Wells Fargo and Subprime Loans

In other words:

WELLS FARGO: We're not part of the problem.

Important if true.

I don't think WF has any better quality sub-prime borrower than the remainder of the market. Who approved the mortgages, WF or the underlying investment banks? Who reviewed the borrowers asset and income claims and deemed the credit-worthy? There is where the lawsuit begins.

Might be neat to see a longer trend. Was that 52% increase Q/Q that CitiMortgage had after a large decrease the previous quarter or have they been ramping up for a long time now? Hmm

sketchy, last year Tanta and I (and others) were trying to figure out who was going to be left holding the bag. It was unclear. Obviously HSBC has come clean, but I wonder who these investment banks are that originate and underwrite these loans. Someone is going to lose some serious money.

Best Wishes.

This does sound like Wells Fargo may be the largest sub-prime lender with the best PR department, but I'd like to hear from it's co-venturing partners , the investment banks that enjoy working with Wells Fargo because ...of better pricing due to its strong credit rating.
See, I'm not sure that the co-issuing, co-originating investment banks see it this way: "All underwriting risk is with the investment banks."
Just doesn't sound like the remark of a friendly co-operating relationship with a partner.
Ok, that and the translation:
"Hey, we are the biggest subprime lender in the market, but there is no risk to our business, due to us passing it all onto our investment banks. And that's why we need to make this statement now: pull your dough outa those investment banks before you get hammered."

Two bits of news:

Second Curve Capital run by a former bank analyst (and well regarded) takes a 8.5% stake in LEND

and a significant "whoops" from AMC. Now about those condo conversion loans on FMT's books (with heavy exposure to FL), hmmm:

"NEW YORK--(BUSINESS WIRE)--February 16, 2007
American Mortgage Acceptance Company ("AMAC" or the "Company")
(AMEX:AMC) today announced that the Company revised its Adjusted Funds
from Operations ("AFFO") per share guidance for 2006 to a range of
$1.08 to $1.13. AMAC previously issued AFFO per share guidance in a
range of $3.00 to $3.20.

"The reduction in AMAC's expected 2006 AFFO per share is primarily
due to write downs of $12.0 million in principal and the reversal of
$908,000 in accrued interest relating to three non-performing
mezzanine loans in the Company's investment portfolio," said J. Larry
Duggins, Chief Executive Officer of AMAC....These mezzanine loans, which
were originated in 2005 in connection with two separate condominium
conversion transactions in the Tampa, Florida area and a land
development transaction in Somerset County, New Jersey, have a
different risk profile associated with them as compared to the loans
we are currently originating. We expect to release our fourth quarter
and year-end 2006 financial results on March 20, 2007, at which time
we will hold a conference call to discuss our results in detail."

Form 1099

AMAC will need to reissue the Form 1099 to common shareholders for
the 2006 tax year. The Company expects to release the revised Form
1099s to common shareholders on or about the first week of March 2007."

Pretty early in the blame game for WF to be telling their valued partner that they got punked.

Wells Fargo is -allowed- to -sell- their credit rating to less creditworthy organizations with no consequences? OMG it is worse than I thought.

Brian,

Didn't you post the short idea being peddled on Bear Stearns and Lehman (based on their subprime exposure)?

Any link to WF?

Wells Fargo does not buy brokered subprime...maybe true, but they originate brokered subprime. Slight difference I know, but not that much of a difference. They are dancing around the questions.

Darn Brian, you beat me to the punch on that AMC news. Here's something I posted a few minutes ago ...

Just something I came across late today -- American Mortgage Acceptance Co. announced a big financial whacking late today. The problem: $12 million in writedowns of principal and the reversal of $908,000 in accrued interest related to non-performing mezzanine loans. They were written in 2005 to finance two condo conversion projects in Tampa, FL and a real estate development transaction in New Jersey.

The stock was recently down more than $3.50, or 20.5%, due to the late afternoon announcement.

You may recall another lender active in FL, Coast Financial Holdings, has gotten into real trouble thanks to problems with construction lending. Specifically, according to this St. Petersburg Times story ...

"Coast Financial Holdings is finishing a turbulent three weeks in which it transformed from a fast-expanding community bank to a candidate for acquisition under scrutiny of state and federal regulators.

"The source of recent troubles was 482 loans for customers of St. Petersburg builder Construction Compliance Inc. CCI ran out of money last fall while building investment homes in the city of North Port in Sarasota County.

"CCI tapped about $70-million in construction loans from Coast but left customers with unpaid debts on vacant lots and unfinished houses. To the detriment of Coast, many customers vow to walk away from the deals, accusing Coast of failing to monitor and correct CCI's slide into insolvency."

These are just a few isolated incidents, of course. But they do show that loan losses related to the housing bubble/bust won't just be confined to losses on individual, subprime mortgages. Condo conversion loans ... lot purchase loans ... construction loans -- several of them could cause problems in the months and quarters ahead.

Merrill Lynch's actions in regard to margin calls on its mortgage banking clients had many executives talking this past week. Merrill's latest victim of buyback requests is California wholesaler ResMAE, a company founded six years ago by former Long Beach Mortgage chief Jack Mayesh. Does Merrill have the right to ask mortgage bankers to repurchase loans if they go bad in the first 90 days? Of course it does. But in its bankruptcy filing ResMAE claims that $308 million in buybacks that Merrill forced upon the company were not even delinquent! That's what the document says. ResMAE charges the loans "were current despite" being what it calls "technical" early payment defaults. ResMAE also says that Merrill thinks it has the right to put loans back to the company for an "unlimited" period of time. Merrill would not comment.

The investment banks like WFC being the servicer because its strong credit rating provides better pricing when these loans are securitized and sold.

Well, yes, they sure do.

Now, you ask yourself, why does the loan servicer's credit rating matter so much? I mean, the servicer is just the party who processes payments and makes collection calls and handles foreclosures, right? For which the servicer gets paid by the excess interest?

Anybody want to bet me that the "co-issue" master agreement requires WF to advance scheduled interest on delinquent loans until they officially go "non-accrual"? That it lets WF eat it if collections, loss mitigation, and foreclosure costs exceed what everybody predicted when they set the servicing compensation?

Look, there's substantially less risk in being the servicer than there is in being the investor. But "less risk" isn't "no risk."

I'm also a little puzzled by the relationship between the first sentence of the last paragraph CR quoted and the rest of the paragraph. Anyone else see a quick change of subject from "subprime mortgage loans" to "real estate secured portfolio"?

"WELLS FARGO: We're not part of the problem. "

Wells Fargo is a very conservatively run bank. Look at their loss reserves... double what any similarly sized competitor would do.

Now the fact that Wells Fargo was making a buck off of loaning out the credibility of their AAA bond rating doesn't surprise me.

Its that they aren't the bagholder. Someone else is. That's what they care about. Its also why they are the last AAA rated bank the USA.

"Look, there's substantially less risk in being the servicer than there is in being the investor. But "less risk" isn't "no risk.""

True. The difference is, Wells Fargo can accept (IIRC) $14 billion in losses before they run out of loss reserves. They're also making $2billion/quarter. While that will drop (and some of that is neg-am equity), They'll be fine. Yes, their bond rating might be put at risk and their profits will be put at risk too. But not their viability as a bank.

You do know that they have $17 billion in free cash sitting around waiting for the right bid?

I do expect them to take a loss over sub-primes. But excluding WFB, Citibank, and HSBC; who else on that list is ready to take a big hit? Answer: none of them.

Got popcorn?
Neil

Neil, I agree that Wells is hardly likely to go down any time soon.

I am also amused as all get-out that they feel obligated to announce loudly in public that they do not beat their spouse.

Apparantly the Staten Island land fill has been re-opened, but it's now being used as a dumping ground for toxic mortgage securities instead. I mean nobody has any on their balance sheets right, so they must be just been buried somewhere? Investment banks won't be holding much of this crap directly, but I'm sure they've been kind enough to stuff dumpster loads of it into the various high yield funds they manage. I would also hazard a guess that there will be somewhat fewer than 10,000 hedge funds in the world by the end of 07. Also, and not to ruin anyone's w/e, but I'd go have a careful read of the holdings of your plain vanilla bond, mortgage and money market funds - I think you'll be shocked by the extent of their not so risk-free holdings. I know I was when I had a good look at my supposedly prime money market fund about a year ago, and started really digging from there.

But enough of that. I learn a lot from all the comments posted here, so a great long w/e to all.

Finally, Wells Fargo Financial does not originate option ARMs, interest-only products, low/no doc loans and requires mortgage insurance for high LTV loans.

So.... would this indicate that certain types of loan programs, are becoming a hot question nowadays?

Funny, to see Wells itching to send the hounds looking elsewhere for these bones.

"but I wonder who these investment banks are that originate and underwrite these loans. Someone is going to lose some serious money."

They have no skin in the game.

Take a look at this:

Mortgage Grapevine: ********** $700,000 Loan in CA **********

The money is still out there...

70% LTV based on what value ? Value from when ?

And here is another example:

Mortgage Grapevine: CA, $513,000, 736 FICO, 90% LTV, Refinance, SF, stated, OO

This one had a loan 9 month ago (took out cash in a refinance) Now he/she needs cash again and there are banks happy to give them a rebate of 2.75% (about 14K cash) and an introductory rate of 1.75% on 80% + 8.875% on 10% This means that the loan broker come back and says:

"I got a loan for you. Your new monthly payment is $748(1st) + $379(2nd) total is $1127 and you get the $14K cash back. Oh, BTW in 6 month (or whenever the start rate ends) your rate go to par + 3.575% "

Let's assume par is 5.25% so this loan goes to 8.825%. (if par is 6 the loan goes to 9.575%)

At that point the monthly payment (interest only, not even taking into account the negative amortization that was accumulated over the 6 month introductory period) is at least $3527+$379 = $3906. Since some payment must go to cover loan itself not just the interest the total monthly payment is north of $4000. (up nearly 4 times what he will paying now)

So the disaster for this customer is postponed by another 6 month (or to when ever the introductory rate continues – can it be 1 year or 3 years ?)

So as long as home prices goes up this whole thing will work and everyone makes money......

Tanta -

Echoing my thoughts exactly. If you'll recall, I called out Stumpf about a week ago for making similarly useless statements.

I'm confused about his first set of comments, not just his slick move from subprime financing into a discussion of secured loan portfolio mix (which has nothing to do with how they fund their subprime loans).

Help me out here: He says 72% of loans were "co-issue originations," and then follows that immediately by saying that the "co-issued loans" are originated entirely by investment banks. Which is it?

Either Wells is a just named servicer in these deals, or it is a co-issuer on a servicing-retained basis, right?

Am I missing something here? I vote that Stumpf still has no idea what he's talking about.

Since Merrill released a report last week that Wells Fargo was one of the companies most exposed to subprime, there seems to be a difference of opinion...

Wells Fargo Financial MAY NOT do interest only or low/no doc loans BUT Wells Fargo Home Mortgage does.

Both Borrowers and Lenders share culpability here - and if you really want to do some research - you will see that the makeup of the loans in foreclosure has heavy concentrations of investment properties from people trying to make a quick buck - and just choosing to walk away when they were unable to make that quick buck...

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