July 6 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc., the world's biggest securities firm, said law-enforcement authorities don't consider letters making threats against the company to be credible.
Now on to the main event- Tanta, how is Fitch dealing with those massive piggyback helocs that were also securitized? Just curious if they are burying the downgrades on page 23;-}
AllenM, there seems to be a connection lately between downgrades and late Friday afternoons. So I will be checking later today to see if there's anything interesting.
In all seriousness though, I must admit that I almost did not make it past the first paragraph on this one. I was thoroughly confused after having read it was too early to be drinking. But I just burried the thought and plowed on. Thank goodness the remainder of the post covered concepts that were far easier to grasp.
Thanks Tanta. It's most helpful to have the benefit of lucid, informative descriptions such as this one.
Who is actually responsible for mapping the month to month performace of CDO's to actual portfolio holdings? Is this a servicing company? When payments don't arrive as expected I assume it has to show up on someone's books as a shortfall. Even though the CDO is brain-dead it still requires that someone keep score. As I understand it, individual loans don't belong to any particular tranche. That's part of the slice and dice magic, right? When a loan is in arrears the heat is first felt in the "equity" tranche. What I am asking is how the mechanics of that process works? Who are the companies who make their living servicing these things and how does the valuation of CDO investments lying in particular portfolios change in response to their actions?
Thanks for explaining this, especially the bucket and 30-day rolling stuff.
Tanta, if you have time I would beg for an ubernerd post that sums up the history of usages of the term "ALT-A", ALT-B etc, and the whole bit about how subprime is sub-620 to some and sub-660 to others. I am still confused about all that.
Read whole thing -- I'm not near to being an ubernerd, but for some reason this one was easy on my simple mind. uberthanks!
Just curious, Tanta, you mentioned the press can incorrecty spin these numbers into something scary -- what about the flip side? Any examples of how these definitions and numbers can be tweaked into a rosy view?
Tanta said: "...It is particularly annoying when we see people throwing around delinquency numbers as if they were loss percentages, and then applying that number to the total outstanding balance of all subprime securitizations to come up with some scary-looking number in the billions, without taking into account, among other things, the original expected loss on the pools. Not even the meanest (sane) critic of the rating agencies accuses them of having predicted no losses at all when these deals were originally rated..."
Thank-you, Tanta. I found your post educational and not at all tedious.
Although you're starting to drift off-message by taking away some of the housing bears' firepower.
"The latter will depend on "loss severity," or what percentage of the outstanding loan balance is not recovered in liquidation. That, obviously, is an issue of home prices and servicer efficiency"
IMO loss severity is where the rubber meets the road and is probably the single most wildly speculated about concern.
Really, an REO is by default going to be a significant loss, as no one will go into default if there's any salvagable equity. The degree of the severity of the loss is what will be in question and CA will finally become a Bright Red State as it crushes ALL competition to rack up losses that will be staggering, probably dwarfing the GDPs of 1/2 of the world's countries.
We're still in the second inning and it's a tie game so far.
thanks for another insightful post. I realize I've been conflating a couple of these terms for quite some time. Guess that makes me an inadvertent weenie.
PS - I don't mean to press, but when are we going to see your manifesto on what sort of reforms are needed for the mortgage market (especially subprime)?
I suspect parts would find their way in legislation surprisingly quickly given the political heat the issue is generating, how popular this site is becoming and the timing of the election cycle.
Um, barely, a lot are going into default with equity- just not enough to make it worth a refi- because a refi is not available to the borrower due to FICO considerations. This is what is driving the housing market down, because a lot of nohope folks are waiting until the last minute to try and do something, and usually it is too late due to killer fees. Check out how a balance can grow on those 60 day ones, especially if they are rolling like Tanta said. It is easy to add five percent in fees to the balance (gravy for the servicer!!!) during a mod- so imagine how fast equity gets eaten up during the preforeclosure stage.
One other fly in the ointment to watch for is the role of leverage.
Even if hyperbears are counting the losses at 100% when they are really 'only' 15%, the role of leverage can increase that. Say some 4x leverage is applied to that security, then the loss becomes 75% of capital. 100K investment, 20K capital, 80K borrowed. 15% loss = 15K / 20K capital = 75%.
So while the hyperbears are counting losses before they hatch, the question is how many folks have laid leveraged eggs.
Who is actually responsible for mapping the month to month performace of CDO's to actual portfolio holdings?
The mechanisms for reporting all this data are actually pretty reliable and non-controversial. (It's in the interpretation of the data that we have our differences of opinion.)
The servicer sends a "remittance report" every month to the security trustee, which includes information on delinquencies and defaults as it's purpose is to calculate how much money came in and how much each bondholder is due in distributions.
Servicers of rated securities upload monthly data to a service that then makes it available to the rating agencies. Each one has slightly different procedures, but basically the monthly numbers run through a filter looking for anything unusual or numbers that are approaching certain tolerances, and those deals are subject to a full-scale review. Other deals just get a review every 12 months if they don't have anything unusual happening. (Hence you can get upgrades, downgrades, or "affirmations" out of these reviews. "Affirmation" just means that the deal was reviewed and nothing much changed from original projections.)
I don't know anyone who is particularly worried that the data reporting process is a problem. I think most people see the controversy in how the rating agencies' models do those reviews--what assumptions they make--not what the data is going in. There has been a problem with how modified loans are reported: they are traditionally reported as current after they are modified, as long as the borrower is making payments. (Bringing them current being the whole point of modifying them.) Fitch has proposed a change to remittance reporting for modified loans so that they can be considered as a separate "bucket" from other current and delinquent loans. It makes sense, as their re-default rate is undoubtedly higher than the roll rate of current loans that have never been modified.
Assuming delinquincy=default is the same thing as thinking that casualty=fatality.
I'm curious, which will go to heck faster, the worst tranches of bonds from pools of middling bad loans, or the middle tranches of pools of the worst loans? I have a sneaking suspicion that this may be very different than what the bond raters suspect. This could mean that all aa bonds are not created equal.
I think the rubber meets the road in column 3 row 1 of the table (projected defaults of current loans). Everything else can be pretty well modeled. And the difference between the loss of 35% and 50% is smaller than with default of 11% vs 30%.
When the model assumed (based on the past performance) that most of the borrowers in trouble would get current by refinance and the rising home prices would bail out almost everybody, then we have a problem when this assumption fails.
Losses are a function of sale price. It is by far more interesting to understand if banks have Hugh REOs that they have so far kept away from the market in order to protect prices.
It is very clear that rolling 30 is not a 90 day delinquent. and that not all rolling-30 become a 60 days and that not all 60 days become 90 days that turn into foreclosure.
The real issue to find reliable stats that aggragate these numbers across a large market. Without such stats the whole discussion is pretty much moot.
So I would say this post did not add much. It would be better to understand what actually goes on. Btw, the table from the Fitch report is unreadable at least on my browser (does not open up to a larger readable format).
I have wondered many times is the real-estate market really going much lower. So far I have not seen any measurable indication (say about foreclosures, delinquencies and real prices) other than industry numbers which I don't really trust. A simple, measure of price per sq ft , or price for property that was sold few years ago and again this year would have shown us much better numbers that the "median" we get from NAR.
Well we have had some unnerving recent changes in loss numbers. Many more of the longer delinquencies are moving toward foreclosure than is typical in some areas.
But as covered on this blog at length, the combination of toxic loan terms and poor borrower qualification, combined with a change in available terms, accounts well for it.
But it does change likely loss scenarios by a bundle.
'm curious, which will go to heck faster, the worst tranches of bonds from pools of middling bad loans, or the middle tranches of pools of the worst loans?
Good question. Part of me suspects it will be the worst tranches of the middlin' bad loans, if only because, all other things being equal, those loans should have lower interest rates, more refi opportunities, and hence those pools risk being unable to build up OC and excess spread fast enough to cover early losses.
It's a point to remember: the question isn't just the credit quality of the loans, but the adequacy of the bond structure and the prevailing market rates for new loans (which impact the original prepayment estimates).
Yal, I'm sorry, I don't know why Blogger won't open up a larger version of that chart. I'll see if I can upload it again. Maybe it'll work the second time.
Yes, even though there may be increasing numbers of people not making mortgage payments that doesn't necessarily result in the wholesale destruction of the value of these securities as there is SOME collatoral to recover.
And if a bubble didn't occur in this market of collatoral, if SO MANY didn't grossly bid prices up and then finance them at 100%......then this whole issue wouldn't be that noteworthy. I have no doubt that these would have been great, relatively safe, securities had they been based on 80% mortgages or on fully documented income....like in the "old days".....when the model's data was largely consistent, reliable and predictible.
I think the big concern is that the cycle not only is reversing but unraveling. Too many properties aren't going to catch a bid in too many locations. Too many properties will be vandalized or suffer other damage severely lessening their value. And while they sit, the tax bills keep accumulating along with other "hidden" costs of property disposal.
This is the glitch in the model, an unraveling. Unless someone knows how to get people to buy a couple of million excess units without their prices being cut dramatically (40-50%) to an "affordable" or rental equivalent level, it just doesn't seem logical that there won't be a significant (25%?) decline in the "real" value of these securities over the next year or so.
My question is why aren't we seeing this unraveling starting already ?
or maybe it is but some are doing their best to udnerreport the real situation in the market.
I am following one small area of california and see the same homes on the market for 6 month or more. Yet when I talk to an agent she tells me: sales are somewhat down and prices are stable.....
We were talking about the misuse of the word "leverage" in that HuffingtonPost article yesterday - Naked Capitalism does a great job of absolutely skewering most of the assertions and figures in the article (including total misuse of the word leverage) - check it out!
After hearing all the negatives about the housing market I am still faced with stable prices in the area I'm interested in (Northern Arizona). I would have thought that all the deliquencies and defaults would have led to lower prices, and also lower rates as the demand for money (loans) decreases, combined with strong money supply (M3 still soaring). Instead, RE prices are relatively stable, and the price for borrowing (interests) increases. What giveth?
Also, does someone know how to profit from delinquencies&defaults? Are there strategies?
AllenM, I am equating default with a property that has had foreclosure procedings intiated. I guess it's possible that a property in default might have a tiny shred of equity, but I figure a property would be sold or refi'd by the owner if there was any money in it. Once it goes back to the lender it's a loss, for sure.
Yal, sorry. Usually most loans that get a NOD don't go to foreclosure. What's disturbing about some of the recent activity is that in some areas (quite large ones) a much higher percentage of loans entering disclosure go to foreclosure than normal. More than double.
Other worries that have raised the spector of much higher losses are lower conversion rates on mods for early delinquencies (dropping out after six months or so) and early poor recovery ratios after foreclosure. Obviously the longer the property sits on the market, the higher the expected loss. During all that time the servicer has to pay insurance, taxes and other expenses.
This will not be uniform. What is disturbing is that some of the "hottest" areas are showing some of the worst figures.
It works like a matrix, you see. If you change the conversion factors in an area, you change the expected losses. I did wonder if Paulson's blah-blah about a housing recovery was aimed at adjusting the expectations on the Street for those losses, because that is what would change valuation of the pools and the tranches. So if you postulate that the current situation is strictly temporary, and that these conditions will be adjusting back to normal in a few months, then you don't have to change the bulk of your pool's projected losses.
I am still faced with stable prices in the area I'm interested in (Northern Arizona).
Flagstaff should be relatively stable, as they couldn't build that much because of all the national land surrounding it. Rates haven't risen enough to really put downward pressure on prices, just demand.
Prescott is another story. ramapnt spec building, rocketing prices, should crash hard when it all goes boom.
Kingman I believe is in the same predicament, except when things go boom it'll be way worse as there's nothing there.
One thing that will "help" maintain prices is that developers have to secure a 100 year water supply, which is hard going on the plateau.
If the fraction of delinquencies is fd, the default rate of currents is dc, the average default rate of delinquences is dd, and loss severity is ls, then the total loss is:
ls * [ (1-fd)dc + fddd ]
The average default fraction as a percentage of all deliquencies in the example given is about 65%. I'm no mortgage lender but that sounds like a pretty reasonable number. It's hard to see that that number should be any lower than, say, 35% (the lowest on the table), and certainly can't be higher than 100%.
As you vary this average number from 35% to 100%, the loss varies from 5.2% to 9.1% (it started out at 7.1%). So varying the default rate of delinquencies over its entire range gives about 30% variation in the final answer (total loss of the pool).
The final answer is linear in the loss rate assumed (vary the loss rate by 30% and the final loss of the pool varies by 30%).
I think I agree with poszi above that the biggest question mark is the fraction of currents that eventually will default. From the numbers in the table, I think this was simply set as fd*dd, which is the steady-state solution.
If you assume a steady state solution (as I'm pretty sure Fitch did), the answer at the end of the day can be boiled down further to
ls * fd * dd *(2-fd)
which shows pretty clearly the dependence of the final loss to the pool as a function of the inputs.
The reason you need a whole table is that I've swept a lot under the rug into "dd", and the table is effectively calculating dd.
If you assume non steady state (i.e. that defaults will increase over time) the numbers look quite different and the simplest formula doesn't work.
Our actual mortgage experts can comment on whether 65% is a reasonably stable number for the default rate averaged over delinquencies.
Do the home price appreciation numbers (factors)below 100% imply lower assumed prices for the (Homes/collateral) in this example. Also what does the 118% adjustment mean for the current loans?
If so I think that would take some of the steam off these huge estimated losses some of the media are throwing around.
Joe,
Maybe it's just our Ubernerd perspective. We follow the RE news on a daily basis expecting the other shoe to drop. Even the tech stock bubble took 3 years to bottom out. One mouse click and you were out of that market. Not so with RE (obviously).
Or alternatively; "A watched pot never boils."
Barely, Yal and others above touch on the importance of severity. IMO, severity is the key given the structure of leverage.
Think of the AAA tranches as withstanding a 100% default rate with a 20% price-related (ex-foreclosure costs) severity.
"Go ahead, don't pay," the AAA-guy says, "I own your home if you do."
"But don't you have to sell it?" you ask.
"Yeah," he replies, lazily glancing at his daily P&L print-out. "And I'll NEVER sell at a loss of more than 20%, because home prices don't fall, and you can take THAT to the bank."
"Gee," you say. "If home prices don't fall, and defaults don't affect you, how much leverage do you have?"
Finally he smiles; a wolfish grin. "50:1's where I stop, but only 'cause it just isn't fair for me to make ALL the money."
Imagine AAA-guy if he thought home prices would fall. He'd dump his holdings faster than you can say, "redemptions."
And that's why the sticky home price hypothesis is so important to these folks.
Gotta be precise in using terms. The losses due to leverage are not in the instruments themselves but in the means used to purchase those instruments. Thus an instrument may go down 15% but that loss wipes out the capital of a purchaser sufficiently leveraged.
Professor Foland, 65% is high, but this is a subprime pool. I would expect the number to be no higher than 50% for prime pools and generally much lower than that. That may be what MOM is getting at by observing that 76% is a high default rate for loans in foreclosure. Historically, prime pools roll from FC to default at no more than 50% or so.
You also notice (in the footnotes to the table) that Fitch is adjusting the default rate for the current loans by two factors: upward for performance (this pool has performed somewhat worse than the benchmark model in its first 18 months, so the defaults are adjusted upward to 118% of benchmark). On the other hand, this pool is old enough to have some appreciation. Fitch gives more "credit" for appreciation to "current" loans than to delinquent loans: the "current" adjustment for property appreciation is 95% for current loans but only 98% for delinquent loans. This differential is attempting to account for adverse self-selection (weaker borrowers buy weaker properties) as well as adverse property condition associated with delinquent loans (I guess we call this the "possum factor" in NY; other people just call it the "deferred maintenance" problem).
Clearly a newly-originated pool is not going to get as much "credit" for price appreciation as an older pool. In any case, it's the varying assumptions of HPA that affect significantly the projection of defaults. Another thing that isn't visible in this table is the impact of things like ARM resets.
I'd really like to do a good post on "payment velocity," which is an alternate measure of delinquency, but although I have asked for permission to post from some proprietary reports I've seen, I haven't gotten it yet, nor have I found what I'm looking for on the web. If anyone does know of any web-available recent payment velocity calcs, please let me know.
potty, to clarify: the 118% performance adjustment means that this pool has, in its first 18 months, performed somewhat worse than the benchmark model prediction of default, so Fitch nudged the number up (using 118% of the benchmark instead of 100% of it). On the other hand, HPA for the pool (given its age) has been slight but positive (Fitch uses a variation of OFHEO's house price index). But Fitch gives loans that are current at 18 months more credit for HPA than loans that are delinquent at 18 months. Therefore, the benchmark default rate in the model is adjusted downward by 5% for current loans but only by 2% for delinquent loans).
Pearson, That's the best one I've seen in a long time. It's a game of chicken with a locomotive and the starters' gun goes off when RE values drop... around 10% or so.
Alec, "Flagstaff should be relatively stable, as they couldn't build that much because of all the national land surrounding it. Rates haven't risen enough to really put downward pressure on prices, just demand"
Aren't you forgetting something, important, in this credit bubble market? Even places that failed to see spikes in either building or RE prices are seeing default rates rocket higher. See, those owners in fly-over-land watch the same TV ADs for $499/mo refis, get the same mailers and watch "Flip This + That" on HGTV. They didn't get the MEW vaccine. They are almost as likely to be facing resets they can't handle and should see price drops too - just perhaps not quite as severe. Depends on the leftover demand, if there is any...
A loss is a loss is a loss. Once it becomes clear that these MBS,CDOs ect are a losing proposition, capital will go else where. A smaller loss won't hurt the investor as badly but it will kill the market for more of this credit or at least cheap credit as it becomes clear these investments are very riskier than assumed. People don't invest to lose money.
The elimination of cheap credit will increase the risks of lending as workouts and refi's and sales become more difficult. And so the cycle becomes self reinforcing.
More losses = less credit = more losses.
The loss of cheap credit will further freeze the housing market as the buyer pool shrinks, as buyers find they cannot sell their houses or get credit needed for a first time purchase.
Which will in turn decrease the value of foreclosed houses and increases losses on MBS and related securities.
Credit cards will no longer be able to be HELOCed away, increasing the risk there as well.
That is why this is a systematic risk.
The best hope is that capital returns to more productive pursuits and keeps jobs loss related to the burst of the housing bubble to a minimum.
Joe, lived in Northern Az for a decade- it is out of phase with Phoenix. When Phoenix starts getting closer to the bottom there will be more deals. B-I-L owns a shack in Munds park and acknowledges he should have sold last year when the party was still going. A lot of inventory is being trolled, but not much activity, even with the prices being 100k off of last year. But second homes/college housing take a while to move downward.
barely- doing a refi requires there to be enough money in the property to float the fees and that a lender is willing to do it- the latter is getting darn near impossible unless you have significant (over 30%) equity in the property that will remain intact after the refi. So, guess what? There are houses going to the block with equity, per se, but if nobody is willing to pay them for it on the courthouse steps, unrealized equity. Still, most of the houses on the steps are going reo now, unlike last year where investors were still buying quickly.
One reason why I believe most of the reporting on potential losses related to paper that derives value from other paper that is backed by sliced up mortgage pools.. Um... One reason I believe this reporting is pointless is that they won't delve into the real details even if they understood them.
My guess is that the real big losses related to all this "mortgage paper" will come from swap contracts or some other swap-esque derivative.
So... I don't think it's some hedge fund holding $1 and borrowing $9 to buy into some MBS. It's a hedge fund entering a swap contract that's based on the interest rates or default rates related to these MBSes.
In this sort of situation.. The parties involved in the swap just need to believe that the volatility is fixed.. Then they'll allow the contract to be entered into with some sort of piddly margin.
As soon as the fear strikes (volatility ventures outside of its accepted zone.. The margin calls come rolling in.
Tanta, u better be careful. if ukeep talking about the sophisticated methodoligies the rating agencies use, people might start to think they know what they're doing!!!
An objective view of all the facts is sufficient for the bullish case, no hyperbole required.
CR, Tanta, it's been fun, but now it's time to wrap things up and move on. Sebastian obviously knows everything there is to know, and he says there's nothing to worry about.
Thanks for the info to all about Northern Arizona.
I have lived in many places and on several continents and consider the Flagstaff area as my all-time favorite. We'll probably pull the trigger next year, regardless. I would be grateful for any more information in this regard.
Some of the readers here seem to be very gloomy. This is surprising to me, given the macroeconomic back-drop. Apart from the languishing residential housing market, the economy seems very strong; the stock market has been extremely bullish and the raising interest rates show that there is demand for loans even at higher rates, thus there are projects and developments economically viable at higher rates. This is unheard of since the 1970s. In conclusion, this seems the beginning of a long lasting and sustained uptrend in US and world economy.
Let's look together at how we can participate on this trend.
Tanta, u better be careful. if ukeep talking about the sophisticated methodoligies the rating agencies use, people might start to think they know what they're doing!!!
Well, I wouldn't want us to go that far . . .
For the record, I think the rating agencies aren't any worse than anyone else when it comes to model construction and statistical analysis. I do not think they lie, nor have I seen any evidence that they massage their numbers in some nefarious fashion.
That said, most of their analysts don't know shit about how a pig becomes a sausage. They're only just now realizing that the data elements they require are too narrow (and let me assure everyone that this isn't because servicers don't have a lot of data. Servicers have an incredible shitpile of data fields. You just have to know what to ask for.)
Nor do I think you could accuse the rating agencies of having been overly sensitive to the possibility of home price depreciation. From the reports they've issued in the last quarter you get the impression that they really just noticed this big problem.
And every time I read their servicer ratings updates I just want to spew. They read like the platitudinous bat guano you'd get in a corporate press release. Due diligence on a servicing operation is a lot of work, and can be very very tedious. I am consistently left with the impression that the rating agencies blow in, glance at a few reports, have lunch with management, and catch the last commuter flight out with a hour to spare.
For contrast, the much-maligned GSEs do know a thing or two about servicing, and a Freddie or Fannie servicing audit is a big deal. I am convinced that a lot of these subprime REITs couldn't pass a GSE audit to save their souls, but they seem able to impress the rating agencies. But, you know, that's that unsexy nursemaid-of-the-universe small-time operational risk stuff, and who cares about that, right?
"Restrooms in the Capitol Complex and all state-owned buildings will not be cleaned, for example, and a limited amount of maintenance personnel will only provide core services, such as chiller plant operations. The Capitol fountain will be turned off, as well as exterior lighting of the Capitol dome."
I have lived in many places and on several continents and consider the Flagstaff area as my all-time favorite. We'll probably pull the trigger next year, regardless. I would be grateful for any more information in this regard.
You're best bet is hoping that someone from Cali bought a 2nd house before unloading their 1st and now can't unload either, then taking them to the cleaners on a short sale, FC or REO.
Barely, IMO EZ credit in Flagstaff aren't really an issue as big chunks of housing stock were locked up as student rentals decades ago, and those that buy likely work for the Uni as well. Even when property prices went up they only would dance around the FHA limit. There is no other industry there until they figure out a political way to make snow at Snowbowl
Not only are there proud owner's with sticky prices... there are proud REO owner's who will hold out for better pricing...
A short sale a friend is working on(as agent) has to be approved the same as if it were the opriginal owner....the buyer has ALL the power now
Remittance data for Mexico is out for May, and it is an ugly sight. This hasnt just slowed, it is actually down 5.5% year over year at $2.170 billion versus $2.295 billion.
i don't know what to believe in anymore if i can't believe in LEVELS...
Hey, now! LEVELS works great. I defy you to write a program that only uses maybe 70% of the critical loan-level data fields it ought to use that comes anywhere close to the accuracy of LEVELS.
"The interesting thing is the varying stages of denial that the street finds itself in," said a university endowment manager who asked that he not be named. Some, he said, are "very willing to mark prices down and take the lumps."
"When investors redeem, the leverage unwind is awful," he said. "They redeem when they see their statement. That happens over the next week or so."
Joe,
Alec has it right- I call Flagstaff "Poverty with a view", which is exactly what it is. We used to say you could make a small fortune in Northern Arizona, especially if you started with a large one. Major employers are the University (Lowest wages for a state school in the state.) The City/County governments, and hotel rooms. WL Gore has a bunch of plants, but they only hire friends and family. Great to retire to with money and the desire to leave for the winter- hard to make a living at with all of the retirees/students pushing down wages due to starvation.
I still have some family interests up there so I go up a couple of times a year- blech in terms of profits at times.
this all reminds me of some thing i heard or read or imagined one time where this quant said he didn't like working in the mortgage group because the models are so inelegant compared to other bonds. he called mortgages "hideously complex" to value. then this trader guy says that means there's more advantage to being smarter than everyone else.
anhow i'm not saying LEVELS isn't useful but i am saying mortgage valuation models can still be better...deterministic models...sigh...
anyway Tanta i will share my whiskey with you even though i don't know what a snort is and i suspect u are being sneaky and will kill the bottle...it just ain't a party 'til the ubernerds show up...
It's not just the models and the levels, but also the leverage and the fraud. When we're not as smart as we think we are, when we're brutally dishonest with each other and when -15% = -150%... joo gotta pro-lem baby.
Excessive leverage especially, is the hauntingly similar to 1929. Well above the others, which have been more or less contant over time.
Levers can be explosive when they getted cranked too hard.
I'n sorry - this is a very elementary question. If I understand tit correctly, lenders are not able to keep any proceeds from a REO sale in excess of the money owed on the note. My question is: what expenses (e.g. agent fees, make-readies) can be paid before the proceeds count toward the money owed, and may the lender also recover delinquent interest or any other copntractual obligations (like prepayment penalties)?
Tanta,
This article shows that as UK homes move towards foreclosure, the banks are agreeing to buy back the homes for a low price and rent them to the previous "owners" so that they don't have to move. Can this be done in the US? I would have expected laws against it as it is easy for the banking system to goose up prices and it would be advantage to do so and then rent back. What is the law here. How can it be capitalism if they don't have to sell at market prices and can instead hold up the market by hanging onto the homes? Where did mark to market go?
This is the glitch in the model, an unraveling. Unless someone knows how to get people to buy a couple of million excess units without their prices being cut dramatically (40-50%) to an "affordable" or rental equivalent level, it just doesn't seem logical that there won't be a significant (25%?) decline in the "real" value of these securities over the next year or so.
jag
Bill and Elaine Nolan paid top dollar when they bought their Tiburon house a few years ago at the height of real estate frenzy. Now, of course, the market is cooling rapidly.
So Bill Nolan, who deals with money all day long as a partner in an investment management firm, wanted to diversify. He turned to a startup based on a new concept: Let homeowners tap their equity without taking on debt.
Nolan contracted with Rex & Co. to receive $100,000 cash in exchange for a 10 percent stake of the home's future appreciation. When the Nolans sell their home, they'll pay Rex the $100,000 plus 10 percent of their home's appreciation above its current value of $2 million....
So while at times it might be too early to start drinking... it appears for some its never too early to be drinking bong water.
are home sales a top line item when figuring GDP?
so if were 1mm lite over ttm,@ an avg of 220k, or 220 billion, that being 5% of current gdp... then ?
Tanta, another question/comment. How much of the lingering REO overhang is due to lender consciously not wanting to take losses/attempting to time or spread out their sales versus we've got two people working in that section and now they're swamped by the unexpected workload. Of course explaing to those in charge that they need to hire more people so that they can realize losses faster at exactly the same time the the gravy train has derailed would be a fun task. NOT.
Regarding remittances to Mexico, it's a wildly noisy data set
DATE \t total amt .. avg.
........(in mmm)
Jan 2006\t1,581.97\t336.66
Feb 2006\t1,650.59\t346.19
Mar 2006\t1,951.91\t354.46
Apr 2006\t1,844.73\t355.01
May 2006\t2,295.24\t350.38
Jun 2006\t2,100.51\t360.40
Jul 2006\t1,967.59\t352.49
Aug 2006\t2,117.54\t359.05
Sep 2006\t1,932.97\t351.57
Oct 2006\t2,077.29\t347.42
Nov 2006\t1,775.57\t349.40
Dec 2006\t1,757.84\t334.49
Jan 2007\t1,714.18\t339.40
Feb 2007\t1,682.26\t345.56
Mar 2007\t1,963.51\t355.62
Apr 2007\t1,950.14\t352.02
May 2007\t2,169.84\t341.80
I would also urge to reconsider the bearish stance.
Most data suggests that the economy is dancing on a knife edge as is, and all that it would need is an exogenous shock (like a housing implosion due to ARM resets and a subsequent credit crunch) to send it off the edge.
Retail is negative in real terms, GDP is in the ballpark as well, the yield curve is a week away from inverting if the hedgies didn't have to liquidate, employment is flat ex B/D model
Is that bearish or an honest assessment of the situation? I see a lot more downside risk than upside potential at this point, the inverse of the 90's
Thanks for the detailed analysis. One number in your example got me flustered was the expected loss as percentage of original pool. Am I right in assuming that you came up 5.25% by adding 0.77% (losses already incurred) to 0.63*7.1% (losses in the current pool scaled up to original pool balance)?
ok, fess up
July 6 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc., the world's biggest securities firm, said law-enforcement authorities don't consider letters making threats against the company to be credible.
who did it
Goldman Says Threats Aren't Believed to Be Credible (Update2) - Bloomberg.com
It wasn't me.
But that reminds me, we haven't seen Doomster lately . . .
Called- too many suspects.
Now on to the main event- Tanta, how is Fitch dealing with those massive piggyback helocs that were also securitized? Just curious if they are burying the downgrades on page 23;-}
Short sale article in the Republic:
site map - azcentral.com - arizona web site
Mods, short sales, next thing you know there will be empty houses on every block!!!
Someday this war's gonna end...but Wall Street doesn't believe it.
all likely threats--
where's unknown unknown?
AllenM, there seems to be a connection lately between downgrades and late Friday afternoons. So I will be checking later today to see if there's anything interesting.
my address is 57th st... could be me i guesss....
let's see.. the subway to queens is???
Too long! The post is too long! [/sarcasm]
Thank you, again, for the edumacation Tanta.
In all seriousness though, I must admit that I almost did not make it past the first paragraph on this one. I was thoroughly confused after having read it was too early to be drinking. But I just burried the thought and plowed on. Thank goodness the remainder of the post covered concepts that were far easier to grasp.
Thanks Tanta. It's most helpful to have the benefit of lucid, informative descriptions such as this one.
Who is actually responsible for mapping the month to month performace of CDO's to actual portfolio holdings? Is this a servicing company? When payments don't arrive as expected I assume it has to show up on someone's books as a shortfall. Even though the CDO is brain-dead it still requires that someone keep score. As I understand it, individual loans don't belong to any particular tranche. That's part of the slice and dice magic, right? When a loan is in arrears the heat is first felt in the "equity" tranche. What I am asking is how the mechanics of that process works? Who are the companies who make their living servicing these things and how does the valuation of CDO investments lying in particular portfolios change in response to their actions?
Thanks for explaining this, especially the bucket and 30-day rolling stuff.
Tanta, if you have time I would beg for an ubernerd post that sums up the history of usages of the term "ALT-A", ALT-B etc, and the whole bit about how subprime is sub-620 to some and sub-660 to others. I am still confused about all that.
Read whole thing -- I'm not near to being an ubernerd, but for some reason this one was easy on my simple mind. uberthanks!
Just curious, Tanta, you mentioned the press can incorrecty spin these numbers into something scary -- what about the flip side? Any examples of how these definitions and numbers can be tweaked into a rosy view?
oops -'incorrectly.' yes, no ubernerd, I
Tanta said: "...It is particularly annoying when we see people throwing around delinquency numbers as if they were loss percentages, and then applying that number to the total outstanding balance of all subprime securitizations to come up with some scary-looking number in the billions, without taking into account, among other things, the original expected loss on the pools. Not even the meanest (sane) critic of the rating agencies accuses them of having predicted no losses at all when these deals were originally rated..."
Thank-you, Tanta. I found your post educational and not at all tedious.
Although you're starting to drift off-message by taking away some of the housing bears' firepower.
Sebastia
"The latter will depend on "loss severity," or what percentage of the outstanding loan balance is not recovered in liquidation. That, obviously, is an issue of home prices and servicer efficiency"
IMO loss severity is where the rubber meets the road and is probably the single most wildly speculated about concern.
Really, an REO is by default going to be a significant loss, as no one will go into default if there's any salvagable equity. The degree of the severity of the loss is what will be in question and CA will finally become a Bright Red State as it crushes ALL competition to rack up losses that will be staggering, probably dwarfing the GDPs of 1/2 of the world's countries.
We're still in the second inning and it's a tie game so far.
Any examples of how these definitions and numbers can be tweaked into a rosy view?
I'll leave that up to Sebastian.
Tanta-
thanks for another insightful post. I realize I've been conflating a couple of these terms for quite some time. Guess that makes me an inadvertent weenie.
PS - I don't mean to press, but when are we going to see your manifesto on what sort of reforms are needed for the mortgage market (especially subprime)?
I suspect parts would find their way in legislation surprisingly quickly given the political heat the issue is generating, how popular this site is becoming and the timing of the election cycle.
Um, barely, a lot are going into default with equity- just not enough to make it worth a refi- because a refi is not available to the borrower due to FICO considerations. This is what is driving the housing market down, because a lot of nohope folks are waiting until the last minute to try and do something, and usually it is too late due to killer fees. Check out how a balance can grow on those 60 day ones, especially if they are rolling like Tanta said. It is easy to add five percent in fees to the balance (gravy for the servicer!!!) during a mod- so imagine how fast equity gets eaten up during the preforeclosure stage.
someday this war's gonna end...
One other fly in the ointment to watch for is the role of leverage.
Even if hyperbears are counting the losses at 100% when they are really 'only' 15%, the role of leverage can increase that. Say some 4x leverage is applied to that security, then the loss becomes 75% of capital. 100K investment, 20K capital, 80K borrowed. 15% loss = 15K / 20K capital = 75%.
So while the hyperbears are counting losses before they hatch, the question is how many folks have laid leveraged eggs.
Who is actually responsible for mapping the month to month performace of CDO's to actual portfolio holdings?
The mechanisms for reporting all this data are actually pretty reliable and non-controversial. (It's in the interpretation of the data that we have our differences of opinion.)
The servicer sends a "remittance report" every month to the security trustee, which includes information on delinquencies and defaults as it's purpose is to calculate how much money came in and how much each bondholder is due in distributions.
Servicers of rated securities upload monthly data to a service that then makes it available to the rating agencies. Each one has slightly different procedures, but basically the monthly numbers run through a filter looking for anything unusual or numbers that are approaching certain tolerances, and those deals are subject to a full-scale review. Other deals just get a review every 12 months if they don't have anything unusual happening. (Hence you can get upgrades, downgrades, or "affirmations" out of these reviews. "Affirmation" just means that the deal was reviewed and nothing much changed from original projections.)
I don't know anyone who is particularly worried that the data reporting process is a problem. I think most people see the controversy in how the rating agencies' models do those reviews--what assumptions they make--not what the data is going in. There has been a problem with how modified loans are reported: they are traditionally reported as current after they are modified, as long as the borrower is making payments. (Bringing them current being the whole point of modifying them.) Fitch has proposed a change to remittance reporting for modified loans so that they can be considered as a separate "bucket" from other current and delinquent loans. It makes sense, as their re-default rate is undoubtedly higher than the roll rate of current loans that have never been modified.
Assuming delinquincy=default is the same thing as thinking that casualty=fatality.
I'm curious, which will go to heck faster, the worst tranches of bonds from pools of middling bad loans, or the middle tranches of pools of the worst loans? I have a sneaking suspicion that this may be very different than what the bond raters suspect. This could mean that all aa bonds are not created equal.
"Who is actually responsible for mapping the month to month performace of CDO's to actual portfolio holdings?"
I think no one is. The models?
I think the rubber meets the road in column 3 row 1 of the table (projected defaults of current loans). Everything else can be pretty well modeled. And the difference between the loss of 35% and 50% is smaller than with default of 11% vs 30%.
When the model assumed (based on the past performance) that most of the borrowers in trouble would get current by refinance and the rising home prices would bail out almost everybody, then we have a problem when this assumption fails.
Losses are a function of sale price. It is by far more interesting to understand if banks have Hugh REOs that they have so far kept away from the market in order to protect prices.
It is very clear that rolling 30 is not a 90 day delinquent. and that not all rolling-30 become a 60 days and that not all 60 days become 90 days that turn into foreclosure.
The real issue to find reliable stats that aggragate these numbers across a large market. Without such stats the whole discussion is pretty much moot.
So I would say this post did not add much. It would be better to understand what actually goes on. Btw, the table from the Fitch report is unreadable at least on my browser (does not open up to a larger readable format).
I have wondered many times is the real-estate market really going much lower. So far I have not seen any measurable indication (say about foreclosures, delinquencies and real prices) other than industry numbers which I don't really trust. A simple, measure of price per sq ft , or price for property that was sold few years ago and again this year would have shown us much better numbers that the "median" we get from NAR.
Well we have had some unnerving recent changes in loss numbers. Many more of the longer delinquencies are moving toward foreclosure than is typical in some areas.
But as covered on this blog at length, the combination of toxic loan terms and poor borrower qualification, combined with a change in available terms, accounts well for it.
But it does change likely loss scenarios by a bundle.
Too early to drink? Guess I better set down my beer to read this...
MaxOMom: can you translte what you just said to simple english for me. TIA.
'm curious, which will go to heck faster, the worst tranches of bonds from pools of middling bad loans, or the middle tranches of pools of the worst loans?
Good question. Part of me suspects it will be the worst tranches of the middlin' bad loans, if only because, all other things being equal, those loans should have lower interest rates, more refi opportunities, and hence those pools risk being unable to build up OC and excess spread fast enough to cover early losses.
It's a point to remember: the question isn't just the credit quality of the loans, but the adequacy of the bond structure and the prevailing market rates for new loans (which impact the original prepayment estimates).
Yal, I'm sorry, I don't know why Blogger won't open up a larger version of that chart. I'll see if I can upload it again. Maybe it'll work the second time.
OK, refresh the page and you should be able to click on the chart and get a readable version.
Tnx. works better now.
A very useful post to keep things in perspective.
Yes, even though there may be increasing numbers of people not making mortgage payments that doesn't necessarily result in the wholesale destruction of the value of these securities as there is SOME collatoral to recover.
And if a bubble didn't occur in this market of collatoral, if SO MANY didn't grossly bid prices up and then finance them at 100%......then this whole issue wouldn't be that noteworthy. I have no doubt that these would have been great, relatively safe, securities had they been based on 80% mortgages or on fully documented income....like in the "old days".....when the model's data was largely consistent, reliable and predictible.
I think the big concern is that the cycle not only is reversing but unraveling. Too many properties aren't going to catch a bid in too many locations. Too many properties will be vandalized or suffer other damage severely lessening their value. And while they sit, the tax bills keep accumulating along with other "hidden" costs of property disposal.
This is the glitch in the model, an unraveling. Unless someone knows how to get people to buy a couple of million excess units without their prices being cut dramatically (40-50%) to an "affordable" or rental equivalent level, it just doesn't seem logical that there won't be a significant (25%?) decline in the "real" value of these securities over the next year or so.
I'm a little confused about REO, if the mortgage has been bundled into MBS and on into CDOs etc, who actually owns the real estate owned?
Jag asked the right questions.
My question is why aren't we seeing this unraveling starting already ?
or maybe it is but some are doing their best to udnerreport the real situation in the market.
I am following one small area of california and see the same homes on the market for 6 month or more. Yet when I talk to an agent she tells me: sales are somewhat down and prices are stable.....
We were talking about the misuse of the word "leverage" in that HuffingtonPost article yesterday - Naked Capitalism does a great job of absolutely skewering most of the assertions and figures in the article (including total misuse of the word leverage) - check it out!
I'm a little confused about REO, if the mortgage has been bundled into MBS and on into CDOs etc, who actually owns the real estate owned?
Whoever owned it when it was a loan owns it when it becomes REO. So these MBS do indeed own real estate until it is liquidated.
All,
After hearing all the negatives about the housing market I am still faced with stable prices in the area I'm interested in (Northern Arizona). I would have thought that all the deliquencies and defaults would have led to lower prices, and also lower rates as the demand for money (loans) decreases, combined with strong money supply (M3 still soaring). Instead, RE prices are relatively stable, and the price for borrowing (interests) increases. What giveth?
Also, does someone know how to profit from delinquencies&defaults? Are there strategies?
Thanks, Joe
AllenM, I am equating default with a property that has had foreclosure procedings intiated. I guess it's possible that a property in default might have a tiny shred of equity, but I figure a property would be sold or refi'd by the owner if there was any money in it. Once it goes back to the lender it's a loss, for sure.
Yal, sorry. Usually most loans that get a NOD don't go to foreclosure. What's disturbing about some of the recent activity is that in some areas (quite large ones) a much higher percentage of loans entering disclosure go to foreclosure than normal. More than double.
Other worries that have raised the spector of much higher losses are lower conversion rates on mods for early delinquencies (dropping out after six months or so) and early poor recovery ratios after foreclosure. Obviously the longer the property sits on the market, the higher the expected loss. During all that time the servicer has to pay insurance, taxes and other expenses.
This will not be uniform. What is disturbing is that some of the "hottest" areas are showing some of the worst figures.
It works like a matrix, you see. If you change the conversion factors in an area, you change the expected losses. I did wonder if Paulson's blah-blah about a housing recovery was aimed at adjusting the expectations on the Street for those losses, because that is what would change valuation of the pools and the tranches. So if you postulate that the current situation is strictly temporary, and that these conditions will be adjusting back to normal in a few months, then you don't have to change the bulk of your pool's projected losses.
Mortgage Credit News - This Week
Pretty good commentary from Lou Barnes today.
I am still faced with stable prices in the area I'm interested in (Northern Arizona).
Flagstaff should be relatively stable, as they couldn't build that much because of all the national land surrounding it. Rates haven't risen enough to really put downward pressure on prices, just demand.
Prescott is another story. ramapnt spec building, rocketing prices, should crash hard when it all goes boom.
Kingman I believe is in the same predicament, except when things go boom it'll be way worse as there's nothing there.
One thing that will "help" maintain prices is that developers have to secure a 100 year water supply, which is hard going on the plateau.
Thanks. clearer now.
Pretty good commentary from Lou Barnes today.
Except that yields on the 10 yr are dancing with 5.2, not bad
Trying to boil the table down a little...
If the fraction of delinquencies is fd, the default rate of currents is dc, the average default rate of delinquences is dd, and loss severity is ls, then the total loss is:
ls * [ (1-fd)dc + fddd ]
The average default fraction as a percentage of all deliquencies in the example given is about 65%. I'm no mortgage lender but that sounds like a pretty reasonable number. It's hard to see that that number should be any lower than, say, 35% (the lowest on the table), and certainly can't be higher than 100%.
As you vary this average number from 35% to 100%, the loss varies from 5.2% to 9.1% (it started out at 7.1%). So varying the default rate of delinquencies over its entire range gives about 30% variation in the final answer (total loss of the pool).
The final answer is linear in the loss rate assumed (vary the loss rate by 30% and the final loss of the pool varies by 30%).
I think I agree with poszi above that the biggest question mark is the fraction of currents that eventually will default. From the numbers in the table, I think this was simply set as fd*dd, which is the steady-state solution.
If you assume a steady state solution (as I'm pretty sure Fitch did), the answer at the end of the day can be boiled down further to
ls * fd * dd *(2-fd)
which shows pretty clearly the dependence of the final loss to the pool as a function of the inputs.
The reason you need a whole table is that I've swept a lot under the rug into "dd", and the table is effectively calculating dd.
If you assume non steady state (i.e. that defaults will increase over time) the numbers look quite different and the simplest formula doesn't work.
Our actual mortgage experts can comment on whether 65% is a reasonably stable number for the default rate averaged over delinquencies.
Do the home price appreciation numbers (factors)below 100% imply lower assumed prices for the (Homes/collateral) in this example. Also what does the 118% adjustment mean for the current loans?
If so I think that would take some of the steam off these huge estimated losses some of the media are throwing around.
Joe,
Maybe it's just our Ubernerd perspective. We follow the RE news on a daily basis expecting the other shoe to drop. Even the tech stock bubble took 3 years to bottom out. One mouse click and you were out of that market. Not so with RE (obviously).
Or alternatively; "A watched pot never boils."
BTW Joe, Can you get me a job there in Northern AZ? I'm a bit tired of the bad weather and screeching Type-A's here in the Northeast.
Barely, Yal and others above touch on the importance of severity. IMO, severity is the key given the structure of leverage.
Think of the AAA tranches as withstanding a 100% default rate with a 20% price-related (ex-foreclosure costs) severity.
"Go ahead, don't pay," the AAA-guy says, "I own your home if you do."
"But don't you have to sell it?" you ask.
"Yeah," he replies, lazily glancing at his daily P&L print-out. "And I'll NEVER sell at a loss of more than 20%, because home prices don't fall, and you can take THAT to the bank."
"Gee," you say. "If home prices don't fall, and defaults don't affect you, how much leverage do you have?"
Finally he smiles; a wolfish grin. "50:1's where I stop, but only 'cause it just isn't fair for me to make ALL the money."
Imagine AAA-guy if he thought home prices would fall. He'd dump his holdings faster than you can say, "redemptions."
And that's why the sticky home price hypothesis is so important to these folks.
Gotta be precise in using terms. The losses due to leverage are not in the instruments themselves but in the means used to purchase those instruments. Thus an instrument may go down 15% but that loss wipes out the capital of a purchaser sufficiently leveraged.
Professor Foland, 65% is high, but this is a subprime pool. I would expect the number to be no higher than 50% for prime pools and generally much lower than that. That may be what MOM is getting at by observing that 76% is a high default rate for loans in foreclosure. Historically, prime pools roll from FC to default at no more than 50% or so.
You also notice (in the footnotes to the table) that Fitch is adjusting the default rate for the current loans by two factors: upward for performance (this pool has performed somewhat worse than the benchmark model in its first 18 months, so the defaults are adjusted upward to 118% of benchmark). On the other hand, this pool is old enough to have some appreciation. Fitch gives more "credit" for appreciation to "current" loans than to delinquent loans: the "current" adjustment for property appreciation is 95% for current loans but only 98% for delinquent loans. This differential is attempting to account for adverse self-selection (weaker borrowers buy weaker properties) as well as adverse property condition associated with delinquent loans (I guess we call this the "possum factor" in NY; other people just call it the "deferred maintenance" problem).
Clearly a newly-originated pool is not going to get as much "credit" for price appreciation as an older pool. In any case, it's the varying assumptions of HPA that affect significantly the projection of defaults. Another thing that isn't visible in this table is the impact of things like ARM resets.
I'd really like to do a good post on "payment velocity," which is an alternate measure of delinquency, but although I have asked for permission to post from some proprietary reports I've seen, I haven't gotten it yet, nor have I found what I'm looking for on the web. If anyone does know of any web-available recent payment velocity calcs, please let me know.
potty, to clarify: the 118% performance adjustment means that this pool has, in its first 18 months, performed somewhat worse than the benchmark model prediction of default, so Fitch nudged the number up (using 118% of the benchmark instead of 100% of it). On the other hand, HPA for the pool (given its age) has been slight but positive (Fitch uses a variation of OFHEO's house price index). But Fitch gives loans that are current at 18 months more credit for HPA than loans that are delinquent at 18 months. Therefore, the benchmark default rate in the model is adjusted downward by 5% for current loans but only by 2% for delinquent loans).
Pearson, That's the best one I've seen in a long time. It's a game of chicken with a locomotive and the starters' gun goes off when RE values drop... around 10% or so.
Alec, "Flagstaff should be relatively stable, as they couldn't build that much because of all the national land surrounding it. Rates haven't risen enough to really put downward pressure on prices, just demand"
Aren't you forgetting something, important, in this credit bubble market? Even places that failed to see spikes in either building or RE prices are seeing default rates rocket higher. See, those owners in fly-over-land watch the same TV ADs for $499/mo refis, get the same mailers and watch "Flip This + That" on HGTV. They didn't get the MEW vaccine. They are almost as likely to be facing resets they can't handle and should see price drops too - just perhaps not quite as severe. Depends on the leftover demand, if there is any...
A loss is a loss is a loss. Once it becomes clear that these MBS,CDOs ect are a losing proposition, capital will go else where. A smaller loss won't hurt the investor as badly but it will kill the market for more of this credit or at least cheap credit as it becomes clear these investments are very riskier than assumed. People don't invest to lose money.
The elimination of cheap credit will increase the risks of lending as workouts and refi's and sales become more difficult. And so the cycle becomes self reinforcing.
More losses = less credit = more losses.
The loss of cheap credit will further freeze the housing market as the buyer pool shrinks, as buyers find they cannot sell their houses or get credit needed for a first time purchase.
Which will in turn decrease the value of foreclosed houses and increases losses on MBS and related securities.
Credit cards will no longer be able to be HELOCed away, increasing the risk there as well.
That is why this is a systematic risk.
The best hope is that capital returns to more productive pursuits and keeps jobs loss related to the burst of the housing bubble to a minimum.
Joe, lived in Northern Az for a decade- it is out of phase with Phoenix. When Phoenix starts getting closer to the bottom there will be more deals. B-I-L owns a shack in Munds park and acknowledges he should have sold last year when the party was still going. A lot of inventory is being trolled, but not much activity, even with the prices being 100k off of last year. But second homes/college housing take a while to move downward.
barely- doing a refi requires there to be enough money in the property to float the fees and that a lender is willing to do it- the latter is getting darn near impossible unless you have significant (over 30%) equity in the property that will remain intact after the refi. So, guess what? There are houses going to the block with equity, per se, but if nobody is willing to pay them for it on the courthouse steps, unrealized equity. Still, most of the houses on the steps are going reo now, unlike last year where investors were still buying quickly.
Someday this war's gonna end...
One reason why I believe most of the reporting on potential losses related to paper that derives value from other paper that is backed by sliced up mortgage pools.. Um... One reason I believe this reporting is pointless is that they won't delve into the real details even if they understood them.
My guess is that the real big losses related to all this "mortgage paper" will come from swap contracts or some other swap-esque derivative.
So... I don't think it's some hedge fund holding $1 and borrowing $9 to buy into some MBS. It's a hedge fund entering a swap contract that's based on the interest rates or default rates related to these MBSes.
In this sort of situation.. The parties involved in the swap just need to believe that the volatility is fixed.. Then they'll allow the contract to be entered into with some sort of piddly margin.
As soon as the fear strikes (volatility ventures outside of its accepted zone.. The margin calls come rolling in.
This is, of course, just my guess.
Tanta, u better be careful. if ukeep talking about the sophisticated methodoligies the rating agencies use, people might start to think they know what they're doing!!!
Alo asked Tanta: "Any examples of how these definitions and numbers can be tweaked into a rosy view?"
Tanta replied: "I'll leave that up to Sebastian."
Well, that was uncalled for. An objective view of all the facts is sufficient for the bullish case, no hyperbole required.
Sebastian
The best hope is that capital returns to more productive pursuits and keeps jobs loss related to the burst of the housing bubble to a minimum.
Too much capital is already tied up in RE and RE derivatives and will die there.
An objective view of all the facts is sufficient for the bullish case, no hyperbole required.
CR, Tanta, it's been fun, but now it's time to wrap things up and move on. Sebastian obviously knows everything there is to know, and he says there's nothing to worry about.
Thanks for the info to all about Northern Arizona.
I have lived in many places and on several continents and consider the Flagstaff area as my all-time favorite. We'll probably pull the trigger next year, regardless. I would be grateful for any more information in this regard.
Some of the readers here seem to be very gloomy. This is surprising to me, given the macroeconomic back-drop. Apart from the languishing residential housing market, the economy seems very strong; the stock market has been extremely bullish and the raising interest rates show that there is demand for loans even at higher rates, thus there are projects and developments economically viable at higher rates. This is unheard of since the 1970s. In conclusion, this seems the beginning of a long lasting and sustained uptrend in US and world economy.
Let's look together at how we can participate on this trend.
Thanks again, Joe
Tanta, u better be careful. if ukeep talking about the sophisticated methodoligies the rating agencies use, people might start to think they know what they're doing!!!
Well, I wouldn't want us to go that far . . .
For the record, I think the rating agencies aren't any worse than anyone else when it comes to model construction and statistical analysis. I do not think they lie, nor have I seen any evidence that they massage their numbers in some nefarious fashion.
That said, most of their analysts don't know shit about how a pig becomes a sausage. They're only just now realizing that the data elements they require are too narrow (and let me assure everyone that this isn't because servicers don't have a lot of data. Servicers have an incredible shitpile of data fields. You just have to know what to ask for.)
Nor do I think you could accuse the rating agencies of having been overly sensitive to the possibility of home price depreciation. From the reports they've issued in the last quarter you get the impression that they really just noticed this big problem.
And every time I read their servicer ratings updates I just want to spew. They read like the platitudinous bat guano you'd get in a corporate press release. Due diligence on a servicing operation is a lot of work, and can be very very tedious. I am consistently left with the impression that the rating agencies blow in, glance at a few reports, have lunch with management, and catch the last commuter flight out with a hour to spare.
For contrast, the much-maligned GSEs do know a thing or two about servicing, and a Freddie or Fannie servicing audit is a big deal. I am convinced that a lot of these subprime REITs couldn't pass a GSE audit to save their souls, but they seem able to impress the rating agencies. But, you know, that's that unsexy nursemaid-of-the-universe small-time operational risk stuff, and who cares about that, right?
****WARNING****
Stay out of PA.!!!
"Restrooms in the Capitol Complex and all state-owned buildings will not be cleaned, for example, and a limited amount of maintenance personnel will only provide core services, such as chiller plant operations. The Capitol fountain will be turned off, as well as exterior lighting of the Capitol dome."
MarketWatch.com
ft on credit crisis-
InfoViewer: Credit crisis to worsen as banks cut and run
In conclusion, this seems the beginning of a long lasting and sustained uptrend in US and world economy.
Wow, sounds just like the late 1920's!
manipulation alledged-
Trading scheme may cost market almost $1 bln, broker CEO says - MarketWatch
I have lived in many places and on several continents and consider the Flagstaff area as my all-time favorite. We'll probably pull the trigger next year, regardless. I would be grateful for any more information in this regard.
You're best bet is hoping that someone from Cali bought a 2nd house before unloading their 1st and now can't unload either, then taking them to the cleaners on a short sale, FC or REO.
Barely, IMO EZ credit in Flagstaff aren't really an issue as big chunks of housing stock were locked up as student rentals decades ago, and those that buy likely work for the Uni as well. Even when property prices went up they only would dance around the FHA limit. There is no other industry there until they figure out a political way to make snow at Snowbowl
Wow, my english today am scrambled, must be the heat.
For the record, I think the rating agencies aren't any worse than anyone else when it comes to model construction and statistical analysis.
gasp
u mean when people claim the value of their residuals is objective and accurate because they valued it using LEVELS it might not be so????
i don't know what to believe in anymore if i can't believe in LEVELS...
hesitates, then takes a long pull from a bottle of whiskey and stares forlornley out the window.
also, here's a link to a recent CS report with payment velocities, but its about BKs. idon't think you will find a free link to anything else...
HEAT
----My question is why aren't we seeing this unraveling starting already ?----
anytime something defies economic sense, refer to the OCC report
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/deriv/dq406.pdf
pg 5
no one losses, EVER
Not only are there proud owner's with sticky prices... there are proud REO owner's who will hold out for better pricing...
A short sale a friend is working on(as agent) has to be approved the same as if it were the opriginal owner....the buyer has ALL the power now
Russ Winter wrote:
Remittance data for Mexico is out for May, and it is an ugly sight. This hasnt just slowed, it is actually down 5.5% year over year at $2.170 billion versus $2.295 billion.
Posted on 06-Jul-07 at 11:01 am
Winter (Economic and Market) Watch » Winston Wolfe Shows Up Again For Brain Tissue Clean Up
Aaron Krowne's Implode-O-Meter's up to 94 today:
The Mortgage Lender Implode-O-Meter - tracking the housing finance breakdown, related to Alt-A and subprime mortgages, lending fraud, predatory lending, housing bubble, mortgage banking, foreclosures, debt, consolidation, lawyers, class-action lawsuits
---An objective view of all the facts is sufficient for the bullish case, no hyperbole required---
Unfortunately, were only privy to a % of a subset of All the Facts
i don't know what to believe in anymore if i can't believe in LEVELS...
Hey, now! LEVELS works great. I defy you to write a program that only uses maybe 70% of the critical loan-level data fields it ought to use that comes anywhere close to the accuracy of LEVELS.
Can I have a snort of your whiskey?
Tanta-
just when you thought you had seen it all-
Court freezes Amerifirst's assets - Dallas Business Journal:
"The interesting thing is the varying stages of denial that the street finds itself in," said a university endowment manager who asked that he not be named. Some, he said, are "very willing to mark prices down and take the lumps."
"When investors redeem, the leverage unwind is awful," he said. "They redeem when they see their statement. That happens over the next week or so."
Subprime risks come home to roost for hedge funds
| Reuters
Joe,
Alec has it right- I call Flagstaff "Poverty with a view", which is exactly what it is. We used to say you could make a small fortune in Northern Arizona, especially if you started with a large one. Major employers are the University (Lowest wages for a state school in the state.) The City/County governments, and hotel rooms. WL Gore has a bunch of plants, but they only hire friends and family. Great to retire to with money and the desire to leave for the winter- hard to make a living at with all of the retirees/students pushing down wages due to starvation.
I still have some family interests up there so I go up a couple of times a year- blech in terms of profits at times.
this all reminds me of some thing i heard or read or imagined one time where this quant said he didn't like working in the mortgage group because the models are so inelegant compared to other bonds. he called mortgages "hideously complex" to value. then this trader guy says that means there's more advantage to being smarter than everyone else.
anhow i'm not saying LEVELS isn't useful but i am saying mortgage valuation models can still be better...deterministic models...sigh...
anyway Tanta i will share my whiskey with you even though i don't know what a snort is and i suspect u are being sneaky and will kill the bottle...it just ain't a party 'til the ubernerds show up...
U guys need to remember the bigger picture...
It's not just the models and the levels, but also the leverage and the fraud. When we're not as smart as we think we are, when we're brutally dishonest with each other and when -15% = -150%... joo gotta pro-lem baby.
Excessive leverage especially, is the hauntingly similar to 1929. Well above the others, which have been more or less contant over time.
Levers can be explosive when they getted cranked too hard.
I'n sorry - this is a very elementary question. If I understand tit correctly, lenders are not able to keep any proceeds from a REO sale in excess of the money owed on the note. My question is: what expenses (e.g. agent fees, make-readies) can be paid before the proceeds count toward the money owed, and may the lender also recover delinquent interest or any other copntractual obligations (like prepayment penalties)?
Any economist here?
http://chevallier.turgot.org/a633-The_variations_of_the_monetary_aggregates_are_only_and_single_reliable_indicators_of_the_economic_activity_.html
This guy is predicting a 2nd Q US GDP to be 0% and 1.26% YOY, based on the chnages in monetary aggregates, M2-M1 etc.
Anyone care to comment about the soundness of his methodology?
another sign of market top?
A new way to tap equity without going into debt - Homeowners can sell a share of future appreciation
Tanta,
This article shows that as UK homes move towards foreclosure, the banks are agreeing to buy back the homes for a low price and rent them to the previous "owners" so that they don't have to move. Can this be done in the US? I would have expected laws against it as it is easy for the banking system to goose up prices and it would be advantage to do so and then rent back. What is the law here. How can it be capitalism if they don't have to sell at market prices and can instead hold up the market by hanging onto the homes? Where did mark to market go?
Central banks take aim at inflation in Europe - The New York Times
This is the glitch in the model, an unraveling. Unless someone knows how to get people to buy a couple of million excess units without their prices being cut dramatically (40-50%) to an "affordable" or rental equivalent level, it just doesn't seem logical that there won't be a significant (25%?) decline in the "real" value of these securities over the next year or so.
jag
Jag makes a great point!
Anonymous | 07.06.07 - 10:56 pm | was 'me'.
Jim that takes the cake... from the link:
Bill and Elaine Nolan paid top dollar when they bought their Tiburon house a few years ago at the height of real estate frenzy. Now, of course, the market is cooling rapidly.
So Bill Nolan, who deals with money all day long as a partner in an investment management firm, wanted to diversify. He turned to a startup based on a new concept: Let homeowners tap their equity without taking on debt.
Nolan contracted with Rex & Co. to receive $100,000 cash in exchange for a 10 percent stake of the home's future appreciation. When the Nolans sell their home, they'll pay Rex the $100,000 plus 10 percent of their home's appreciation above its current value of $2 million....
So while at times it might be too early to start drinking... it appears for some its never too early to be drinking bong water.
are home sales a top line item when figuring GDP?
so if were 1mm lite over ttm,@ an avg of 220k, or 220 billion, that being 5% of current gdp... then ?
Great information for a rube like me, thanks!
Thanks
Tanta, another question/comment. How much of the lingering REO overhang is due to lender consciously not wanting to take losses/attempting to time or spread out their sales versus we've got two people working in that section and now they're swamped by the unexpected workload. Of course explaing to those in charge that they need to hire more people so that they can realize losses faster at exactly the same time the the gravy train has derailed would be a fun task. NOT.
Regarding remittances to Mexico, it's a wildly noisy data set
DATE \t total amt .. avg.
........(in mmm)
Jan 2006\t1,581.97\t336.66
Feb 2006\t1,650.59\t346.19
Mar 2006\t1,951.91\t354.46
Apr 2006\t1,844.73\t355.01
May 2006\t2,295.24\t350.38
Jun 2006\t2,100.51\t360.40
Jul 2006\t1,967.59\t352.49
Aug 2006\t2,117.54\t359.05
Sep 2006\t1,932.97\t351.57
Oct 2006\t2,077.29\t347.42
Nov 2006\t1,775.57\t349.40
Dec 2006\t1,757.84\t334.49
Jan 2007\t1,714.18\t339.40
Feb 2007\t1,682.26\t345.56
Mar 2007\t1,963.51\t355.62
Apr 2007\t1,950.14\t352.02
May 2007\t2,169.84\t341.80
I just wanted to thank everybody for their comments on Northern Arizona.
I would also urge to reconsider the bearish stance.
Thanks, Joe
Tanta et al,
What are the chances that there are any numbers somewhere covering foreclosures owned by third party servicers as opposed to owned by lenders?
I would also urge to reconsider the bearish stance.
Most data suggests that the economy is dancing on a knife edge as is, and all that it would need is an exogenous shock (like a housing implosion due to ARM resets and a subsequent credit crunch) to send it off the edge.
Retail is negative in real terms, GDP is in the ballpark as well, the yield curve is a week away from inverting if the hedgies didn't have to liquidate, employment is flat ex B/D model
Is that bearish or an honest assessment of the situation? I see a lot more downside risk than upside potential at this point, the inverse of the 90's
Thanks for the detailed analysis. One number in your example got me flustered was the expected loss as percentage of original pool. Am I right in assuming that you came up 5.25% by adding 0.77% (losses already incurred) to 0.63*7.1% (losses in the current pool scaled up to original pool balance)?
thanks,
David
short sale me with a Florida short sale and foreclosure will not happen. This Florida short sale must bankruptc Florida.