because Fannie or anyone else might have been more lenient in the past about buybacks or indems that they will continue to be, exactly because it's not so much an individual loan as a pattern of loans. After the pattern forms your "innocent victim" schtick is less convincing.

BTW Tanta, why did you single out BOA?

I believe Countrywide was Fannie Mae's single largest counterparty.

That'd now be a BOA problem.

What happens if the seller of the fraudulent loan to FNM/FRE turns out to be IndyMac or a IndyMac to be? Is the FDIC left holding the bag?

More or less.

It's enough to turn an orange man pale.

"I got my money on Silver State Bancorp (SSBX)"

BRING ON WAMU!!

Tanta,

Is there a reason to think loans conforming to Ginnie Mae standards may have been subject to fewer rep and warranty breaches than those conforming to Freddie or Fannie?

I believe Countrywide was Fannie Mae's single largest counterparty.

I will be amazed if BOA's subsidiary trick works: But if it does, FNM standing in line with everyone else will be interesting to watch.

Somewhat ot, but I heard on NPR yesterday that some Massachusetts supplier of student loans can't sell the debt, so can't make the loans, so some thousands of students now have a problem just before school is due to start. Governor going hat in hand to Retirement Fund (getting a big no), and rich schools like Haaavaaard.

It is good for Fannie that these kids cannot go to college, because somebody needs to investigate this fraud.

So I guess the question is Will the taxpayers be the bagholders by recapitalizing FRE and FNMA, or will they be the bagholders by recapitalizing the FDIC?

Lawyerliz

Massachusetts Educational Financing Authority is trying to float a $425M bond offering, and the Gov. Patrick is trying to strong-arm the PF's and the endowments into purchase the bonds. It would make more sense if Patrick strong-armed the schools to LOWER costs.

With housing, we have fundamentals to gauge the affordability: price/rent or median home price ratios. Someone really needs to develop analagous fundamentals with education. No effing way can $60K for private undergrad tuition/room/board be sustainable...

"Just file criminal charges and stick all of them in tent prisons in the middle of BLM land in Nevada."

Or better yet, sentence them to 20 years of Carl Spackler duty at that 18-hole McAllister Ranch sand trap. And give the gophers automatic weapons.

Is there a reason to think loans conforming to Ginnie Mae standards may have been subject to fewer rep and warranty breaches than those conforming to Freddie or Fannie?

I think you mean FHA standards.

FHA probably had less fraud during the boom than it historically has had, since if you were a fraudster it was soooooo much easier just to do a conventional subprime loan. FHA has never allowed "stated income" or "drive-by appraisals" or stuff like that, so doing fraudulent FHA loans takes a lot of work.

This is one reason why FHA lost market share during the subprime boom.

That said, I wouldn't trust the appraisals on those "DAP" loans as far as I could throw them.

This is going to be a LOT of paperwork for someone.something like 90% of stated income loans showed significant fraud...and as has been mentioned man originators are gone,so "pushing back'these loans is a bit of a joke unless and until a few criminal actions are brought under rico or other statutes.

Tanta,

It is vital to look at the indemnification language. I seriously doubt Fannie would've taken on the loan without an indemnfication from the originators. It seems likely to me that the originators (because they will do anything to avoid paying these damages) will claim the indemnification language doesn't cover this type of conduct. Alternatively, the indemnification language could be mutual: the originators could claim they have to indemnify but Fannie also has to indemnify to the extent of its wrongdoing. If Fannie expects the originators to pick up the entire tab this will surely end up in court.

Thanks, Tanta.

Two questions:

  • Is there some basis for a class action, rather than just FNMA, to bring these actions against originators for misrepresntation. Presuably trustess on all the RMBS may be interested.
  • Does this also mean FNMA is asserting it will go after each individual borrower who may, for example, have misrepresnted their income/assets/ownership intentions (leaving aside many of these may be getting blood from a stone and better deep pockets to hit first).

It is vital to look at the indemnification language.

The GSEs have been using the same contractual verbiage of reps/warranties/remedy for breach for decades. This stuff isn't new, and it has been in court before, and I have personally never heard of any originator getting anywhere alleging that loan-level fraud is "wrongdoing" on Fannie Mae's part.

I don't see the point in talking about what-ifs of contractual verbiage you've never read.

- Is there some basis for a class action, rather than just FNMA, to bring these actions against originators for misrepresntation. Presuably trustess on all the RMBS may be interested.

The only party who can demand warranty against misrep is the party to whom the misrep was made.

RMBS (private issue securities) also work on loan purchase agreements, which also have their rep/warranty/buyback provisions. And Fannie Mae wouldn't be a party to that, any more than a private investor is party to a Fannie Mae contract with one of its seller/servicers.

- Does this also mean FNMA is asserting it will go after each individual borrower who may, for example, have misrepresnted their income/assets/ownership intentions (leaving aside many of these may be getting blood from a stone and better deep pockets to hit first).

No.

I keep trying to explain this. The issue is what representations the seller of the loan made to Fannie Mae, the buyer of the loan.

We call these things "buy-backs" because the only relevant transaction was the original purchase of the loan by Fannie Mae. Not the original loan closing. Fannie Mae isn't a party to that.

In order to sell a loan to Fannie Mae (or any other investor, GSE or private), you must represent and warrant that the loan is not fraudulent. Period.

If your representation turns out to be false, you make the warranty, which is usually buy-back but could be indem instead (just paying actual damages instead of buying back the loans).

It would then fall to the original lender to go after borrowers.

These are secondary market transactions.

Regarding MI paying off in fraud, this is mentioned in a recent Accrued Interest post:

Accrued Interest: Big day for the monolines

Ambac booked $339m in reduced loss reserves by finding violations in rep and warranty. I think the operative quote is:

"The company indicated that a survey of some of their higher delinquency transactions showed a 80%+ "hit rate" on representation and warranty violations"

I would expect FNM and FRE to find similar levels of fraud in the shadiest portions of the portfolio.

Regarding MI paying off in fraud, this is mentioned in a recent Accrued Interest post

Ambac is not a mortgage insurer. It is a bond insurer. The violations it found were presumably reps having to do with the structure of the bonds or underlying bond collateral.

Fannie Mae is going to double the number of barn door closers, in the hopes that what!?!?!?!...the horses will somehow reappear.

What part of "the money is long gone" don't they get? It's irretrievable....they should be trying to do more work up front to stop taking on more water....

Didn't a BOA exec say something not more than 2 weeks ago along the line that they probably would not honor Countrywide guarantees and were prepared for the consequences? I paraphrase, but Tanta, how might that remark fit into this scenario?

The push backs will trickle down. Fannie will push back to say WAMU or BAC and WAMU/BAC will turn around and push back to the broker, with whom they have their own reps and warranties, the broker will then either push back to borrower or pay up (HA).

I would imagine that a rather large number of these brokers are either out of business or soon to be and I rather doubt that the ones that are still in business have the ability to pay up. Going after the individual borroers is a non-starter.

So then what? The losses go on to the WAMU/BAC books??? Loans that were sold, booked as income, now come back with big hairy teeth? I may have that all wrong.

Lawyerliz sez:
"With housing, we have fundamentals to gauge the affordability: price/rent or median home price ratios. Someone really needs to develop analagous fundamentals with education. No effing way can $60K for private undergrad tuition/room/board be sustainable..."

Quite true - - need WalMart University to step up to the plate, especially given:
No Significant Difference Phenomenon Website

In the meantime, there are various means of avoiding the nasty sticker price, if getting a decent accredited degree is the goal:
100 Online schools to earn an accredited college degree
http://www.lowestcostcolleges.com/

I paraphrase, but Tanta, how might that remark fit into this scenario?

Beats me. The actual non-paraphrased language might be helpful.

Buyback provisions are not "guarantees." They are contractual obligations. If you mean to say that BAC said it would unilaterally abgrogate all CFC's existing contractual obligations, you're telling me news.

There is no way on earth that Fannie would be able to do anything in such a situation but terminate all its contracts with BAC. Why would BAC never want to do business with Fannie Mae ever again?

as long as loans are still processed with any of the accompanying documentation done with verbal verification this will continue.

C&C-
99% in a bit harsh....I'd say about 80%.
What's lost in this meme. is ramifications of the securities that are margined on the backs of these loans.
WHy doesn't anyone speak to this problem? Instead all we get is flag waving BS and a market that gets bloated up to begin the same process again.

Ciao
MS

What part of "the money is long gone" don't they get?

Uh, a whole lot of it.

What money is long gone? You're telling me BAC is insolvent today? Did someone alert the FDIC?

If you mean to say that BAC said it would unilaterally abgrogate all CFC's existing contractual obligations, you're telling me news.

Only the ones that lose money.
This is what I meant above with the BOA "subsidiary" trick. I'll look for the link if useful.

So then what? The losses go on to the WAMU/BAC books??? Loans that were sold, booked as income, now come back with big hairy teeth?

Absolutely correct.

Fannie Mae (or any other investor) is under no obligation to eat losses for you just because you can't find anyone else to.

It would be nice if FNMA would also released foreclosure data on Alt-A loans where those was no mispresentation. How many fully documented loans where originated through mortgage brokers that were 100% financing, no reserves, credit scores under 680 and back ratios greater than 60%? Are they going to own up to having placed a crappy product on the market?

"No effing way can $60K for private undergrad tuition/room/board be sustainable..."
But Liz, the govt has stepped up and promised low interest loans to assist people who otherwise could not afford an education. You see, it's not the principal that matters, it's the payment. These private institutions will, out of charity, keep their tuition at current levels, allowing students, not the private universities, profit from the below market interest rates.
The only thing that might be more helpful would be financing innovations like Adjustable Rate Student Loans and Education Expense Lines of Credit.
Who says we don't learn from history?

Fannie Mae (or any other investor) is under no obligation to eat losses for you just because you can't find anyone else to.

Nor should they be. I was just thinking through the flow and these would be potential losses that WAMU/BAC no longer carries loss reserves for, right? Bear with my little pea brain here but is this not a potential btch slap to their income, hard dollar btch slap, at that?

Thanks Tanta for response.

One point all can agree - this is a huge win for the lawyers who will make a fortune as all the litigation progresses.

I hope MEFA can't get their money. Schools have not had to lower their tuition rates because they just kept piling up the student loan (alternative) debt for students. Gone are the days of a dorm room with a double bed and 2 desks. Now they have living areas, private sleeping areas, etc- just keep signing for more debt.

In the long this student loan "crisis" will be much better for future students who won't see tuition skyrocket over the next 10 years like it has over the last 10.

Bottom line is if you can't afford the 45K private school then go to your state school- they give out the same degree.

Sorry, Tanta, that was sloppy of me.

On 8/8/2008, CR reported on a BOA conference call, including this:
“We have received a lot of questions about Countrywide's public debt. All I can say at this point is we don't intend to guarantee the public debt but we understand the ramification of not paying. We will keep you informed as we continue to integrate the country wide transaction.”

In order to sell a loan to Fannie Mae (or any other investor, GSE or private), you must represent and warrant that the loan is not fraudulent. Period.

If your representation turns out to be false, you make the warranty, which is usually buy-back but could be indem instead (just paying actual damages instead of buying back the loans).

It would then fall to the original lender to go after borrowers.


Great point Tanta.

I need to go out and buy myself a couple of dump trucks full of popcorn and a good seat as I think we are soon going to watch the easy house money river stop flowing downhill and reverse and flow uphill.

Man this is going to blow up a lot of people as everyone stops trusting each other implicitly and slows the pace of transactions and increases scrutiny. This should be fun to watch

Nor should they be. I was just thinking through the flow and these would be potential losses that WAMU/BAC no longer carries loss reserves for, right?

Well, actually, repurchase warranties are a contingent liability that everybody should be reserving for.

Maybe they aren't reserving enough, but that's their problem.

When you do business with an investor like Fannie Mae, you get regular QC reports and audits and "normal" repurchase activity and stuff. Your accountants have to set the contingent reserves based on their best estimates of how much shit sandwich you might ever have to eat based on historical performance and current conditions, just like in any reserving situation.

I'm sure a lot of them under-reserved for this, but then they under-reserved for the loans they hold in portfolio.

Comment from the Texas S&L fiasco 1988-1992), when there was a civil remedy (i.e., a private party to make good on the loss) the feds had less interest in criminal remedies:

When there was a loss that could not be put or offset, or the indemnity was worthless, then you more frequently saw a criminal referral. Given the generally sloppy business practices of the era (probably no worse than those of the recent housing boom) making a criminal case tended to be pretty easy, once the prosecuting teams quit trying to explain the grand schemes in detail to a jury of normal people and focused on a few simple representative fraudulent transactions sufficient to support a conviction and easily understood by a lay jury.

We'll probably see the same pattern here. And the Bushies will be long gone before this is all straightened out or the limitations statutes have run--I suspect McCain might be in favor of recycling Gitmo as a holding pen for a number of participants in this sad food chain.

Are they going to own up to having placed a crappy product on the market?

They just said they were going to stop buying these loans. No more Alt-A. It's in the post beneath this.

I take that to be an admission that the product is not working out so hot.

>
loan loss reserves

See for reference: Alternative Loan Trust 2007-OA6, et al. · 424B5 · On 5/2/07

http://www.secinfo.com/dsvR3.u2ht.htm

\tCredit enhancement is intended to reduce the effect of loan losses. But credit enhancements may benefit only some classes of a series of securities and the amount of any credit enhancement will be limited as described in the related prospectus supplement. Furthermore, the amount of a credit enhancement may decline over time pursuant to a schedule or formula or otherwise, and could be depleted from payments or for other reasons before the securities covered by the credit enhancement are paid in full. In addition, a credit enhancement may not cover all potential sources of loss. For example, a credit enhancement may or may not cover fraud or negligence by a loan originator or other parties. Also, all or a portion of the credit enhancement may be reduced, substituted for, or even eliminated so long as the rating agencies rating the securities indicate that the change in credit enhancement would not cause them to change adversely their rating of the securities. Consequently, securityholders may suffer losses even though a credit enhancement exists and its provider does not default.

Maybe they aren't reserving enough, but that's their problem.

Until it becomes our problem.

Thank you, that makes more sense as far as how it should be working.

ACCREDITED HOME LENDERS HOLDING CO. 10-Q

The number of outstanding shares of the registrant’s common stock as of August 31, 2007 was 25,154,069.

We are subject to losses due to fraudulent and negligent acts on the part of mortgage loan applicants, mortgage brokers, other vendors and our employees.
When we originate mortgage loans, we rely heavily upon information supplied by third parties including the information contained in the mortgage loan application, property appraisal, title information and employment and income documentation. If any of this information is intentionally or negligently misrepresented and such misrepresentation is not detected prior to mortgage loan funding, the value of the mortgage loan may be significantly lower than expected. Whether a misrepresentation is made by the mortgage loan applicant, the mortgage broker, another third party or one of our own employees, we generally bear the risk of loss associated with the misrepresentation. If a mortgage loan is subject to a material misrepresentation, we are typically unable to sell or are required to repurchase the loan if it was sold prior to detection of the misrepresentation. Even though we may have rights against persons and entities who made or knew about the misrepresentation, such persons and entities are often difficult to locate and it is often difficult to collect any monetary losses that we have suffered as a result of their actions.
We have controls and processes designed to help us identify misrepresented information in our mortgage loan origination operations. We cannot assure you, however, that we have detected or will detect all misrepresented information in our mortgage loan originations. We are subject to losses due to fraudulent and negligent acts in other parts of our operations. If we experience or detect a significant number of such fraudulent or negligent acts, our business, financial condition, liquidity and results of operations would be significantly harmed.

What money is long gone? You're telling me BAC is insolvent today? Did someone alert the FDIC?

If everybody thinks they can get their money back on those loans (other than via free money from the Treasury), then yes, even BAC might be insolvent.

These guys are even declaring profits on the declining value of their obligations to others....if they owe everyone every penny they promised, most of them are toast sans Treasury free money.

So how difficult in terms of manpower and time to find fraud? I'd guess in terms of return it's going to be 'lucrative' to do the investigation, but when are we (the public) likely to hear about outcomes? Days, weeks, or months?

I should add that even BAC is saying "we won't be honoring any promises CountryWide made"....

Putting back loans....it'll be like unspilling milk that has evaporated. It'll cost a lot of money to clean up the stain, but it's not going to be renumerative.

“We have received a lot of questions about Countrywide's public debt. All I can say at this point is we don't intend to guarantee the public debt but we understand the ramification of not paying. We will keep you informed as we continue to integrate the country wide transaction.”

Am I parsing this right? They're saying "We just paid four billion dollars for CFC, but it's probably going to go BK/FDIC and that's fine, we'll just write off those billions that we paid to buy it."

In what parallel universe is that a reasonable exercise of BofA's fiduciary duty to its shareholders?

Again, I'll remind you of an anecdote from which I see all of this....

I have a twenty something cousin with $1.1 million of pay option loans on two homes that are worth maybe half that.

Fine, take back both houses - still short .5M.

Gonna take back his used subaru?
Gonna go after the twentysomething mortgage broker who gave him the
loans, who's currently pounding the
pavement because the brokerage closed? Gonna go after whomever
bought that loan to repackage it?...just how many put backs do you think they can take on, when they already paid out their repackaging & fee profits in bonus and salary. That's right -- push backs will just force banks to go TU, or cause tax payer backed recapitalization. The money is long gone. The only money still around is tax payer provided....one way or another, that's where push backs will go, if they suceed at all.

This is perhaps as old as Ms Bair's hairstyle, but at least on topic:

A loan that is subject to a material misrepresentation is typically unsaleable or subject to repurchase if it is sold prior to detection of the misrepresentation. Although we may have rights against persons who, or entities that, made, or knew about, the misrepresentation, those persons and entities may be difficult to locate, and it is often difficult to collect from them any monetary losses that we have suffered.

In addition, for approximately 40% of the non-conforming loans that we originate, we receive little or no documentation of the borrowers' income. Instead, we base our credit decisions on the borrowers' credit score and credit history, the collateral value of the property securing the loan and the effect of the loan on the borrowers' debt service. There is a higher risk of default on loans where there is little or no documentation of the borrower's income.

I'm not sure what you're getting at Tanta. I haven't read the indemnification language either but my experience with indemnification language in complex contracts they are ambiguous and (most of the time) mutual. I'm not saying there's any "wrongdoing" by Fannie, just that the originator will allege something (which is why I used the term wrongdoing rather than fraud or breach of contract). This isn't really a legal issue: This fiasco is about financial institutions playing kick the can. We know there are massive losses -- no one wants to take responsibility for them. That is why I think any claim for indemnfication will end up in court. Everyone is holding out as long as they can, hoping time will make it all go away. The originators have very smart lawyers who will concoct something.

Then add to all of the above the fact that a California Judge said "you didn't rely materially on the representations of the buyer...because you didn't check anything".
You think anyone else in the food chain can make this stick? The ultimate lender was stupid....they'll either take a loss, or get free tax payer money. Period.

All we're talking about now is a lawyer employment bubble that might develop.
More money malinvested.....

COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP. DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
http://www.blbglaw.com/casedox/2008-05-14CountrywideOrder.pdf

...It produces both “conforming loans” which can be sold to government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and non-conforming ones, which can be sold only to private investors.

Plaintiffs’ Allegations 1. Increased Origination of Non-conforming Loans Plaintiffs allege that from 2002-2006, the Company steadily increased the origination of “non-conforming” loans, which are inherently less safe than conforming loans because they cannot be sold to government-sponsored entities.

A. Exchange Act §10(b) Count VI of the complaint pleads a violation of §10(b) of the Exchange Act. A §10(b) claim requires the following elements: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) reliance; (4) economic loss; and (5) loss causation, which is “a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss.” Dura Pharm. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005); 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(4). Together, the Individual Defendants’ and Defendant Dougherty’s Motions to Dismiss argue that Plaintiffs have failed to plead each of these elements.

Viewed as a percentage of the overall loan portfolio, Plaintiffs observe, the allowances in 2003-2006 were less than half their 2002 levels. Id. (noting reserves of 0.69% in 2002, but an average reserve of just over 0.30% in the following four years). By maintaining such low reserves, Plaintiffs allege, Defendants improperly boosted profits and deceived the market as to the true risk of their portfolio.

The Individual Defendants, unlike the investing public, were members of Board Committees charged with oversight of Countrywide’s risk exposures, investment portfolio, and loan loss reserves. 13 As such, they were in a position to recognize the significance of these red flags, and, accordingly, investigate the extent to which underwriting standards had been abandoned. Notably, the underwriting violations, unlike the “red flags” themselves, were not disclosed to the public – indeed, Mozilo repeatedly assured investors of Countrywide’s underwriting discipline and loan quality. See id. ¶¶141-146. Here, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts giving rise to a strong inference that Defendants on four specific Committees knew of the underwriting violations, or at the very least, proceeded with deliberate recklessness:

  • 13 Moreover, the Board committees met regularly and were presumably functioning as intended. For example, in2006, the Audit & Ethics committee met 14 times; the Finance committee, 10 times; the Credit and Operations & Public Policy committees, 5 times each; and the Compensation committee, 29 times. See Compl. ¶¶78-97. 14 Defendants Melone, Parry, and Russell (and previously, Defendant Cisneros) are on the Audit Committee. 15 The Exception Processing System flagged highly risky loans based on certain objective criteria, for example, if the loan-to-value ratio was too high when compared with the borrower’s FICO score

Off topic?

PFF Bancorp Inc · 10-K · For 3/31/08
http://www.secinfo.com/d14D5a.t454g.htm

During the economic downturn in the US economy and its resulting negative impact on the housing market, DBS’s loan portfolio experienced a significant decline in value and credit quality since most of DBS’s loan portfolio consisted of construction and land loans. As a result, during the fourth quarter of fiscal 2008, DBS transferred its loan portfolio to the held-for-sale classification, whereby DBS charged-off $47.4 million in loans and subsequently wrote-down an additional loss of $10.2 million to lower of cost-or-market which was recoded in other non-interest income. For the fiscal year ended March 31, 2008, DBS charged off $62.4 million in loans, recorded a provision for loan loss of $58.5 million and a lower of cost-or-market loss of $10.2 million.

The OTS and the FDIC have significant discretion in connection with their supervisory and enforcement activities and examination policies, including policies with respect to the classification of assets and the establishment of adequate loan loss reserves for regulatory purposes. Any change in such policies, whether by the OTS, the FDIC, the SEC or the United States Congress, could have a material adverse impact on the Bancorp, the Bank and their operations and stockholders.
Further, new statutes, regulations and guidance are regularly proposed that contain wide-ranging potential changes to the statutes, regulations and competitive relationships of financial institutions operating and doing business in the United States. We cannot predict whether or in what form any proposed regulation or statute will be adopted or the extent to which our business may be affected by any new regulation or statute.

As a lender concentrating its business primarily in the Inland Empire of the State of California (San Bernardino and Riverside Counties), deterioration in the credit quality of our loan portfolios has had, and may continue to have, a negative impact on earnings resulting from increased provisioning for loan losses and from increased nonaccrual loans, which could cause a decrease in interest-earning assets. Credit risk incorporates the risk of loss due to adverse changes in a borrower’s ability to meet our financial obligations on agreed upon terms. The overall credit quality of our loan portfolios is particularly impacted by the strength of the U.S. economy and local economies in which we conduct our lending operations, as well as trends in residential housing prices. We continually monitor changes in the economy, particularly unemployment rates and housing prices, because these factors can impact the ability of our borrowers to repay their loans.
During 2007, the housing market in the U.S. (particularly in California, where properties securing approximately 95% of our outstanding single-family residential mortgage loans are located) began to experience significant adverse trends, including accelerating price depreciation in some markets and rising delinquency and default rates. These conditions led to significant increases in loan delinquencies and credit losses in our mortgage portfolios and higher provisioning for loan losses which has adversely affected our earnings. A substantial majority of our mortgage loans were secured by real estate in Southern California. We expect that housing prices will experience significant further deterioration in 2008 with further adverse effects on our operating results, business and financial condition....blah, blah...

During the economic downturn in the US economy and its resulting negative impact on the housing market,

As the cart pushed the horse...

Maybe they aren't reserving enough, but that's their problem.

It was for New Century

Fannie Mae Push-Back

Something wrong with this story.
Story said Fannie looks for fraud and improper lending practices
Is this some kind of a bad joke?
Where where the Federal Regulators?
That was there responsiblility to supervise and exam these lenders to make sure they complied with US Code
12 CFR 560.01 and 564, plus others.
Has the government lost their mind.
What kind of crap is this?
The Bank made the loan, Butt crack Mae purchased it.
Certainly Crime pays here in lending land.
Michael LittleBig

When my Senators wrong way Sherrod Brown and George Voinovich get back from their paid vacation I will ask them to pass another money bill to help the Office of Thrift Supervision
to hire a bank examiner with a brain.

I didn't say that, someone else did in response to something I said. But I certainly agree!!

Tanta writes:
Here, specifically, they are talking about post-FC reviews. There is no longer a loan to buy back. They could make the servicer buy the REO at par, or they could make the servicer pay all actual losses, damages, attorney's fees and so on that are incurred because of fraud. The latter is strictly speaking an indemnification rather than a buy-back.

Aaaaahhh. I'm feeling a little bit better about Fannie/Freddie today, at least. Hopefully Freddie will also step up their push-back efforts as well. I mentioned a couple of Freddie foreclosures in my neighborhood on a previous thread, which were fairly obvious fraud cases and good candidates for push-backs. I don't know if Freddie or Fannie have a hotline for this sort of thing... I'll post around on Freddie's site and try contacting them anyway, it can't hurt.

Rob Dawg writes:
Fannie could offer a bounty for people to bring particular instances of retail fraud to their attention.

Now you're talkin'. I could finally get paid for scouring the county deed website...

The broker who used to refer me deals and is now selling cruises was honest. He brokered loans to the specs of countrywide, and did virtually no neg-am mtges, because he didn't believe in them. He hated Countrywide, but dealt with them, because they had "such good programs".

There should be no push back to him, and even if there were, he doesn't have any money.

One point all can agree - this is a huge win for the lawyers who will make a fortune as all the litigation progresses.

Maybe true, but this is still a win for taxpayers. If the loans are successfully pushed back, even if BofA/WaMu/etc are pushed toward insolvency, their shareholders and possibly bondholders will eat some losses along with any losses that make it back to the taxpayers in the form of FDIC bailouts, etc. Much preferable to direct Fannie/Freddie losses.

Thanks, Tanta.

This will soon be a MAJOR issue, and you are ahead of the curve. And with the most knowledgeable comments I've seen.

So how difficult in terms of manpower and time to find fraud? I'd guess in terms of return it's going to be 'lucrative' to do the investigation, but when are we (the public) likely to hear about outcomes? Days, weeks, or months?

Actually, many kinds of fraud investigations end up costing more than you can recover.

Appraisal fraud is actually a hard one. It is usually easier for an investor like Fannie Mae to just declare that the appraisal doesn't meet Fannie Mae rules and demand buy-back than it is to do a full-scale investigation to determine that the appraisal was truly fraudulent (instead of, say, just weak or technically unsatisfactory).

When losses in FC are fairly low, there is then little motivation to do full-scale appraisal fraud investigations. However, when losses are as severe as they are now, it becomes more cost-effective.

To Tanta,
I agree with you Tanta, appraisal fraud is hard to prove with today’s creative attorneys. I speak from experience. In 2003, Am Trust Bank, Cleveland Ohio, appraised my property for a refinance with no new cash out on my mortgage balance with them. They used their employee who was a State of Ohio Licensed appraiser since 1991. They denied my loan because the LTV was 98% based on their appraisal. Besides $67K in improvements, I never had a late charge on any payments including the banks mortgage. I complained to the State of Ohio citing 4 violations of State law and the American Appraisal Standards Board. The State of Ohio discounted those violations but cited the appraiser with 5 other violations of state Law and AASB. After a year from my filing date, the Bank and the State made a deal behind closed doors. The State said in writing the settlement made to save time and money. The appraiser got a penalty of 14 additional hours of real estate education. The violations of Ohio State law also meant that this bank violated US code 12-CFR 564-Appraisals. The Office of Thrift Supervision stated after 18 months that agreed with the bank that there were no appraisal violations and then the bank proceeded to sell my house at foreclosure. Therefore in Ohio, understand that this State does not enforce its appraisal laws.

Michael LittleBig
PO Box 16588, Rocky River OH 44116

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