I think if you drop the paid-off part of the chart you'll find that:
The 2006 reset vintage 50% defaulted, 50% current
The 2007 reset vintage is 28% default, 72% current
This is March status. I assume that the majority defaulted after reset, not before. Well, at THAT rate probably 80% will default by the end of the year
3. This is March status. I assume that the majority defaulted after reset, not before. Well, at THAT rate probably 80% will default by the end of the year
I wouldn't assume that; there's no reason to. Just take the 7% in FC/REO: those have been delinquent for at least 90 days as of March; you don't miss a payment in January and end up REO in March.
It's highly likely that a lot of those loans started missing payments almost immediately; remember all the EPDs?
I also don't think it helps to think in terms of "dropping" the payoffs. The 2/28 product was designed to mostly pay off in 2 years, and lo and behold, it did. Until the refi opportunities went away, as they will when the rate cycle goes away from you.
But you have to remember that any significantly aged vintage will end up looking like that 2006-reset pie. The issue is not that the vintages prepay; they all do. The issue is how fast (or how slow).
Part of the problem is that you can't unmix a cake. You can't differentiate between sub-prime, alt, and arm, hybrid, & I/O, so the conclusions drawn have to strictly limited. It would also be good to see a look at the 2006 vintage at the same phase as the 2007 chart.
It don't bode well, but that's not exactly hot news.
Lama, these charts are based on status as of the end of the first quarter of 2007.
Remember that what you are seeing is that 37% of 2/28s that were originated in very late 2004-very late 2005 have paid off by the end of the first quarter of 2007. In other words, the importance of 2007 is that this is the calendar year in which those loans have their scheduled first payment reset. So, 2/28 loans that had an actual first payment reset in Q107 had a first payment date of 1/05, 2/05, or 3/05 (and closing date of somewhere around 11/04-2/05). Those loans could have refinanced at any time from the beginning of 2005 until March of 2007. The issue, I think, is that if that 45% of "current" loans hadn't refi'd by 3/07, they're likely to have a hard time refinancing ahead of their 2007 reset, since between tightening guidelines and rising rates, they're no longer "in the money." The implication is that a big chunk of the 2005 originations "missed the boat." Since 75% of these loans hadn't reset as of the report date, you can conclude that defaults have nowhere to go but up.
it's amazing that even in 2006 24% can't refi. With rising interest rate I guess more and more people won't be able to refi this year or in the near future. I don't know what is the appropriate percentage, but it will probably be more than 63%. If we use the breakdown of 2006's #, around 30% will be in the status of deliquent/foreclosure/REO. I am sure this is a very conservative one.
p.s since we are just in Jun, out of 45% current, some may reset in the next few months. Some will be able to refi.
Well, bear in mind that these two vintages are probably accounting for the lion's share of the modifications that have been causing so much uproar lately. A modification is never counted as a payoff, and once payments resume it is not reported as delinquent. It's quite possible that a more or less significant slice of these "current" loans in either vintage are modifications (that have not yet redefaulted).
ac: It has occured to me that the reason that we've seen the M3 explode while the CPI has stayed tame is that all that money has simply flowed into assests that can be used as collateral for further borrowing. It hasn't been invested in plant or productivity improvements. It hasn't been added to wages and prices of consumable consumer goods. It's been on Wall Street bidding up stock price and Main Street bidding up RE prices. To what extant we can blame the FED or the BOJ is an exercise left to the reader.
missplaced modifier:
"I'm not, frankly, sure why..."
"miss"placed...because a woman misplaced it.
I think if you drop the paid-off part of the chart you'll find that:
I can put adverbial absolutes anywhere I want, enclosed by as many parenthetical commas as I can stand.
All I have to do is declare "frankly" to be an absolute.
Hopefully, this has cleared up the problem.
3. This is March status. I assume that the majority defaulted after reset, not before. Well, at THAT rate probably 80% will default by the end of the year
I wouldn't assume that; there's no reason to. Just take the 7% in FC/REO: those have been delinquent for at least 90 days as of March; you don't miss a payment in January and end up REO in March.
It's highly likely that a lot of those loans started missing payments almost immediately; remember all the EPDs?
I also don't think it helps to think in terms of "dropping" the payoffs. The 2/28 product was designed to mostly pay off in 2 years, and lo and behold, it did. Until the refi opportunities went away, as they will when the rate cycle goes away from you.
But you have to remember that any significantly aged vintage will end up looking like that 2006-reset pie. The issue is not that the vintages prepay; they all do. The issue is how fast (or how slow).
Tanta,
Is the 37% 2007 vs the 75% 2006 "Paid off", as well as the "Current" loans difference largely due to 2007 being half over?
28
Part of the problem is that you can't unmix a cake. You can't differentiate between sub-prime, alt, and arm, hybrid, & I/O, so the conclusions drawn have to strictly limited. It would also be good to see a look at the 2006 vintage at the same phase as the 2007 chart.
It don't bode well, but that's not exactly hot news.
Lama, these charts are based on status as of the end of the first quarter of 2007.
Remember that what you are seeing is that 37% of 2/28s that were originated in very late 2004-very late 2005 have paid off by the end of the first quarter of 2007. In other words, the importance of 2007 is that this is the calendar year in which those loans have their scheduled first payment reset. So, 2/28 loans that had an actual first payment reset in Q107 had a first payment date of 1/05, 2/05, or 3/05 (and closing date of somewhere around 11/04-2/05). Those loans could have refinanced at any time from the beginning of 2005 until March of 2007. The issue, I think, is that if that 45% of "current" loans hadn't refi'd by 3/07, they're likely to have a hard time refinancing ahead of their 2007 reset, since between tightening guidelines and rising rates, they're no longer "in the money." The implication is that a big chunk of the 2005 originations "missed the boat." Since 75% of these loans hadn't reset as of the report date, you can conclude that defaults have nowhere to go but up.
it's amazing that even in 2006 24% can't refi. With rising interest rate I guess more and more people won't be able to refi this year or in the near future. I don't know what is the appropriate percentage, but it will probably be more than 63%. If we use the breakdown of 2006's #, around 30% will be in the status of deliquent/foreclosure/REO. I am sure this is a very conservative one.
p.s since we are just in Jun, out of 45% current, some may reset in the next few months. Some will be able to refi.
Well, bear in mind that these two vintages are probably accounting for the lion's share of the modifications that have been causing so much uproar lately. A modification is never counted as a payoff, and once payments resume it is not reported as delinquent. It's quite possible that a more or less significant slice of these "current" loans in either vintage are modifications (that have not yet redefaulted).
28
Graphs. We need graphs, Steve. That's how we communicate around here.
That's why CR is the Man.
28 (.xls format)
Better?
28, in my blog:
NAHB index and recessions « The Theroxylandr in Flame
28 (.xls format)
LOL! Much! Nicely done.
28 (.xls format)
Nice. Good job.
Well, that file was from the NAHB website, but I'll take the credit for linking it.
Nice image of the Corporate Credit Bubble, the other dark mountain looming on the horizon.
Make sure that your 401k plan does not contain any "high yield bonds"
From Bersons Weekly Commentary:
(quote)
This will be an important week for housing data, highlighted by the NAHB housing market index on Monday and housing starts on Tuesday.
On Monday the NAHB housing market index for June is expected to hold steady at 30....
(end quote)
One expectation disappointed.
...the other dark mountain looming on the horizon.
BTW I meant to say "dark cloud". I don't know what I was thinking. I hope nobody feels misled.
I'd like to see a Markov Chain analysis of the flows, or at the least a plain vanilla roll-rate analysis. The graphs leave too much out, as is.
BG, I've seen some recent roll-rate and payment velocity stuff on the 2/28s that's pretty scary. It's also 1) not on the web and 2) not free.
I'm trying to keep my eye out for anything like that to become web-available.
ac: It has occured to me that the reason that we've seen the M3 explode while the CPI has stayed tame is that all that money has simply flowed into assests that can be used as collateral for further borrowing. It hasn't been invested in plant or productivity improvements. It hasn't been added to wages and prices of consumable consumer goods. It's been on Wall Street bidding up stock price and Main Street bidding up RE prices. To what extant we can blame the FED or the BOJ is an exercise left to the reader.